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2Abstract
In the 1990s, the relationship between trade liberalisation and environmental protection 
was widely discussed in several fora around the world. At the 1992 Earth Summit, it 
was acknowledged that, in order to achieve the long-term goal o f sustainable 
development, trade liberalisation and environmental protection should be made mutually 
supportive. However, integrating trade and environment paradigms is an arduous task. 
Conflicts have already manifested themselves, leading to trade and environment 
disputes. These disputes often arise because one party uses trade measures, sometimes 
— with a protectionist intent, to pursue its environmental goals. Unless settled in a 
balanced fashion, these disputes will prolong the trade and environment tension. As a 
result, both economic and ecological interests would be impaired.
This thesis has set out to assess the potential of the dispute resolution 
mechanism of the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) - the Dispute Mediation 
Service (DMS) - for resolving trade and environment disputes between APEC members 
in the balanced fashion. It was found that while the quasi-judicial dispute resolution 
j  ^  mechanism of the World Trade Organization has often been used for resolving trade and
u /' j , , ** environment disputes, it could be argued that APEC could potentially succeed in
y  /  resolving such disputes while maintaining the trade-environment equilibrium by using
^  i ^  •  •the mediation technique. Two main factors have made this possible: APEC’s distinctive
'Vs . ' '  • 1 features and the unique characteristics of trade and environment disputes themselves. It
X ) i*t was also found in this thesis that the APEC’s DMS would be particularly useful when
p
used as a dispute avoidance mechanism, preventing a conflict from escalating into a full 
blown dispute.
Despite its promising future, the present form of the APEC’s DMS could be 
further improved with a view to enhancing its potential for resolving trade and 
environment disputes in the balanced fashion if  some recommendations, developed 
along the line of the North American Free Trade Agreement model, could be 
implemented.
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Chapter 1 
Introduction
In the 20 century, trade liberalisation and environmental protection were two of the key 
issues discussed at several international fora. The recognition of the impact of trade 
liberalisation on the national economy and on the world economic welfare had led many 
governments towards the creation of a number of bilateral, regional and global trade 
agreements. The most significant agreement governing the process of trade 
liberalisation is the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), created in 1947. 
The main aim of GATT was to promote of world-wide trade liberalisation by reducing, 
and eventually eliminating, trade barriers in the form of tariffs.
Since the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment, held in 
Stockholm in 1972, an awareness of environmental protection has been heightened. 
This event had triggered off the formulation of a string of national and international 
environmental activities, resulting in the drafting of many domestic and multilateral 
environmental agreements in order to improve environmental management at all levels.
Although trade liberalisation and environmental protection seem to operate in 
isolation from one another, the interface between these two regimes has gradually been 
acknowledged. In the 1990s, the relationship between trade liberalisation and 
environmental protection was discussed around the world. At the United Nations 
Conference on Environment and Development held in Rio de Janeiro - the 1992 Earth 
Summit - it was acknowledged that, in order to achieve the long-term goal of 
sustainable development, trade liberalisation and environmental protection should be 
made mutually supportive. But this is a difficult task. Differences between the trade 
and environment paradigms, particularly the use of trade measures to encourage 
compliance with environmental policies, have already caused tension between the trade 
and environmental communities. More often than not, such a tension has escalated into 
a trade and environment dispute. This kind of dispute must be resolved in the balanced 
fashion so that both trade liberalisation and environmental protection could continue 
without impairing one another.
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1.1. The Scope and Objective of the Thesis
In the light of the growing concerns about the increase in trade and environment 
disputes around the world and the fear that trade-environment interface will continue to 
cause conflicts between trade and environmental communities, this thesis sets out on a 
quest to explore the potential of the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) to 
resolve trade and environment disputes in the balanced fashion via its dispute resolution 
mechanism - the Dispute Mediation Service (DMS).
This study will attempt to establish that the APEC’s DMS could indeed be used 
as an alternative to the dispute settlement mechanism of the World Trade Organization 
(WTO) for resolving trade and environment disputes (in the realm of trade in goods) 
between APEC members in the balanced manner, such that the process of trade 
liberalisation and environmental protection are not made subordinate, or act as an 
impediment, to each other.
1.2. The Structure of the Thesis
This thesis is divided into seven chapters. In Chapter 1, a general overview of the thesis 
is provided, which includes discussions on the scope, objective, structure and 
methodology of this study. Chapter 2 will give a brief overview of the trade and 
environment disputes which will provide a necessary foundation for discussions in later 
chapters. Issues which will be discussed in this chapter include: some positive and 
negative aspects of the trade and environment nexus; the use of trade measures for 
environmental purposes and their implications; and how might the trade and 
environment disputes be resolved.
Chapter 3 will provide an analysis on trade and environment dispute resolution 
from the perspective of the WTO. This chapter is primarily intended to show how trade 
and environment disputes have been resolved by the world’s most important trade 
institution. In doing so, it will highlight the drawbacks of the WTO’s predecessor, i.e. 
the GATT of 1947, in resolving trade and environment disputes. Then, some recent 
decisions given by the WTO’s dispute settlement organs will be reviewed in order to
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show whether or not the drawbacks of the GATT’s trade and environment dispute 
settlement process have been ameliorated by the dispute settlement system of the WTO.
Chapter 4 will be devoted to discussions on APEC. The objective of this chapter 
is to provide a general introduction to APEC, its institutional arrangement and activities 
in the areas of trade liberalisation and environmental protection. APEC’s dispute 
resolution mechanism - the DMS - will be examined in Chapter 5. This chapter will 
give an explanation why mediation, rather than other methods of dispute resolution, has 
been adopted by APEC. It will also provide a detailed analysis of the mediation 
technique of dispute resolution. It will then proceed to examine whether trade and 
environment disputes among APEC members could be resolved in the balanced fashion 
by the APEC’s DMS.
Chapter 6 will explore if the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) 
could provide a model for APEC with regard to trade and environment dispute 
resolution. NAFTA has been chosen because it has been regarded as one of the most 
environmentally friendly regional trade agreements in the modem era. It also contains 
some interesting elements which could help promote the balance in the trade and 
environment dispute resolution process.
The concluding chapter of this thesis, Chapter 7, will give a synopsis of the 
findings of this study as well as recommendations of some necessary changes which will 
further enhance the potential of the DMS for resolving trade and environment disputes 
between APEC members in the balanced manner. Areas of further research will also be 
identified at the end of this chapter.
1.3. The Methodology
The methodology used in this thesis is largely based on a review of relevant literature in 
the field of trade and environment, which includes a selection of legal texts, cases, 
international treaties, international documents, articles, comments of various authors 
and newspapers. Some interviews with government delegates to international meetings, 
symposiums and conferences, particularly those related to APEC, were also conducted. 
However, it must be mentioned that within the purview of this thesis it is not possible,
21
time wise and financially, to study each member economy of APEC individually. Thus, 
this thesis will only reflect the viewpoint from the regional perspective. In addition, 
because the subjects of trade liberalisation, environmental protection and APEC develop 
continuously, the majority of resources utilised in this thesis are restricted up to the end 
of 1998. However, some 1999 materials are consulted where directly relevant.
On the whole, this thesis endeavours to contribute towards the ongoing debate 
on the subject of trade and environment which continues to be one of the most important 
issues for international discussion for years to come. It will complement and contribute 
to amplifying the literature in the field of trade and environment, which is heavily 
dominated by studies from the perspectives of GATT/WTO, NAFTA and the European 
Union, by providing discussions on the regional approach in resolving trade and 
environment disputes specifically from the Asia-Pacific’s dimension.
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Chapter 2
Trade and Environment Disputes: An Overview
tViIn the 20 century, trade liberalisation and environmental protection were two of the 
most important issues discussed world-wide. They were products of the two 
internationally significant developments which have become prominent over the years: 
the trade liberalisation process under the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 
(GATT) of 1947 and the environmental movement initiated by the United Nations 
Conference on the Human Environment (UNCHE) held in 1972 in Stockholm. 
Although the relationship between trade and environment is by no means novel, it was 
not until the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED) 
held in Rio de Janeiro - the 1992 Earth Summit - that trade and environment linkages 
were seriously discussed. In particular, Principle 12 of the Rio Declaration on 
Environment and Development (the Rio Declaration)1 has called for a corroboration 
between trade and environment regimes in seeking for the long-term goal of sustainable 
development.2
1 UN Doc. A/CONF. 151/5/Rev. 1, 13 June 1992; reprinted in 31 ILM  (1992) 874. Principle 12 of the 
Rio Declaration states:
States should cooperate to promote a supportive and open international economic 
system that would lead to economic growth and sustainable development in all 
countries, to better address the problems of environmental degradation. Trade policy 
measures for environmental purposes should not constitute a means of arbitrary or 
unjustifiable discrimination or a disguised restriction on international trade. Unilateral 
action to deal with environmental challenges outside the jurisdiction o f the importing 
country should be avoided. Environmental measures addressing transboundary or 
global environmental problems should, as far as possible, be based on an international 
consensus.
For a general overview o f the Rio Declaration, see Ileana M. Porras, ‘The Rio Declaration: A New Basis 
for International Cooperation’, in Philippe Sands, ed., Greening International Law, (London: Earthscan, 
1993), 20-33 (arguing that the Rio Declaration is likely to influence the future development of 
environmental and developmental law and practice in the future). The Rio Declaration is one of the five 
important legal instruments produced at the Rio Earth Summit. The other four instruments are: the United 
Nations Convention on Biological Diversity; the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate 
Change; the Statement o f Principles for a Global Consensus on the Management, Conservation and 
Sustainable Development of All Types of Forests; and Agenda 21.
2 The definition o f “sustainable development” was given by the World Commission on Environment and 
Development (WCED) as “a development which meets the need o f the present without compromising the 
ability of the future generation to meet their own needs”. WCED, Our Common Future, (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1987), at 43.
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As a result, the study of trade and environment has been conducted by several 
institutions around the world, for example the Organization for Economic Cooperation 
and Development (OECD),3 the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP),4 the 
United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD),5 the United 
Nations Commission on Sustainable Development (UNCSD), and the Committee on 
Trade and Environment (CTE) of the World Trade Organization (WTO).6 Not only 
have these international organisations seriously paid attention to the issue of trade and 
environment, a number of regional initiatives have also been commissioned to deal with 
this issue, especially under the auspices of the European Union (EU) and the North 
American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). Recently, with large contribution from 
academics and non-governmental organisations (NGOs) the literature in the field of 
trade and environment has dramatically been amplified.
3 The OECD was the first international organisation to examine trade and environment issues. With its 
establishment in 1991 of the Joint Session o f Trade and Environment Experts, jointly sponsored by the 
Trade Committee and the Environment Policy Committee, the OECD aimed to “contribute to the 
achievement of sustainable development by addressing trade and environment issues with a view to 
promoting the compatibility and mutual reinforcement o f trade and environmental policies in practice”. 
Up to date, the OECD has regularly conducted a number o f analytical works toward clarification of the 
main differences between trade and environmental policies. See OECD, Report on Trade and 
Environment to the OECD Council at Ministerial Level, OECD Working Papers, vol. Ill, no. 47, (Paris: 
OECD, 1995).
4 UNEP has undertaken extensive studies on the trade and environment relationship. In particular, 
UNEP has focused its work, inter alia, on the use of trade restrictive measures to reinforce environmental 
protection regionally and globally.
5 UNCTAD has already established an Ad Hoc Working Group on Trade, Environment and 
Development to conduct an examination o f impacts of environmental measures on trade in developing 
countries. See for more details o f UNCTAD’s work in UNCTAD Secretariat, UNCTAD Environment 
Report, Note Prepared for the Third Session of the United Nations Commission on Sustainable 
Development, 11-28 April 1995, available on the internet at: http://www.unicc.org./unctad/en/ 
pressref7itdtael.htm. In addition, UNCTAD and UNEP have jointly organised several meetings in 
relation to the linkages between trade, environment and development. For instance, a series of seminars 
on trade and environment was organised in various capitals o f the Association o f South-East Asian 
Nations (ASEAN) under the sponsorship of UNCTAD in 1995. See ASEAN Secretariat, Trade and 
Environment: Issues and Opportunities, ASEAN Workshop Report, (Jakarta: ASEAN Secretariat, 1995). 
Trade and environment seminars have been organised in Manila, Bangkok, Kuala Lumpur and Jakarta 
during 11-23 May 1995.
6 The work of the CTE will be discussed in Chapter 3.
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2.1. Trade and Environment Nexus
Due to the issues involved and the level of sensitivity around the subject, trade and 
environment linkages can prove to be extremely complex. The trade and environment 
nexus can be viewed from two perspectives: positive and negative.
2.1.1. The Positive Nexus
It is generally acknowledged that trade liberalisation can benefit environmental
n
protection in two ways. Firstly, trade liberalisation, according to an economic theory of 
comparative advantage, will result in an increase in specialisation in producing and
Q
manufacturing goods, both for domestic consumption and for export. In developing 
such specialisation, manufacturers may be able to develop more efficient and 
environmentally friendly production methods. Normally, it may be thought that 
environmentally friendly technology, i.e. “clean technology”, is more expensive than its 
counterpart, i.e. “dirty technology”. But when the producers are more specialised, they 
can produce more goods, which in turn will reduce the cost of clean technology per 
product. Hence, while being able to maintain an economy of scale, the manufacturer 
may also protect the environment at the same time.
Secondly, trade liberalisation will bring about an expansion of trade, removal of 
subsidies and pricing policies which are discriminatory and distortionary, and better 
resource allocation, hence an increase in economic growth.9 As one country can sell 
goods more easily in the freer trading environment, it will acquire more financial 
resources, which in turn can be used to invest in promoting environmental protection. 
This can be done in a variety of ways, such as promoting environmental education,
7 See OECD, Report on Trade and Environment, op. cit., at 5. Also see John. H. Jackson, ‘World 
Trade Rules and Environmental Policies: Congruence or Conflict?’, 49(4) Washington and Lee Law 
Review (1992) 1219, at 1228; The House o f Commons Environment Committee, World Trade and the 
Environment, Environment Committee Fourth Report, Session 1995-1996, vol. 1, (London: HMSO, 
1996), xii-xiii.
8 See for a general discussion o f the theory o f comparative advantage in John H. Jackson, ‘The Policies 
and Realities of International Economic Regulation’, in The World Trading System: Law and Policy of 
International Economic Relations, 2nd edition, (Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press, 1997), 1-30, 
at 14-19.
9 Duncan Brack, Trade and Environment: An Update on the Issues, Briefing Paper No. 35, February 
1997, (London: The Royal Institute o f International Affairs, 1997).
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enhancing cleaner technology, improving capacity building, and enforcing domestic and 
international environmental law. Moreover, since poverty in itself has been viewed as a 
kind of environmental problem, the relief of poverty through the provision of financial 
resources generated by trade expansion can indeed demonstrate that free trade can also 
indirectly help the protection of the environment.10
Although theoretically sound, an ideology that trade liberalisation can help 
promote environmental protection is somehow doubtful in reality. Resources generated 
from trade expansion and economic growth may not always be spent on efforts to 
protect the environment, especially in the developing countries whose priorities may lie 
in something other than environmental protection per se. However, a study by 
Grossman and Krueger, for example, has shown that it is not always the case that the 
poorer countries are not interested in protecting their environment. Their study of 
pollution levels and national wealth illustrates that once the poorer countries have 
reached the middle-income level (about $5,000 GDP per capita), they tend to invest 
more on pollution controls, hence reducing the emission level of sulphur dioxide.11 
Although this study was criticised by Pearson as narrowly limited to specific pollutants 
produced in the manufacturing process,12 Grossman and Krueger’s study is a valuable, 
although inconclusive, illustration of a trend which shows that once the poor countries 
have overcome the problem of providing for the basic needs for their people, they might 
re-prioritise their needs and place environmental protection higher in their agenda.
10 See WCED, Our Common Future, op. cit., at 28.
Environment stress has often been seen as the result o f the growing demand on scarce 
resources and the pollution generated by the rising living standards of the relatively 
affluent. But poverty itself, pollutes the environment, creating environmental stress in a 
different way. Those who are poor and hungry will often destroy their immediate 
environment in order to survive: They will cut down forests; their livestock will 
overgraze grasslands; they will overuse marginal land; and in growing numbers they will 
crowd into congested cities. The cumulative effect o f these changes is so far-reaching 
as to make poverty itself a major global scourge. (Emphasis added.)
11 Gene M. Grossman and Alan B. Kruger, ‘Environmental Impacts o f a North American Free Trade 
Agreement’, in Peter M. Garber, The Mexico-US Free Trade Agreement, (Cambridge, Massachusetts: The 
MIT Press, 1993).
12 Charles S. Pearson, ‘Trade and Environment’, in Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the 
Pacific (ESCAP), State o f  the Environment in Asia and the Pacific, (Bangkok: ESCAP, 1995), at 34.
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With regard to the benefits the environment generate for trade, it requires less 
explanation. Simply, most trade activities depend on the use of natural resources in one 
form or another. Industries such as logging, fishery and petroleum cannot continue their 
businesses without woods, fish and crude oil respectively. Thus, a careful management 
of environmental resources is necessary if economic activities and wealth generation are 
to be sustained.
2.1.2. The Negative Nexus
The prime argument in this respect is that trade expansion leads to over consumption of
natural resources, thereby exacerbating environmental degradation. Given the present
rate of economic growth and economic development, it has been noted that the
11ecosystem cannot possibly be sustained. The problem is even more acute in Southeast 
Asian countries, who view trade expansion as an engine of economic growth.14 
Southeast Asia possesses great wealth in environmental resources, but with its 
astonishing rate of economic growth over the past few decades, the amount of tropical 
rain forests, for example, has been devastatingly decreased in order to provide wood for 
logging industries. Moreover, reducing the amount of forestry resources arguably will 
also lead towards extinction of wildlife, soil erosion, flooding and many other 
environmental disasters.15
Trade could also damage the environment by encouraging poor environmental 
practice. As countries are trying to compete against one another in order to gain market 
share, they might attempt to reduce the cost of production so that their goods could be 
more competitively priced. It has often been argued that a country with low 
environmental standards could produce cheaper goods as little or no environmental cost 
is taken into account, hence no cost internalisation of environmental externalities. If the
13 Robert Housman and Durwood Zaelke, Trade, Environment, and Sustainable Development: A 
Primer’, 15(4) Hastings International and Comparative Law Review (1992) 535, at 536.
14 Sinion S.C. Tay, International Trade and the Environment in Asia: Business and Environmental 
Cooperation Across Regions, a monograph commissioned for the Asia Conference on Trade and 
Environment, June 1996, Singapore, (Singapore: Asia-Pacific Centre for Environmental Law, National 
University of Singapore, 1996), at 21.
15 For example, the Indonesian fire incident which destroyed a devastating amount o f trees and land in 
order to further an entrepreneurial fiscal greed. See Simon S.C. Tay, ‘ASEAN: the Haze, Economics and 
the Environment’, 2(2) Bridges (1998) 1.
environmental standards are set too stringently and would be expensive to implement, a 
company might consider relocating to another location where environmental regulation 
is more lax - a “pollution haven”.16 Another argument which flows from the pollution 
haven issue is that some countries might compete against one another to lower their 
environmental standards in order to attract more foreign direct investment, hence a
1 7“race-to-the-bottom”. The effect of such an action would be an opposite to what the 
1992 Earth Summit has called for and ultimately make sustainable development 
impossible to achieve.
Another concern about the negative impact of trade liberalisation on the 
environment is that freer trade will lead to more long-distance transportation of goods, 
as transborder movement of goods becomes much easier between members of free trade 
arrangements. This will not only elevate the level of noise pollution from constantly 
moving lorries, ships and aeroplanes, it will also increase the level of toxic emissions, 
notably carbon monoxide, from their exhausts. Moreover, the probability of accidents 
with environmental impact, such as collisions of freighters or oil tankers, could be
I f tincreased.
However, it is not only trade liberalisation which could have a negative impact 
on the environment. Up until now, environmental regulators have resorted to the 
utilisation of trade measures to enforce environmental protection. Despite the fact that 
the use of trade measures may lead towards higher environmental standards, hence stop 
the race-to-the-bottom problem, these trade measures could equally hinder the process
16 However, it should be noted that there has also been an argument against the fact that the company 
would relocate to a country where environmental regulation is less stringent as the environmental factor is 
not the only consideration for relocating. Other economic factors such as wage costs, the proximity to 
natural resources and markets, and the investment policy climate could have more influence on the 
decision to relocate. SELA Permanent Secretariat, ‘Trade, Environment and the Developing Countries’, 
Paper presented at the XVIII Regular Meeting o f  the Latin American Council held in Caracas, Venezuela 
on 7-11 September 1992 (SP/CL/XVIII.O/Di No. 2), in UNCTAD and SELA, Trade and Environment: 
The International D ebate , (Geneva: UNCTAD, 1993), 41-69, at51.
17 In recent years, a debate on whether the race-to-the-bottom is a legitimate concern has generated 
increased interest. However, in view o f Richard Ravesz, the race-to-the-bottom ideology has no basis in 
theory. In fact, he believes that diverse environmental standards will lead to an increase in social welfare. 
His justification is that the pressure put on governments to reduce environmental compliance costs will 
boost them to streamline their environmental regulations. Thus, it is unlikely that governments will pursue 
sub-optimal standards. Richard L. Ravesz, ‘Rehabilitating Interstate Competition: Rethinking o f the
x  “Race-to-the-Bottom”, 67 New York University Law Review  (1992) 1210. It is also worth noting that 
another commonly used terminology o f the “race-to-the-bottom” is the “race-toward-bottom” .
18 See Nisid Hajari, ‘Dark Cloud o f Death’, Time, 6 October 1997, 40.
of trade liberalisation. There are several forms of trade measures which have now been 
used to promote environmental protection, some of which have received more scrutiny 
from the trade community than others. These measures will be discussed below.
The main fear for traders is that the trade measures would be used too liberally 
and without a bona fide environmental justification. Consequently, it is believed that 
this will lead to the emergence of “eco-imperialism” or “green protectionism”. In other 
words, the trade measures would be used in this instance as a tool for economic 
protection of a domestic industry which, while being protected ostensibly for 
environmental reasons, does not achieve any environmental benefit.19 The problem of 
green protectionism particularly raises concerns for developing countries whose 
environmental standards tend to be different in form and in their implementation from 
those in the developed countries.
Another fear for traders is the problem of “eco-dumping”. The eco-dumping is 
caused by the fact that cheaper goods from the locations with low environmental cost 
are being sold in the markets of the countries whose environmental cost is relatively 
high, causing the market distortion in the importing countries. In contrast to the green 
protectionism problem, the eco-dumping controversy has caused more worries to the 
developed countries rather than the developing countries as their goods tend to be more 
expensive to make. For example, Mexico could produce much cheaper goods than the 
United States as the environmental practice of the former is less stringent than the latter. 
Due to the freer trade between these two countries, the Mexican goods could be sold 
more easily in the US market.20 As a result, the United States fears that its market 
would be “dumped” by cheaper and lower environmental quality goods from Mexico.
19 See, for a discussion on green protectionism, Charles Arden-Clarke, Green Protectionism: 
Differentiating Environmental Protection from  Trade Protectionism , a WW F International Discussion 
Paper, (Gland, Switzerland: WWF International, 1994).
20 The United States and Mexico have entered into some bilateral and multilateral trade agreements 
which enable the goods o f  these two countries to be exchanged more freely, for example GATT and the 
North American Free Trade Agreement.
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2.2. Trade-Related Environmental Measures
Trade related environmental measures, or as commonly referred to as “TREMs”, can be
defined as “measures whose justification is primarily the protection of the environment,
01but which take the form of trade instruments”. From this definition, it can also be 
argued that the suitable terminology for such measures should be “environment-related 
^ 17 trade measures” (ERTMs) rather than TREMs as the measure is trade oriented, not 
environmentally oriented. However, without an official terminology, the use of TREMs 
is more common than ERTMs and thus will be followed in this study.
2.2.1. Unilateral vs. Multilateral Trade Measures
There are two manners upon which TREMs are used. Firstly, TREMs may be used 
unilaterally and, secondly, TREMs may be used in pursuance to multilateral 
environmental agreements (MEAs). The former can be regarded as an expression of one 
country’s unilateral environmental policy, whereas the latter is the product of 
international co-operation.22
2.2.1.1. Unilateral Trade Measures
One country may use TREMs against an import of another country as authorised by its 
domestic law. An example is clearly provided in one infamous case under the GATT 
regime - the Tuna/Dolphin I case.23 In this case, the United States imposed a ban on 
tuna import from Mexico, as authorised by the Marine Mammal Protection Act 
(MMPA) of 1972, for the reason that the Mexican tuna were harvested by the purse- 
seine net fishing technique which resulted in the incidental killing of dolphins. It was 
found that the US measure in this instance was inconsistent with certain rules under 
GATT. This case has indeed provoked an important discussion about the relationship
21 Paul Demaret, ‘TREMs, Multilateralism, Unilateralism and the GATT’, in James Cameron, Paul 
Demaret and Damien Geradin, eds., Trade & The Environment: The Search for Balance, vol. I, (London: 
Cameron May Ltd., 1994), 52-68, at 52.
22 Ibid., at 59.
23 United States - Restrictions on Imports o f Tuna, unadopted, circulated on 3 September 1991, BISD 
39S/155; reprinted in 30 ILM ( \9 9 l)  1594.
between trade and environment among traders and environmentalists alike. From the
environmental perspective, this case was thought to set a bad precedent as
environmental considerations were made subordinate to trade rules contained in GATT.
As a result, it can lead to an interpretation that GATT has decreased a state’s
sovereignty to set its own environmental standards. However, from the trade
perspective, if states are allowed to set their environment standards freely, the process of
trade liberalisation will be hindered as TREMs will be used as non-tariff barriers to
trade (NTBs). , * i jjum fl'-e f f r  /^~  ^ < rV  , A
f lJr&XA- '  '_
Not only that import and export bans or quotas can indeed act as NTBs, there are 
also other measures which are capable of hindering trade. These measures include 
environmental taxes, border tax adjustment schemes, labelling and packaging 
requirements, and environmental subsidies. Although these measures do not directly 
stop the free flow of trade like bans or quotas, they could still affect the competition in a 
particular market.
Firstly, the imposition of taxes for environmental purposes is a way of ensuring 
compliance with environmental standards such as emission standards. The aim of 
environmental taxation is to curb environmental degradation through the internalisation 
of environmental externality costs, a process through which the costs of environmental 
damages are integrated into the costs of the products themselves or the production 
processes. The idea of using taxes has been supported by the OECD, as they believe 
that environmental taxes have better potential to achieve cost-effective environmental 
protection than other measures.24 They have argued that the advantages of using the tax 
system are: more transparency, predictability, and effectiveness in allocation of 
resources through a pricing mechanism 25 According to the OECD, the polluters should 
pay for the cost of deterioration of the environment caused by their actions, be it 
consumers or producers of the products, hence the “polluter-pays-principle” (PPP).26
24 OECD, Report on Trade and Environment, op. cit., at 28.
25 OECD, Processes and Production Methods (PPMs): Conceptual Framework and Considerations on 
the Use ofPPM-Based Trade Measures, OECD Working Papers, vol. V, no. 70, (Paris: OECD, 1997), at 
40.
26 For a discussion on the PPP, see Patricia W. Bimie and Alan E. Boyle, International Law & The 
Environment, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1992), 109-111. Essentially, the PPP is an economic principle, 
rather than legal principle. The definition was given by its creator, the OECD, as “the polluter should 
bear the expenses o f carrying out the measures decided by public authorities to ensure that the
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Secondly, as different countries administer different levels of taxation on 
products, it is inevitable that the price of domestic goods and imports will differ. In a 
highly competitive world market, a country which imposes a higher tax on a product 
will suffer competitively against cheaper products from its competitors. In order to curb 
the competitive disadvantage of domestic products, the level of taxation can be adjusted 
at the border in order to ensure that the same taxes are imposed on products 
notwithstanding where they originate from. As the world trade rules, like GATT, do not 
distinguish the purpose on which the border tax adjustment scheme may be used, the 
level of environmental taxes may therefore be adjusted accordingly.27
Thirdly, labelling and packaging requirements are other forms of trade measure 
which are increasingly being used in order to promote environmental awareness and 
environmental protection respectively. “Eco-labels” give consumers information about 
the environmental impacts of the products, be it from their manufacturing processes or 
consumption. They encourage consumers to make an informed choice whether or not 
they would use environmentally friendly products. Several countries have already 
used different eco-labelling schemes, notably the Dolphin Safe (USA), Environmental
environment is in an acceptable state. In other words, the cost o f these measures should be reflected in the 
cost o f goods and services which cause pollution in production and/or consumption”; Art. 4 OECD 
Guiding Principles Concerning the International Economic Aspects o f Environmental Policies, OECD 
Document C(72)128, 26 May 1972; reprinted in 11 ILM (\912) 1172. See further in Candice Stevens, 
‘Interpreting the Polluter Pays Principle in the Trade and Environment Context’, 27(3) Cornell 
International Law Journal (1994) 577.
27 See United States - Taxes on Petroleum and Certain Imported Substances, adopted on 17 June 1987, 
BISD 34S/136. In this case, the panel ruled that the border tax adjustment schemes
do not distinguish between taxes with different policy purposes. Whether a sales tax is 
levied on a product for general revenue purposes or to encourage the rational use of die 
environmental resources, is therefore not relevant for the determination o f the eligibility 
o f a tax for border tax adjustment. (Emphasis added.)
For more comments on GATT and border tax adjustments, see Beatrice Chaytor and James Cameron, 
Taxes for Environmental Purposes: The Scope for Border Tax Adjustment under the WTO Rules, a WWF 
International Discussion Paper, (Gland, Switzerland: WWF, 1995).
28 Due to the limited scope in this chapter, it is not possible to explore the issue of eco-labelling in 
depth. For detailed discussions, see, for example, Veena Jha and Simonetta Zarrilli, ‘Eco-labelling 
Initiatives as Potential Barriers to Trade - A Viewpoint from Developing Countries’ in UNCTAD and, 
SELA, op. cit., 311-330; Halina Ward, ‘Trade and Environment Issues in Voluntary Eco-labelling and 
Life Cycle Analysis’, 6(2) RECIEL (1997) 139; Seung Wha Chang, ‘GATTing a Green Trade Barrier: 
Eco-labelling and the WTO Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade’, 31(1) Journal o f World Trade 
(1994) 137; Elliot B. Staffin, ‘Trade Barrier or Trade Boon? A Critical Evaluation o f Environmental 
Labelling and Its Role in the “Greening” o f World Trade’, 21(2) Columbia Journal o f Environmental Law 
(1996) 205.
Choice (Canada), Blue Angel (Germany) and White Swan (Scandinavia). In general, 
the labels are granted upon an assessment of the product’s life cycle - i.e. from the 
production to disposal of the product. The issuers of the label may be governments, 
private entities or the NGOs. Most of the eco-labelling schemes are run voluntarily 
(voluntary eco-labels), but there also exist those which operate on a compulsory basis 
(mandatory eco-labels). Whichever basis the labelling schemes operate, the difference 
in the criteria for granting labels could have some impacts on the market access. In 
recognition of this problem, the Geneva-based International Standards Organization 
(ISO) was established with a view to setting harmonised standards which operate on a
9Qglobal scalef Environmental labels operate under the ISO 14000 series scheme. 
Manufacturers have to pursue an effective environmental management system, based on 
the life-cycle approach, in order to earn for themselves the ISO label. Although the ISO 
standard is applicable only on a voluntary basis, companies which do not obtain the ISO 
certificate may be at a disadvantage if the consumers prefer the ISO certified goods. At 
the international level, goods which are sold in the market with preference towards ISO 
certified goods will suffer competitively if they do not satisfy the ISO standard. 
Moreover, according to the Chief of the Trade and Environment Section of the 
International Trade Division of UNCTAD, developing countries only modestly
rA/  ,
participate in international standard setting, therefore, they are mostly vulnerable to
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• indenial of access to the markets dominated by the ISO certified goods.
Packaging requirements are normally used in order to promote recycling of 
packaging, which ultimately can lead to waste reduction and pollution control. One 
good example of packaging requirements is the Danish law which introduces a
• '3 1mandatory system requiring all beer and soft drink containers to be returnable. 
Another example is the German take back scheme which operates under the German
T9Packaging Ordinance. Under this law, manufacturers and distributors are required to
29 The ISO is a worldwide federation o f national standards bodies form some 130 countries, one from 
each country. Established in 1947, the mission o f this NGO is to promote the development o f 
standardisation and related activities in the world. The ISO is funded by the Central Secretariat.
0 Rene Vossenaar, ‘Trade and Environment in the Framework o f International Cooperation’, in 
UNCTAD and SELA, op. cit., 17-39, at 26.
11 See Commission v. Denmark. C-302/86 119881 ECR 4607. (The Danish Bottles case.)
’2 See, for a detailed account on Germany’s eco-packaging schemes, Kilian Delbriick, ‘Eco-Packaging, 
Green Dot and Blue Angel: The German Case’, and Christine Wyatt, ‘Environmental Policy Making, Eco-
take back used packaging for the purpose of recycling. Like eco-label programmes, the 
eco-packaging schemes may operate on either voluntary or compulsory basis.
Lastly, governments may help their domestic producers by way of subsidies. 
Subsidies which are classified as environmental subsidies are those granted inter alia for 
the purposes of cleaning up pollution, further environmental research and development, 
and encourage the use of environmentally sound technology in the production processes. 
Such subsidies can be termed “non-perverse” subsidies. Provided that these subsidies 
satisfy conditions laid down in GATT, they will be treated as “non-actionable” subsidies 
and deemed consistent with the GATT’s obligations. However, there also exist 
subsidies which are harmful to the environment. These subsidies can be termed 
“perverse” subsidies. Examples of such subsidies are those granted to the fishery, 
forestry, energy and agriculture industries. It was reported that the EU has spent 
US$230 million a year on subsidising fishing off the coast of Africa.33 As a result of 
cheaper fishing costs, some fishermen have overexploited their fishing quotas. Rather 
than helping the marine conservation, such subsidies have therefore contributed towards 
the rapid depletion of fish stocks. The subsidisation scheme under the EU Common 
Agricultural Policy (CAP) is also noteworthy. The CAP reduces the manufacturing 
costs for the EU farmers in order to enable the EU crops to compete against the cheap 
crops from developing countries. Not only does this subsidy encourage the overuse of 
fertilisers - which can lead towards some health problems once too much chemical 
substances get into the food chain - it has also been argued that the EU subsidy inhibits 
developing countries’ ability to develop sustainable farming techniques. This is because 
the cheap EU products can depress the world prices and the developing countries’ 
farmers have to lower their prices in order to regain the market share, hence lesser 
income and lesser financial support in order to adopt more environmentally friendly 
farming methods.34
Labelling and Eco-Packaging in Germany: The Impact on Exports from Developing Countries’, in 
UNCTAD and SELA, op. cit., 331-343 and 345-388.
Frances Williams, ‘Cut in Fishing Subsidy U rged’, The Financial Times, 4 June 1997, 3.
4 The House o f Commons Environment Committee, op. cit., at xiii.
2.2.I.2. Multilateral Trade Measures
Several MEAs currently in operation are involved with the use of TREMs.35 The 
Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora 
(CITES),36 the Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone layer (the 
Montreal Protocol) and the Basel Convention on the Control of Transboundary 
Movement of Hazardous Wastes and their Disposal (the Basel Convention) are only 
three of the 180 MEAs existing today which use TREMs as enforcement mechanisms. 
These three MEAs will be briefly discussed below in order to show how TREMs are 
used by them.
H
(i) CITES
i
CITES aims at controlling international wildlife trade (endangered species and their 
parts).36 This MEA was drawn up in 1973 and came into force on 1 July 1974. CITES 
operates via three Appendices: Appendix I regulates species that “are threatened with 
extinction and are or may be affected by trade”;40 Appendix II covers species that 
“although not necessarily now threatened with extinction, may become so unless trade 
in specimens of such species is subject to strict regulation in order to avoid utilisation 
incompatible with their survival”;41 and Appendix III deals with species identified by a 
CITES member as “subject to regulation within its jurisdiction for the purpose of 
preventing or restricting exploitation, and as needing the co-operation of other parties in 
the control of trade”.
See generally, Robert Housman et al., The Use o f  Trade Measures in Select M ultilateral 
Environmental Agreements, (Geneva: UNEP, 1995).
36 Reprinted in 12 1L M(\913)  1055.
37 Reprinted in 26 I L M ( m i )  1550.
38 Reprinted in 28 ILM  (1989) 657.
39 See generally, Chris Wold, ‘The Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species o f Wild 
Fauna and F lora’, in Robert Housman et al., op. cit., 163-196.
40 Art. 11(1) o f CITES.
41 Art. 11(2) o f CITES.
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TREMs authorised by CITES primarily comprise import and export permits, 
quotas and, sometimes, sanctions.42 However, the choice of measures to be used 
depends on the listing in the Appendices. CITES also contains a provision restricting 
trade with non-parties. The aim of such a provision is to reinforce the reciprocity of 
import and export restrictions already in place between parties. Indirectly, the limitation 
in trading parties also provides an incentive and puts pressure on the non-parties to join 
the convention so as not to be left out.
One of CITES’ successes can be seen, for example, from combating illegal trade 
in ivory. During 1981-1989, the population of African elephants declined from 1.2 
million to 600,000 due to illegal commercial trade in ivory. However, since an 
implementation of CITES, the population of African elephants has remained at 
600,000 43 In addition, the growing number of members in the convention through the 
years is another good indication of the success of CITES. A number of CITES members 
now stand at 146 - a larger number than the WTO’s membership. Indeed, trust in the 
workability of CITES has arguably made it the most effective international convention 
on wildlife protection.
(ii) The Montreal Protocol
The Montreal Protocol was negotiated to act as an environmental agreement 
internationally designed to protect the depletion of the ozone layer in response to the 
recognition of possible threats to global climate and human health.44 It came into force
42 For example, the Standing Committee of CITES recommended trade prohibition to be imposed by the 
United States on Thailand for reasons, inter alia, that Thailand failed to enact legislation allowing 
confiscation o f non-Thai species listed on CITES’ Appendices, resulting in Thailand becoming a capital 
for illegal trade in wildlife. Such a sanction cost Thailand 100 million bahts in terms o f economic loss. In 
addition, Thailand has enacted several pieces o f domestic legislation in order to support its CITES 
obligations. See Mingsan Khawsa-aad and Pisamai Phurisinsitti Iamsakulrattana, Trade vs. 
Environmental Problems: From GATT to WTO, (Bangkok: Natural Resources and Environment Division, 
Thailand Development Research Institute Foundation, 1997), at 7, (in Thai - Gam Ka VS Punha 
Singwadlom: Jark GATT thung Ong-garn Ka Lok).
43 See Edward B. Barbier, ‘The Role o f Trade Interventions in the Sustainable Management o f Key 
Resources: The Cases of African Elephant Ivory and Tropical Timber’, in James Cameron, Paul Demaret 
and Damien Geradin, op.cit., 436-458, at 437.
44 It should be noted, however, that the Montreal Protocol is not the first MEA dealing with the ozone 
layer. In fact, it is a continuation o f its mother agreement, the Convention on the Protection of the Ozone 
Layer, Vienna, under the initiative of UNEP; 22 March 1985, reprinted in 26 ILM  (1987) 1529, in force
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on 1 January 1989. Only 29 parties, including the EU, were signatories then and now 
the Montreal Protocol has 172 members.45 With an aim to protect the ozone layer, this 
Protocol contains provisions allowing use of trade measures, directly or indirectly, with 
a view to achieving the total elimination of ozone-depleting substances, particularly 
chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs). The principal basis relied upon by this Protocol are 
scientific developments, technical and economic considerations, and the needs of 
developing countries 46
TREMs which are authorised by the Montreal Protocol comprise bans on 
imports and exports of ozone depleting substances from non-parties, and import bans on 
products made with, but not containing ozone depleting substances. Unlike other 
MEAs, the Montreal Protocol also contains funding and technical assistance provisions 
for developing country members under Art. 10. The Protocol thus recognises that trade 
measures alone will not help control the depletion of the ozone layer, it is also necessary 
to allow the developing countries to develop better technology in order to find 
substitutes for the CFCs and meet their obligations under the Protocol.
(iii) The Basel Convention
The Basel Convention is an MEA which addresses the international transfer of waste on 
a global scale. It was created under the auspices of UNEP with three principal 
objectives: (i) to decrease the generation of hazardous wastes; (ii) to encourage disposal 
of hazardous wastes within the proximity of the location where they are produced; and
(iii) to ensure environmentally sound management of all hazardous wastes. The 
Convention was adopted on 22 March 1986 and entered into force six years later, on 24 
May 1992. Although it was adopted by 116 states in 1986, as of April 1995 only 82 
states, including the EU, have ratified this convention. Several reasons for not ratifying 
the convention, as in the case of Thailand, are lack of appropriate regulations for import
22 September 1988. This convention only represents a framework convention without specifying any 
measure to combat the ozone-depletion.
45 For a general discussion on the Montreal Protocol see, for example, Rosalind Twum-Barima and 
Laura B. Campbell, Protecting the Ozone Layer through Trade Measures: Reconciling the Trade 
Provisions o f  the Montreal Protocol and the Rules o f the GATT, (Geneva: UNEP, 1994); Donald M. 
Goldberg, ‘The Montreal Protocol’, in Robert Housman et al., op. cit., 61-92.
46 Rosalind Twum-Barima and Laura B. Campbell, op. cit., 5-6.
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and export controls, lack of procedures for cross-border transportation of hazardous 
wastes, and lack of environmentally sound management of hazardous wastes.47
At the Second Meeting of the Conference of the Parties to the Convention in 
March 1994, in Geneva, the parties also agreed, inter alia, on bans imposed on 
transboundary movements of wastes for the purpose of disposal from OECD to non- 
OECD countries, and prohibitions on all transboundary movements from the OECD to 
non-OECD countries of hazardous wastes destined for recycling or recovery operations 
as from 31 December 1997.48
TREMs authorised under the Basel Convention are restrictions through import 
and export bans, and prohibitions similarly used by the Montreal Protocol. However, 
exceptions are provided in Art. 11 which allows for transboundary movements of 
imports and exports of “covered wastes” between parties and non-parties subject to 
bilateral or multilateral agreements 49 But, it should be noted that the Art. 11 allowance 
is also subject to the coming into force of the Basel Convention, in that for a pre-dated 
agreement, the transboundary movements of covered wastes are allowed if such an 
agreement is “compatible” with the Basel Convention’s requirement of environmentally 
sound management of covered wastes. As for the post-Basel agreement, transboundary 
movements will only be allowed if the standards imposed by the Basel Convention are 
not being derogated, i.e. for this situation the other agreement must at least comply with 
the Basel Convention’s requirement of sound environmental management of covered 
wastes.
2.2.2. Product vs. PPM Standards
Whether TREMs are used unilaterally or in pursuant to the MEAs, there are two 
bases upon which they may be used. Firstly, TREMs may be used in order to ensure 
compliance with “product standards”; and secondly, TREMs may be used to promote
47 Mingsan Khawsa-aad and Pisamai Phurisinsitti Iamsakulrattana, op. cit., at 24.
48 UNEP, Draft Decision II, Conference o f the Parties to the Basel Convention on the Control of 
Transboundary Movements of Hazardous Wastes and their Disposal, 2nd meeting, UN Doc. 
UNEP/CHW.2/CRP.35,25 March 1994.
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compliance with standards imposed on “processes and production methods (PPMs). As 
the product and PPM standards have different legal implications, it is vital that a 
distinction between them needs to be made from the outset.
Product standards are those which require the characteristic of the product per 
se to comply with the specified environmental requirements. For example, an 
environmental regulation may require that the containers for certain goods must be 
recyclable, or tropical timber products must be made from woods harvested in 
sustainable tropical forests. The PPM standards, however, are those which control the 
manner in which particular products are manufactured, for example the way tuna are 
caught or the way garments are dyed. Thus, the essential distinction between the 
product and PPM standards lies in the determination whether the environment can be 
affected by the end products themselves or how they were made. Currently, only the 
product standards are scrutinised by trade rules like GATT, as the characteristic of the 
product will be used as an important factor in order to determine whether or not one 
product may be treated differently from the others.
The PPM standards can be further divided into two categories: “product-related” 
PPM standards and “non-product related” PPM standards. The difference between them 
rests on how the end products are affected by the PPM. In order to provide an 
understanding of the product-related PPM standards, let us consider two types of 
potato: an organically grown potato and a potato grown by using pesticides. Noticeably, 
the methods of growing these two potatoes differ. The latter method seems to have a 
greater environmental impact than the former since chemicals used in the composition 
of the pesticide may, for example, cause acidification of the soil or pollute a nearby 
river. Additionally, such chemicals may be passed to humans and animals through 
consumption. Due to the difference in terms of environmental quality between these 
two potatoes the PPM in this instance is said to be product-related PPM. This is 
because consumers have to be more careful when consuming the potato treated with 
pesticides.
49 “Covered wastes” in this context refer to both hazardous and other wastes listed in the Basel 
Convention. See further, Paul Hagen and Robert Housman, ‘The Basel Convention’, in Robert Housman 
et a l, op. cit., 131-161, at 138 footnote 24, for an analysis o f the definitions o f “wastes”.
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An example of the non-product related PPM can be found in tuna catching. The 
main concern in this instance is whether or not tuna are caught by an environmentally 
sound technique, not the environmental quality of tuna as products per se.
At present, only the PPM standards which affect the final products (product- 
related PPM) are under the scrutiny of GATT. Thus, governments are at liberty to set 
A their own environmental standards based upon how the products are made as long as an 
environmental impact from the PPM is negligible and is not caused by the final product
itself.
/.
2.2.3. Why TREMs are used? ^
dxrvY
There are different purposes for which TREMs are used. They can be used defensively 
or offensively, or, in non-technical terms, as “shields and swords”.50 According to 
definitions given by one leading trade and environment expert, TREMs which are 
“defensive” represent those “employed by a country to address the threat of 
environmental harm within its own borders”, whereas TREMs which are “offensive” 
represent those “employed by one country to address environmental harms outside its 
territory”. '1 For example, where a country sets its own level of pesticide standards and 
such standards are to be administered only within its geographical boundary, those 
standards can be perceived as the defensive TREMs. However, where trade bans are 
used with a view to changing other country’s environmental practice, such TREMs can 
be interpreted as the offensive TREMs
Alternatively, the use of TREMs can be classified as “carrots and sticks”. In this 
context, the “carrots” are TREMs which help protect the environment via providing 
incentives or inducements to do so while the “sticks” are TREMs designed to punish the 
failure to protect the environment.' An example of TREMs which are classified as 
“carrots” is a border tax adjustment scheme under which taxes may be rebated if
50 See for general comments, Daniel C. Esty, ‘Unpacking the “Trade and Environment” Conflict’, 25(4) 
Law & Policy in International Business (1994) 1259, at 1263.
51 Daniel C. Esty, Greening the GATT: Trade, Environment, and the Future, (W ashington, DC: Institute 
for International Economics, 1994), at 103.
52 Simon S.C. Tay, International Trade and the Environment in Asia, op. cit., at 14.
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products have sustained a required level of environmental standards. Trade sanctions or 
embargoes, on the other hand, may be seen as “sticks” as they are used to punish 
countries which adopt lower environmental standards.
Whichever ways the use of TREMs are classified, one important question still 
remains to be asked: Why TREMs are used? Generally, TREMs are used in order to 
secure compliance with an environmental policy, be it domestic or international 
environmental policy. As already discussed above, unilateral trade measures may be 
used to ensure compliance with the former and trade measures authorised by the MEAs 
may be used to secure compliance with the latter. However, the use of unilateral and 
multilateral trade measures may be combined together. This is when one country wants 
to impose a more trade restrictive measure than that allowed under a particular MEA. 
This kind of situation can be seen more easily from the regional practice. In the EU, for 
example, members are allowed to raise their environmental standards above the 
community level as long as certain conditions as laid down in the treaty provisions are 
satisfied.53
It has long been debated whether trade measures are the best instrument to 
address environmental problems. The common view is that they are not.54 Trade 
measures are not believed to be capable of addressing the root causes of the 
environmental problems. Most TREMs are used predominantly to safeguard the 
national competitiveness against other country’s imports. Several incidepetfs have 
demonstrated that TREMs are not always used with environmental goals in mind, thus 
the ecological reasons in such cases were used merely as a guise for trade restriction. 
The Thai Cigarettes case under the regime of GATT neatly exemplifies this fact.55 In
53 See Art. 130r-t (the “Environment” chapter) o f the Single European Act o f 1987. These articles have 
now been renumbered by the 1997 Treaty of Amsterdam as Art. 174-176 respectively. For more 
discussions on the EU and the environment, see Joanne Scott, EC Environmental Law, (New York:
f  Longman, 1998); Damien Geradin, ‘Trade and Environmental Protection: Community Harmonization and
National Environmental Standards’, Yearbook o f  European Law (1993) 151; Damien Geradin, Trade and 
the Environment: A Comparative Study o f  EC and US Law, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
j /  1997); Emst-Ulrich Petersmann, International and European Trade and Environmental Law after the
Uruguay Round, (London: Kluwer Law International, 1995); Andreas R. Ziegler, Trade and Environment 
Law in the European Community, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1996).
54 The House of Commons Environment Committee, op. cit., at lvii.
55 Thailand - Restrictions on Importation of and Internal Taxes on Cigarettes, adopted on 7 November 
1990, BISD 37S/200.
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this case, the Thai bans on imports of cigarettes from the United States were found to be 
inconsistent with the GATT’s obligations under Art. III.56 Thailand had attempted to 
justify its import restrictions on the protection of health basis. However, while 
Thailand restricted the US imports it still allowed domestic cigarettes to be sold. 
Therefore, the Thai restrictions could not be seen as purely environmentally oriented.
In the recognition that trade measures are not the best instrument for addressing 
environmental problems, other means have been recommended as substitutes. The 
forerunner of such means is the international co-operation, especially in the case of 
transboundary environmental problems.57 Such a co-operation is all the more important 
for natural resources which are classified as “global commons”, for example the ozone 
layer and global climate, which no one particular country has the property rights over 
them. The environmental problems may also be addressed by economic means (such as 
cost internalisation based on the PPP), technology transfer, improvement of 
environmental education and provision of financial assistance.
Despite environmental problems may arguably be better addressed by means 
other than trade measures, there is evidence supporting the use of TREMs particularly 
from the environmental community as other means were thought to be either ineffective
f  Q
or unavailable. International environmental agreements, just like other international 
agreements, take time to negotiate. The more parties to the agreement, the more 
diversity in terms of interests, needs and ability to implement such an agreement. It has 
often been argued that the such diversity may lead towards the use of the “lowest 
common denominator” as an international environmental standard. In effect, this would 
inhibit the countries who desire to pursue higher level of environmental protection from 
doing so, and in the long run this could jeopardise the effort to protect the global 
environment altogether.
56 The GATT articles will be discussed in the next chapter.
57 See, for example, OECD, Report on Trade and Environment, op. cit., at 22; Robert Housman and 
Durwood Zaelke, ‘Overview’, in Robert Housman et al., op. cit., 1-23, at 2.
58 Andrd Dua and Daniel C. Esty, Sustaining the Asia Pacific Miracle: Environmental Protection and 
Economic Integration, (Washington, DC: Institute for International Economics, 1997), at 88.
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From the MEAs’ perspective, at least three reasons are said to provide 
justifications for the use of trade measures.59 Firstly, certain MEAs, like CITES or the 
Basel Convention, use trade measures as the means to achieve environmental goals, i.e. 
prohibiting trade in endangered species and waste respectively. Secondly, trade 
measures are used in order to safeguard against free-riders, i.e. non-parties, enjoying 
benefits of the MEAs without bearing the costs. Lastly, trade measures are used to 
encourage accession to the agreements by causing non-parties more economic and 
ecological hardships.
Although there are some compelling reasons for using trade measures, in 
practice it is evident that trade measures only work against certain parties. The United 
States, for instance, still remains outside the Basel Convention despite it generates more 
waste than other countries. A case study of UNEP and UNCTAD on India also shows 
that the threat of trade measures only played insignificant part in phasing out of the 
CFCs in most sectors of the Indian industry.60 Moreover, trade measures will only work 
effectively between countries with a strong economic tie, as the country on which 
TREMs are used may seek an alternative market. Nevertheless, in absence of 
environmental supervisory institution, like the Global Environmental Organization 
(GEO),61 who will oversee and provide some incentives for compliance with 
international environmental obligations, trade measures arguably still remain the 
effective instruments for curbing a short term environmental problems.
Despite the fact that TREMs can, to certain extent, help ameliorate 
environmental problems, they must be used cautiously. There are some problems 
associated with the use of TREMs which may cause concerns for traders. Firstly, 
TREMs may be used with a discriminatory intent in mind and, secondly, TREMs may 
be used extra-territorially. Trade rules, such as GATT, prohibits use of TREMs in these
59 Veena Jha, Anil Markandya and Ren£ Vossenaar, ‘Policy Instruments in Multilateral Environmental 
Agreements: Experience of Developing Countries’, in Reconciling Trade and the Environment: Lessons 
from Case Studies in Developing Countries, (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 1999), 57-78, at 58.
60 Ibid.
61 See Daniel C. Esty, Greening the GATT, op. cit., at 78-85. For a more detailed discussion on the
GEO, see Daniel C. Esty, ‘The Case for a Global Environment Organization’, in Peter Kenen, ed.,
Managing the World Economy: Fifty Years After the Bretton Woods, (Washington, DC: Institute for
International Economics, 1994), 287-309.
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manners. However, if TREMs are used within the jurisdiction of a state and do not 
cause an unequal treatment to imports, it is well recognised under the international law 
doctrine of “sovereignty” that it can do so and such measures also will not be found 
inconsistent with trade rules. For instance, in the Tuna/Dolphin I case it was found 
that the United States could ban the Mexican tuna imports only if the bans were neither 
imposed discriminatorily nor outside its jurisdiction so as to extend its domestic
//i 63
y'y 1 /  environmental standards at arm’s length. Other pieces of legislation which have
caused concerns about the extra-territoriality issue are the EU Seal Directive,64 the 
l' J/V . Whales Regulation6' and the Leghold Trap Regulation.66 As a result, international co-
f b , f t  operative efforts are preferred. This is emphasised by the third and fourth sentences of
(V- y
Principle 12 of the Rio Declaration, which state:
O ' . [ j j
,rJ . . . .^  Unilateral action to deal with environmental challenges outside the
jurisdiction of the importing country should be avoided. Environmental 
measures addressing transboundary or global environmental problems
should, as far as possible, be based on an international consensus. 
(Emphasis added.)
2.3. T ra d e  an d  E n v iro n m e n t D ispu tes
A dispute starts “when two parties become unable or unwilling to deal with problems 
and disagreement in their relationship by dyadic adjustment in private and when, 
therefore, one or both put the matter into a public domain”. Alternatively, disputes 
can be seen as “discrete, bounded and pathological episodes, generated by rule-
62 For more discussions on the concept o f sovereignty under international law, see Ian Brownlie, 
Principles o f  Public International Law , 5th edition, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998), 289-299.
6’ Supra , note 23, para. 5.25 and 5.26.
64 Council Directive 83/129 o f  28 March 1983, OJ 1983 (L 91) 30. This Directive prohibits the 
importation o f skins o f certain seal pups and products made from them into the M ember States.
65 Council Regulation 348/81 o f 20 January 1981, OJ 1981 (L 39) 1. This Regulation governs the 
importation into the European Community o f whales and other cetacean products.
66 Council Regulation 3254/91 o f  4 November 1991, OJ 1991 (L 308) 1. This Regulation prohibits the 
use o f leghold traps in the European Community and the introduction into the Community o f  pelts o f 
manufactured goods o f certain wild animal species originating in certain countries which catch them by 
means o f leghold traps or trapping methods which do not meet international humane trapping standards.
67 P.H. Gulliver, Disputes and Negotiations: A Cross-cultural Perspective, (Toronto: Academic Press, 
Inc., 1979), at 79.
44
breach”.68 In layman’s terms, they are “messes which need to be cleared up”.69 
Moreover, a dispute may be interpreted as “a class or kind of conflict which manifests 
itself in distinct, justiciable issues”.70
In the domain of trade and environment, disputes tend to arise as a result of the 
disability to resolve the differences between the two governments with regard to the use 
of environmentally inspired trade measures, causing commercial loss to an exporting 
country. Therefore, “trade and environment disputes” may be viewed broadly as “trade 
disputes in which one party is more environmentally minded than another”.71 However, 
due to the unique characteristics of these disputes, as will be discussed below, it is 
difficult to clearly categorise whether they are in fact “trade” or “environmental” 
disputes. The modem trend, however, seems to suggest that trade and environment 
disputes are “trade” disputes which could be resolved by a trade institution like the 
WTO. But, if the trade measure is used pursuant to the MEA, could a dispute arising 
out of the use of such a measure be classified as an environmental dispute? One way of 
eradicating the difficulty in the categorisation of trade and environment disputes may be 
to treat such disputes as a separate type of dispute and resolve them in the manner that 
best suited the interests of both trade and environment regimes, i.e. finding a trade- 
environment balance.
2.3.1. Trade and Environment Dispute Resolution
Dispute resolution under both trade and environmental agreements aims at fostering 
confidential negotiations among the parties.72 The main purpose of dispute resolution is 
thus to prolong the relationship between the parties. In the contexts of international
68 Michael Palmer and Simon Roberts, Dispute Processes: ADR and the Primary Forms o f Decision 
Making, (London: Butterworths, 1998), at 7.
69 Ibid.
70 Henry J. Brown and Arthur L. Marriott, ADR Principles and Practice, 2nd edition, (London: Sweet & 
Maxwell, 1999), at 2.
71 See Winfried Lang, ‘WTO Dispute Settlement: What the Future Holds’, in Simon S.C. Tay and Daniel 
C. Esty, eds., Asian Dragons and Green Trade: Environment, Economics and International Law, 
(Singapore: Times Academic Press, 1996), 145-151, at 147.
72 Zane O. Gresham and James M. Schurz, Dispute Avoidance and Dispute Resolution in International 
Environmental Agreements and Multilateral Trade Agreements: An Introduction, (Geneva: UNEP, 
1995), at 7.
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trade and environmental policy-makings, it is essential that the relationship between the 
parties to a particular treaty is preserved. This is all the more important in the case of 
international environmental policy-making as international co-operation is well 
recognised as the most suitable approach to deal with environmental problems, 
especially those with transboundary nature.
Like other disputes, a trade and environment dispute involves an examination of 
laws and facts which will lead towards a determination of who violates the rules in the 
dispute. However, unlike other disputes, the aim of the trade and environment dispute 
resolution idealistically should emphasise the finding of the trade-environment 
equilibrium. More often than not, trade and environment disputes are decided without 
the trade-environment balance being met. As a result, they have provoked much 
criticism from the environmental community. So, should trade and environment 
disputes be treated differently from other disputes? In my view, the answer is yes. This 
is because trade and environment disputes have unique characteristics which require a 
careful and delicate balancing act to be performed during the dispute resolution process. 
This issue will be explored in more detail below.
Theoretically, trade disputes are better resolved by a trade dispute settlement 
mechanism and, in the same vein, environmental disputes are better resolved by an 
environmental dispute settlement mechanism. What about trade and environment 
disputes? Which category of dispute do they fall into? In my opinion, it is rather 
difficult to precisely categorise trade and environment disputes. There are two issues 
which need to be considered: trade and the environment. However, whichever category 
do trade and environment disputes fall into depends largely on the forum before which 
they are brought. For instance, if a trade measure is used as authorised by the MEA and 
the dispute is brought before the dispute settlement of the MEA, that dispute may be 
viewed as an environmental dispute. On other hand, if the same dispute is brought 
before the dispute resolution mechanism of the trade forum, like the WTO, it may be 
perceived as a trade dispute. In order to ease the burden of determining what type of 
dispute trade and environment disputes are, and which forum may such disputes suitably 
be brought before, there are two options. Firstly, the determination may be made 
according to which rules are the main issue of contention. If the trade rules are being 
challenged, then the dispute may be classified as a trade dispute ana be resolved before
J*) ' ^ y /  ■
ithe dispute resolution mechanism of the trade forum. If the environmental rules are being contested, then the dispute may be classified as an environmental dispute and be resolved before the environmental dispute resolution mechanism accordingly. 
Secondly, a special mechanism to resolve trade and environment disputes may be 
created. This mechanism must be able to determine whether the trade measures are used 
legitimately for environmental purposes vis-a-vis protectionism. In doing so, three 
issues must be considered: (i) the intent and effect of TREMs; (ii) the legitimacy for 
using such TREMs; and (iii) reasonableness of TREMs. First of all, it is necessary to 
investigate the intent and effect of the TREMs employed. This is to discover whether or 
not TREMs in question are hidden trade barriers and to identify environmental policies. 
If the intent is genuinely environmental and not solely to protect domestic industries, 
and the effect of using such trade measures does not create trade restrictions, then it 
would be difficult to challenge such measures. Secondly, the use of TREMs will be 
legitimate if they are used in response to an environmental injury for which the country 
administering them has a legitimate interest. Lastly, a determination needs to be made 
as to whether TREMs in question are reasonable. In other words, whether TREMs are 
“appropriate vis-a-vis the burden imposed on trade flows” - a kind of proportionality 
test.
/-& P' - t r r r  hi f  — I— (X  ,V  rTT ...  C*4
Although identifying whether trade or environmental rules are being violatecU"'' 
may be a simple process, the first option may run a risk that an emphasis is placed on 
only one discipline. In other words, once a trade and environment dispute is brought 
before a dispute resolution mechanism of a trade forum, the focus of the dispute may 
only be placed on trade issues without careful considerations being given to the 
environmental issues, and vice versa. In the environment paradigm the global 
environmental organisation (equivalent to the WTO in the realm of trade) does not exist.
This institutional non-existence together with the fact that trade and environment 
disputes are often treated as trade disputes might explain why most trade and 
environment disputes have been brought before the WTO and its predecessor. Thus, it 
may be better to consider the second option, i.e. creating a trade and environment 
dispute resolution mechanism. This could be done either by creating a new mechanism
73 See Daniel C. Esty, Greening the GATT, op. cit., 99-136.
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for trade and environment disputes or transforming an existing dispute resolution 
mechanism into a more environmentally sensitive avenue.
2.3.2. The Uniqueness of Trade and Environment Disputes
Trade and environment disputes are not as straight forward to be resolved like other 
kinds of dispute. At least three issues could be attributable to the complexity of trade 
and environment dispute resolution: conceptual differences between the trade and 
environmental communities; complexity of the issues involved; and the developed vs. 
developing countries’ perceptions.
2.3.2.1. Conceptual Differences
The trade and environment literature shows that there are severed conceptual differences 
between the trade and environmental communities which have been observed over the 
years. Some common ones, however, can be identified and will be discussed below.
First, it has been thought that, to some extent, one of the causes leading to 
frictions between trade liberalisation and environmental protection protagonists is the 
differences in their underlying policies. Generally, the proponents of free trade believe 
that:
trade liberalization is important for enhancing world economic welfare 
and for providing a greater opportunity for billions of individuals to lead 
satisfying lives. Measures that restrict trade often will decrease the 
achievement of this goal.
While, through the lens of environmentalists:
protection of the environment has become exceedingly important, and 
promises to be more important for the benefit of future generations. 
Protecting the environment involves rules of international cooperation, 
sanction, or both, so that some governments’ actions to enhance 
environmental protection will not be undermined by the actions of other 
governments. Sometimes such rules involve trade restricting measures.
These two propositions, made by Prof John H. Jackson,74 have truly and 
accurately reflected the thoughts of those who are pro-trade liberalisation on the one 
hand and pro-environmental protection on the other. Although, since the 1992 Rio 
Earth Summit, trade liberalisation and environmental protection policies have been 
urged to provide support to each other, especially as countries have become more 
interdependent both economically and ecologically, the divergence in terms of policies 
of these so-called “camps” undeniably still persists.
Secondly, it can be said that traders and environmentalists differ in their cultures. 
Prof Daniel C. Esty notes that although both traders and environmentalists are result- 
oriented, the clash in cultures in this context can be seen from the fact that traders tend 
to pursue their goal via diplomatic means and often isolate themselves from public 
participation. Thus, a lot of trade negotiations have been undertaken in secret. On the 
contrary, environmentalists tend to prefer public participation and openness in the 
decision-making process.75 The difference in the decision-making processes has 
manifestly been problematic, especially in GATT cases involving trade and 
environmental issues. In particular, the secrecy of the GATT’s dispute settlement 
process has been heavily criticised on many occasions.76
Thirdly, the trade and environment paradigms differ in their basic modes of 
operation. It has been argued that environmentalists like to work under the rule-based
• 77system, while traders tend to base their reasomng largely on economic considerations.
In the United States, for instance, environmental groups believe that environmental 
objectives should be justifiably supported by the rules of law which are coupled with 
measures for punishment, like penalties and sanctions. However, although it cannot be 
denied that traders also need strict and precise legal instruments to give assurance in 
their trading activities, discriminatory imposition of those punishing measures, 
especially at international level, would jeopardise the trading community.
74 John H. Jackson, ‘World Trade Rules and Environmental Policies’, supra, note 7, at 1227-1228.
75 See Daniel C. Esty, Greening the GATT, op. cit., at 36.
76 See later in Chapter 3 for a more detailed discussion on the GATT issue.
77 See Daniel C. Esty, Greening the GATT, op. cit., at 37.
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Fourthly, environmentalists sometimes worry about environmental problems 
which have not yet been proven scientifically. This causes difficulties for traders 
because they do not believe that one can calculate the cost of environmental problems 
when it is not even certain that such problems do, or will, exist. As traders will not 
sacrifice their economic gain for some unquantifiable environmental loss, a middle 
ground, which is now commonly accepted, is to rely on the “precautionary principle”
which operates on the basis that the lack of full scientific certainty should not be used as
‘tT + + a reason tor postponing measures to prevent environmental degradation where there are
^  ' threats of serious or irreversible damage.78 Indeed, this shows the difference in terms of
the principle used by each regime.
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9 * 2.3.2.2. Complexity of the Issues
Trade and environment disputes involve the determination of several complex issues. In 
particular, they will involve an analysis of scientific information which arguably is 
better carried out by an expert. All environmental policies are triggered by scientific 
research.79 For example, the Montreal Protocol was drafted once it had been discovered 
by scientists in the 1970s that the ozone layer was depleted and it would become another 
environmental threat in the near future. Several researchers had carried out 
investigations in order to confirm such a discovery. In 1974, a report was published, 
concluding that the main cause of the ozone-depletion was the presence of chlorine, 
allegedly released from the CFCs, in the atmosphere.80 Among other uses, the CFCs are 
commonly used as blowing agents for foams, coolants in air conditioners and
• R1refrigerators, and aerosol propellants. Effects of the depletion of the ozone from the
8 A definition given by the 1990 Bergen Ministerial Declaration on Sustainable Development, 20 
Environmental Policy and Law  (1990) 100. For more comprehensive discussions on the precautionary 
principle see, for example, Tim O ’Riordan and James Cameron, eds., Interpreting the Precautionary 
Principle, (London: Cameron May Ltd., 1994); James Cameron and Julie Abouchar, ‘The Status o f the 
Precautionary Principle in International Law’, in David Freestone and Ellen Hey, eds., The Precautionary 
Principle and International Law: The Challenge o f  Implementation, (The Hague: Kluwer Law 
International, 1996), 29-52.
79 For a general discussion, see Lawrence E. Susskind, Environmental Diplomacy: Negotiating More 
Effective Global Agreements, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994), 62-81.
80 See Mario J. Molina and Sherwood F. Rowland, ‘Stratopheric Sink for Chlorofluormethanes: Chlorine 
Atom Catalyzed Destruction o f O zone’, 249 Nature (1974) 810.
81 See Rosalind Twum-Barima and Laura B. Campbell, op. cit., at 6.
50
stratosphere (about 12 to 50 km above the earth) can vary. They range from an increase 
in the penetration of the ultra-violet light into the earth’s atmosphere, resulting in the 
risks to human, animal and plant health, to changes in the global temperature and 
climate.82
For environmental issues on which scientific research has been conducted and 
confirmed the existence of the risk to the environment, the consideration of scientific 
evidence during the dispute resolution process may be easier than the issues which have 
^  no conclusive scientific proofs. In this instance, the core issue of the dispute will be 
whether the measure in question is reasonable such that the degree of trade impact is 
proportionate to the environmental risk. In other situation, the dilemma which the trade 
and environment decision makers have to face is that they have to decide whether the 
trade measure as used by one party is reasonable in the light of scientific uncertainty. 
Indeed, it is more difficult for the decision maker in this situation.
The role of science in the field of environmental protection has become even 
more important in relation to some recent international agreements. The Agreement on 
Technical Barriers to Trade and the Agreement on Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures 
under the framework of the WTO are examples to name but only a few. These 
agreements allow different environmental standards to be set by a country who can 
support its justification by scientific evidence.
2.3.2.3. The Developed vs. Developing Countries’ Perceptions
Developed and developing countries have different perception towards trade and 
environmental issues. The consideration of the interests of developed vis-a-vis 
developing countries thus adds another dimension to the trade and environment dispute 
resolution. With the diversity in economic development, priority and need between 
developed and developing countries, the trade and environment issues therefore receive 
different attention in different countries. A country that is so economically advanced 
may place the need to protect the environment higher in its political agenda than a 
country that is still poor. The poor country may pay little or no attention at all to
82 Rosalind Twum-Barima and Laura B. Campbell, op. cit., at 7.
environmental issues, such as the protection of the ozone layer or distinction of 
endangered species, while it is more concerned about finding enough food and clean 
water for its inhabitants. As noted by one commentator:
In the [United States], for example, rare wildlife like the Bald Eagle and 
excessive radon levels in households are among the highest 
environmental concerns of average people. In contrast, for poorer 
countries, key environmental issues may be basic needs such as the lack 
of clean water and proper sanitation.
What needs to be considered, therefore, is whether the same environmental 
practice should be followed by all countries. The answer is surely not. As the 
experience of the GATT meetings has demonstrated, countries in the Asia continent 
have strongly objected to the use of the same environmental standards which have been 
set by the developed countries, like the United States and the European Union. 
However, this does not mean that the Asian countries are not concerned about 
environmental protection. Indeed, some of them - like Singapore - are environmentally 
advanced and most of them have become more environmentally sensitive. But, they 
need to practise a different set of standards from those set by the Western countries. If 
the international rules allow environmental standards to be set by the developed 
countries, the poorer countries which cannot meet such stringent standards may suffer 
competitively. As many of the developing countries are struggling to improve their 
economic performances via an export-oriented trade policy, trade barriers in the form of 
environmental conditions would hinder such development.
83 Simon S. C. Tay, International Trade and the Environment in Asia, op. cit., at 2.
Chapter 3
WTO: Trade, Environment and Dispute Settlement
The last chapter has provided some general overview of the complicated relationship 
between trade liberalisation and environmental protection, and how trade and 
environment disputes should be resolved. This chapter will review the trade- 
environment nexus in the context of the World Trade Organization (WTO). The focus 
of this chapter will be placed on the way trade and environment disputes have been 
settled under the WTO regime. The WTO’s practice is an important pointer for the 
direction in which trade and environment dispute resolution will develop given that the 
WTO is the world’s largest trade institution. Therefore, it will provide an excellent 
reflection on how trade and environment disputes are resolved from an international, 
vis-a-vis regional or domestic, perspective.
With a view to assessing whether the WTO has succeeded in achieving a trade- 
environment balance when a trade and environment dispute is brought before it, this 
chapter will be divided into three sections. Section one will give a general overview of 
the WTO. This section is intended to provide an overview of the WTO’s framework. It 
will review the genesis of the WTO and its organisational structure in order to provide a 
necessary background for further discussions in this thesis. However, it must be noted 
from the outset that only synopses of these topics will be given as the WTO itself is a 
well researched topic among international scholars.
Then, an analysis of the WTO’s dispute settlement system will be provided in 
section two. Section three will review the trade and environment dispute resolution 
under the framework of the WTO. In doing so, this section will begin with a survey of 
legal provisions relating to the WTO’s trade and environment dispute resolution. Next, 
it will briefly discuss the Tuna/Dolphin I case under the General Agreement on Tariffs 
and Trade (GATT) of 1947, then it will discuss some recent cases brought before the 
WTO: the Gasoline, Shrimp/Turtle and Beef Hormone cases.
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3.1. The WTO
3.1.1. The Background
The WTO is the largest international organisation governing the global trade 
liberalisation process. Having been established in 1994 as a product of a successful 
conclusion of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations (hereinafter “the 
Uruguay Round”), the WTO entered into force on 1 January 1995.1 A piece of legal 
instrument which gives effect to the WTO is the Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the 
World Trade Organization, commonly referred to as “the WTO Charter”.2 The WTO 
Charter is an important agreement with regard to an institutional aspect of the WTO as it 
gives the WTO the character of a fully fledged international trade organisation. It also 
gives the WTO a status of a genuine international organisation with legal personality, 
privileges and immunities recognisable under international law.4 Parties of the WTO 
are thus called “members”, rather than “contracting parties”. At present, more than 130 
countries are members of the WTO, and a number of countries have expressed their 
interest to join the WTO including, most importantly, China.
1 The negotiations of the Uruguay Round, in fact, commenced in 1986 and was completed in Marrakesh, 
Morocco, on 15 April 1994. At the start of the Round there were 103 participating countries, but the 
number of participants was increased to 128 by the end of the Round. The Uruguay Round is the eighth 
round of multilateral trade negotiations under the realm of GATT 1947. The seven rounds preceding the 
Uruguay Round are: the Geneva Round (1947), the Annecy Round (1949), the Torquay Round (1951), the 
Geneva Round (1956), the Dillon Round (1960-1961), the Kennedy Round (1964-1967), the Tokyo 
Round (1973-1979). Throughout these rounds, trade liberalisation process in the form of tariff reduction 
was negotiated as well as several side agreements - “the Codes” - which were binding only on the GATT 
parties that were signatories to those codes.
2 Reprinted in GATT Secretariat, Final Act: Embodying Results o f the Uruguay Round of Multilateral 
Trade Negotiations, (Geneva: GATT Secretariat, 1994), 5-18. (Hereinafter Results o f the Uruguay 
Round.)
3 According to Prof Jackson, the WTO has acted as a “third leg of the Bretton Woods stool” and filled 
up the “missing link” of the international economic institutions, which was supposed to comprise the 
World Bank, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the International Trade Organization (ITO). 
These institutions were created in order to promote the restructuring of the world economic order after the 
World War II. The ITO, however, did not materialise as the US Congress refused to ratify the ITO 
Charter, which was successfully concluded in Havana in 1948. See John H. Jackson, The World Trading 
System: Law and Policy o f International Economic Relations, 2nd edition, (Cambridge, Massachusetts: 
The MIT Press, 1997), at 4.
4 John H. Jackson, William J. Davey and Alan O. Sykes, Jr., Legal Problems o f International Economic 
Relations: Cases, Materials and Text, 3rd edition, (St. Paul, Minnesota: West Publishing Co., 1995), 303- 
304.
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The scope of activities of the WTO is more wide ranging than that of its 
predecessor - GATT - which was created in 1947.5 While GATT only governs trade in 
goods, the WTO governs trade in goods as well as other issues including services and 
intellectual property rights. Trade in goods under the WTO’s framework is governed by 
the “new GATT”, i.e. the GATT of 1947 as amended and supplemented by provisions 
negotiated during the Uruguay Round.6 This agreement is often referred to as “GATT 
1994” in order to mark a distinction between the two GATTs. Trade in services and 
intellectual property rights are governed by the General Agreement on Trade in Services 
(GATS)7 and the Agreement on Trade in Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPs)8 
respectively. Besides these three main agreements, there also are other agreements 
which have been brought under the rubric of the WTO, including Plurilateral Trade 
Agreements,9 a Trade Policy Review Mechanism, and an Understanding on Rules and 
Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes which is commonly referred to as the 
“Dispute Settlement Understanding” or, in short, “the DSU”.10 In effect, the WTO has 
brought together agreements and codes negotiated under the realm of GATT 1947 and 
those negotiated in the Uruguay Round under one single framework.
The functions of the WTO are manifold: administering and implementing the 
multilateral and plurilateral agreements contained within the WTO’s legal framework; 
acting as a forum for multilateral trade negotiations; providing a dispute settlement 
system for resolving trade disputes between members; reviewing and assessing trade 
policies of its members; co-operating with other international institutions; and helping 
developing countries and economies in transition fully enjoy the benefits of the 
multilateral trading system. The goals of the WTO are set out in the preamble of the 
WTO Charter. These include: raising standards of living; ensuring full employment;
5 GATT was only a part of the broadly drafted ITO Charter and it had never been intended to become a 
de jure  international organisation. But as the ITO did not come into existence GATT had remained 
operative through the Protocol of Provisional Application.
6 Reprinted in Results o f the Uruguay Round, 19-324.
7 Reprinted in Results o f the Uruguay Round, 325-364.
8 Reprinted in Results o f the Uruguay Round, 365-403.
9 There are four o f these agreements which govern four areas: civil aircraft, government procurement, 
dairy products and bovine meat.
10 Reprinted in Results o f the Uruguay Round, 404-433.
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ensuring large and steadily growing real incomes and demand; and expanding the 
production of and trade in goods and services.
In order to achieve its goals and fulfil its functions, the WTO operates on three 
core principles. First of all, the WTO operates on the principle of non-discrimination. 
This principle can furthermore be divided into two sub-principles, viz.: the most- 
favoured nation principle (MFN) and the national treatment principle. In brief, the MFN 
principle requires that if one country gives a preferential treatment to another country, 
such a treatment must be accorded to all other member countries of the WTO. The 
national treatment requires that foreign goods and services must be treated no less 
favourable than the domestic counterparts. More details of these principles will be 
discussed below.
The second principle is the market access. This principle is geared towards the 
promotion of an open trading system by ensuring more predictable market access 
conditions for traded goods and services. Predictability is enhanced by transparency of 
domestic laws, regulations and practices of member countries. As the third principle, 
members of the WTO are required to practise fair competition that ensures the same 
level playing field.
3.1.2. The Organs of the WTO
The WTO’s institutional structure consists of several organs, arranged in a hierarchical 
fashion. At the top of the hierarchy is the Ministerial Conference, a governing body of 
the WTO, composed of international ministers from the member countries. The main 
function of this organ is to set an agenda for the WTO and making decisions on issues 
under its governance. It meets at least once every two years. Decisions are generally 
made by consensus, but voting may be used in some circumstances.
The next level down is the General Council, based in Geneva. Its function is to 
manage the day-to-day business of the WTO. It is composed of senior representatives, 
usually ambassadors, of all member countries. Meeting as often as once a month, the 
General Council can also carry out functions of the Ministerial Conference when the 
latter is not in session. The General Council also has two more roles. It can act, firstly,
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as the Trade Policy Review Body (TPRB) and, secondly, as the Dispute Settlement Body 
(DSB). In the former role, the TPRB periodically reviews trade policies and 
implementations of the WTO members. In the latter role, the DSB oversees the 
implementation of the DSU and the decisions on the disputes, and the overall 
effectiveness of the WTO’s dispute settlement process. In addition, the DSB has a role 
to establish an Appellate Body which is composed of seven members who serve on a 
four-year term.11 The function of the Appellate Body is to hear an appeal on the points 
of law and legal interpretations. As will be discussed below, the DSB and the Appellate 
Body have transformed the international trade dispute resolution process and enhanced 
the credibility of the WTO as the guardian of the world trade.
Under the organisational framework of the WTO there also are three Councils, 
established to oversee the administration of specific agreements: GATT 1994, GATS 
and TRIPs. These Councils operate under the mandate of the General Council. Under 
the supervision of the three Councils are numerous Committees and Working Parties 
whose work is specifically targeted at a number of individual issues, including regional 
trade agreements, balance-of-payments restrictions and rules of origin.
With regard to trade and environment issues, a Committee on Trade and
1 9Environment (CTE) was set up in 1994. The CTE has been entrusted to continue the 
work formerly carried out by the Working Group on Environmental Measures and 
International Trade (1991-1993) under the aegis of GATT 1947 and the Sub-Committee 
of the Preparatory Committee of the WTO, which met in 1994. Due to the scope of the 
work undertaken by the CTE, it can be said that the CTE is one of the main international 
bodies currently dealing most comprehensively and directly with trade and environment 
issues.13
11 The current members of the Appellate Body are from the United States, EC, Japan, Philippines, New 
Zealand, Egypt and Uruguay.
12 Ministerial Decision on Trade and Environment, adopted by Ministers at the Meeting of the Trade 
Negotiations Committee in Marrakesh on 14 April 1994, reprinted in Results o f  the Uruguay Round, 469- 
471.
13 For more discussions on the work of the CTE, see WTO, Report o f the WTO Committee on Trade and 
Environment, document WT/CTE/W/40, 7 November 1996, (Geneva: WTO, 1996); Sabrina Shaw, 
‘Trade and Environment: The Post-Singapore WTO Agenda’, 6(2) RECIEL (1997) 105.
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Ten issues have been addressed by the CTE. These are: (i) the relationship 
between trade provisions in Multilateral Environmental Agreements (MEAs) and WTO 
rules; (ii) the relationship between environmental policies relevant to trade and 
environmental measures with significant trade effects and the provisions of the 
multilateral trading system; (iii) the relationship between the provisions of the 
multilateral trading system and charges and taxes for environmental purposes, 
requirements for environmental purposes relating to products, including standards and 
technical regulations, packaging, labelling and recycling; (iv) transparency of trade 
measures used for environmental purposes and environmental measures and 
requirements which have significant trade effects; (v) the relationship between the 
dispute settlement mechanisms in the multilateral trading system and those found in the 
MEAs; (vi) the effect of environmental measures on market access, especially in 
relation to developing countries, in particular to the least developed among them, and 
environmental benefits of removing trade restrictions and distortions; (vii) the issue of 
exports of domestically prohibited goods; (viii) trade-related aspects of intellectual 
property rights; (ix) the work programme envisaged in the Decision on Trade in 
Services and the Environment; and (x) input to the relevant bodies in respect of 
appropriate arrangements for relations with intergovernmental and NGOs referred to in 
Art. V of the WTO Charter.
The institutional arrangement of the WTO, however, is not completed without 
mentioning the Secretariat, permanently based in the WTO headquarters in Geneva. 
The Secretariat houses more that 500 staff who help the day-to-day administration of the 
WTO. It has no decision-making power. The head of the Secretariat is the Director- 
General who is elected by the members of the WTO for a renewable term of four years.
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3.2. The Dispute Settlement System
A dispute settlement system can be seen as one of the important components of a trading 
arrangement. This is especially so for the WTO which places the dispute settlement 
system at the heart of its framework. The governing instrument of the dispute 
settlement process of the WTO is the DSU, which is contained in Annex 2 to the WTO 
Charter. This 3 5-page document provides detailed provisions in relation to all aspects 
of dispute resolution which might take place under the framework of the WTO. The 
new dispute settlement process can be used to resolve disputes concerning issues 
contained in all agreements under the rubric of the WTO, with exceptions to the 
plurilateral agreements under which parties may resolve the disputes as provided by 
those agreements.
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3.2.1. The Dispute Settlement Process of the WTO
The dispute settlement process under the DSU can be broadly divided into four phases: 
consultations, panel establishment, appeal and implementation. In general, the members 
are required to consult one another as the first step towards resolving a dispute in order 
to avoid the use of the formal dispute settlement procedures, i.e. the panel process. Art. 
4 of the DSU sets out the rules for consultations. If the parties cannot resolve the 
dispute within 60 days, the establishment of a panel may be requested by the 
complainant. In addition, good offices, conciliation and mediation may also be used at 
any time. The rules for these methods of dispute resolution are contained in Art. 5 of 
the DSU, which allow these informal methods to be used as an alternative to, or in lieu 
of, the panel process. Like consultations, the time period allowed for these procedures 
is 60 days. Art. 5(6) furthermore allows the Director-General to act in an ex officio 
capacity in order to provide good offices, conciliation or mediation with a view to 
assisting the disputants to settle a dispute.
Secondly, if consultations fail to produce a solution the complainant may request 
in writing the establishment of a panel. Art. 6(1) of the DSU explicitly grants the right 
to request the establishment of the panel. Once the request is made the DSB shall 
establish the panel unless there is a consensus in the DSB not to do so. The function of 
the panel is articulated in Art. 11 of the DSU: “to assist the DSB in discharging its 
responsibilities under [the DSU] and the covered agreements...[by] making an objective 
assessment of the matter before it”. The next step is the panel selection process. Details 
of this process are contained in Art. 8 of the DSU. The panel shall be composed of three 
well-qualified individuals, both governmental and non-governmental, who inter alia can 
be a representative of a member country of the WTO or GATT contracting party, a 
representative to the Council or Committee of any covered agreement under the WTO 
regime, or international trade law experts.14 The Secretariat will propose to the
14 See Art. 8(1) of the DSU for a comprehensive list o f persons who will be qualified as panellists. This 
article read:
Panels shall be composed of well-qualified governmental and/or non-governmental 
individuals, including persons who have served on or presented a case to a panel, served 
as a representative of a Member or of a contracting party to GATT 1947 or as a 
representative to the Council or Committee of any covered agreement or its predecessor 
agreement, or in the Secretariat, taught or published on international trade law or policy, 
or served as a senior trade policy official of a Member.
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disputing parties the panellists from those whose names are listed and kept at the 
Secretariat. Should the parties disagree on the panellists, the Director-General may 
appoint the panellists who are considered most appropriate, after having consulted with 
the disputants. The panellists are required to serve independently, neither as 
representatives of their countries nor any organisations. It should be noted, however, 
that where one of the disputants is a developing country Art. 8(10) of the DSU allows at 
least one panellist to be appointed from a developing country member. The costs 
incurred from the panel procedures are to be paid from the WTO budget.
Art. 7 of the DSU sets out rules with regard to the terms of reference. Standard 
terms of reference are to be followed unless otherwise agreed by the parties within 20 
days from the panel establishment process.15 During the panel process (Art. 12 of the 
DSU), the panel hears oral presentations and reviews the written submissions made by 
the parties. The working procedures of the panel are elaborated in Appendix 3 of the 
DSU, setting out a detailed timetable for each step of the process. A third party, who 
has substantial interest in the dispute, may also present its case orally and in writing.16 
However, the panel process is conducted in secret, i.e. no public audience,17 and 
documents submitted to the panel are kept confidential, subject to the parties’ discretion 
to make them public. Once deliberated, the panel will produce a drafted report detailing 
its findings. Under normal circumstances, the panel shall deliver its report within six 
months, three months in an urgent case. A delay, supported by reasons in writing to the
15 See Art. 7(1) of the DSU, which reads:
Panels shall have the following terms of reference unless the parties to the dispute agree 
otherwise within 20 days from the establishment o f the panel:
To examine, in the light of the relevant provisions in (name of the covered agreement(s) 
cited by the parties to the dispute), the matter referred to the DSB by (name of party) in 
document...and to make such findings as will assist the DSB in making the 
recommendations or in giving the ruling provided for in that/those agreement(s).
16 See Art. 10 of the DSU for rules concerning the third party’s intervention.
17 Art. 14 of the DSU provides:
(1) Panel deliberations shall be confidential.
(2) The reports of panels shall be drafted without the presence of the parties to the 
dispute in the light of the information provided and the statements made.
(3) Opinions expressed in the panel report by individual panellists shall be anonymous.
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DSB, may justify an extension of a further period. In any event, the whole process of
1 ftdispute settlement should not exceed nine months in total.
The third stage of the dispute resolution process is the appeal to the Appellate 
Body, which is governed by Art. 17 of the DSU. The appeal can only be requested by 
the parties in the dispute, not the third party,19 and only on issues of law and legal 
interpretations arising out of the panel report.20 The appeal is made to a panel of three 
so-called “judges” who will be appointed by the DSB for each case. The qualification 
requirements of the members of the Appellate Body are contained in Art. 17(3) which 
provides that only the following persons may serve in the Appellate Body: “persons of 
recognised authority with demonstrated expertise in law, international trade and the 
subject matter of the covered agreements generally, and unaffiliated with any 
government”. The working procedures of the appeal process are governed by the 
Procedures for Appellate Review, under which it is required inter alia that the
91proceedings of the Appellate Body shall be confidential. Like the panel process, at the 
end of the appeal process, the Appellate Body will prepare a report. The duration of the 
appeal process in total should normally take no longer than 60 days, with exception to 
certain cases. But, in any event the duration of the appeal process shall not exceed 90 
days.
Once the report is made by the panel, or the Appellate Body as the case may be, 
the next step of the dispute settlement process is the report adoption. Under the DSU, it 
is required that such a report shall be adopted by the DSB unless there is a consensus not
99to do so. This method of adoption is called “reverse consensus”. This new approach 
is worth being distinguished from the former adoption process of GATT 1947 under 
which the report was deemed adopted only if there was a consensus to adopt it. As a 
result, the new approach has made it more difficult for a WTO member to block the
18 Art. 12(9) o f the DSU.
19 Art. 17(4) of the DSU. Although no right to appeal, the interested third party may submit written 
submissions to and make oral representation before the Appellate Body.
20 Art. 17(6) of the DSU.
21 Working Procedures for Appellate Review, 28 February 1997, WT/AB/WP/3.
22 The adoptions o f the panel and Appellate Body reports are governed by Art. 16 and Art. 17(14) of the 
DSU respectively.
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adoption of the report. The adopted reports are generally deemed binding on the parties 
of the dispute, albeit no precedent creating value. Nevertheless, the practice of the 
panels has demonstrated that there is a tendency that a later panel will follow its 
predecessors’ reasoning. Moreover, the significance of an unadopted report cannot be 
overlooked. Although such a report does not represent “an authoritative statement of 
GATT law” it can act as a persuasive impetus that influences the later panels.24
After the adoption process, the last stage of the dispute settlement process is the 
implementation of the findings. Art. 21(1) of the DSU states: “Prompt compliance with 
recommendations or rulings of the DSB is essential in order to ensure effective 
resolution of disputes to the benefit of all Members”. In the report of the panel or the 
Appellate Body recommendations will normally be given, calling upon the offending 
party to rectify its acts, for example by ceasing or amending the offending measures. 
The offending party has 30 days after the report being adopted to give an intention on 
implementation, after which it will have a “reasonable period of time” to carry out the 
implementation programme. In absence of any other agreement, such a period normally 
will not exceed 15 months.25 However, where the implementation is not forthcoming
23 See Japan - Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages, adopted 1 November 1996, WT/DS8/AB/R, 
WT/DS10/AB/R, WT/DS11/AB/R. The Appellate Body in this case noted that the adopted panel reports 
are:
an important part o f the GATT acquis. They are often considered by subsequent panels.
They create legitimate expectations among WTO [mjembers, and, therefore, should be 
taken into account where they are relevant to any dispute. However, they are not 
binding, except with respect to resolving the particular dispute between the parties to 
that dispute.
24 Halina Ward, ‘Trade and Environment in the Round - And After’, 6(2) Journal o f Environmental Law 
(1994) 263, at 275.
25 Art. 21(3) of the DSU gives an elaboration of the reasonable period of time as follows:
(a) the period of time proposed by the Member concerned, provided that such period is 
approved by the DSB; or, in the absence of such approval,
(b) a period o f time mutually agreed by the parties to the dispute within 45 days after the 
date of adoption of the recommendations and rulings; or, in the absence of such 
agreement,
(c) a period o f time determined through binding arbitration within 90 days after the date of 
adoption o f the recommendations and rulings. In such arbitration, a guideline for the 
arbitrator should be that the reasonable period of time to implement panel or Appellate 
Body recommendations should not exceed 15 months from the date o f adoption o f a 
panel or Appellate Body report. However, that time may be shorter or longer, 
depending upon the particular circumstances.
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the DSB has no power to compel the offending member to change its offending 
measures. But, the winning party may seek compensation from, or suspend concessions 
formerly reciprocated to, the offending party. Either compensation or the suspension 
of concessions can be pursued automatically under the DSU if there is no consensus to
onprevent it. The level of compensation or the suspension of concessions are to be 
determined according to guiding procedures in Art. 22(3). If there is a challenge on the 
level of compensation or the suspension, it will be referred to an arbitration.28 It is 
worth noting, however, that the DSU explicitly indicates its intention that in any event 
both compensation or the suspension of concessions are not to be preferred to the 
withdrawal of the offending measures.29
With the rule-oriented approach, precise time-frame and possibility to appeal, it 
is not difficult to understand why the dispute settlement mechanism of the WTO has 
been praised by a community of government officials and scholars.30 The increasing 
number of disputes which have been brought before the DSB provides an excellent 
evidence of the trust in the WTO’s dispute settlement mechanism for resolving 
international trade disputes. Statistically, within only a few years of the DSB being in 
existence more than a hundred disputes have already been filed. This can be sharply 
contrasted with the GATT 1947’s experience under which only 36 complaints were filed
*3 1
between 1991-1994. However, with more social issues - like the environment, labour 
and human rights - being brought closer to the operation of the WTO trade rules it is 
still debatable whether the dispute settlement mechanism will be able to withstand the 
challenges from these contemporary issues.
26 Art. 22(1) of the DSU.
27 Art. 22(6) of the DSU.
28 See Art. 22(6) and (7) of the DSU for the roles of arbitration.
29 Art. 22(1) of the DSU.
30 For example, John H. Jackson, The World Trade Organization: Constitution and Jurisprudence, 
(London: The Royal Institute o f International Affairs, 1998), 64-72; Debra P. Steger and Susan M. 
Hainsworth, ‘New Directions in International Trade Law: WTO Dispute Settlement’, in James Cameron 
and Karen Campbell, eds., Dispute Resolution in the WTO, (London: Cameron May Ltd., 1998), 28-58.
31 Debra P. Steger and Susan M. Hainsworth, supra, note 30, at 33.
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Source: WTO, WTO: Trading into the Future, (Geneva: WTO, 1995).
3.2.2. The Grounds for Initiating the Dispute Settlement Process
In the realm of trade in goods, while some elements of the dispute settlement system of 
GATT have been improved by the DSU, what have not been changed are the grounds 
upon which the dispute settlement process could be initiated, i.e. “nullification or
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impairment” of benefits accruing to the complainant under GATT; or “impedance” of 
the attainment of a GATT’s objective. These grounds are contained in Art. XXIII of 
GATT. Virtually all disputes which have been brought before GATT or the WTO have 
relied on the nullification or impairment of GATT’s benefits as a ground to initiate the 
dispute settlement proceedings. However, the nullification or impairment complaint 
alone is not sufficient to demand the establishment of a panel, the complainant also has 
to demonstrate that its nullification or impairment has arisen out of: (i) a breach of 
obligation by the respondent; (ii) the application of any measure by the respondent, 
whether or not it conflicts with GATT; or (iii) the existence of any other situation.
Nullification or impairment of GATT’s benefits can arise out of either the 
violation or non-violation of the GATT’s obligations by the respondent. The history of 
GATT shows that it is more common that a case is brought to its attention on the ground 
of GATT’s violation vis-a-vis non-violation. In the “violation” case, it is required that 
the respondent must have failed to carry out its GATT’s obligations and that benefits 
accruing to the complainant directly or indirectly under GATT is being nullified or 
impaired. Thus, it is not enough to show only that the respondent has violated its 
GATT’s obligations, it must also be shown that the benefits of the complainant have 
been nullified or impaired. This is because the GATT panel used to rely on the 
establishment of violation in order to determine whether such violation had in fact
99caused the nullification or impairment of the GATT’s benefits. The requirement that 
both “violation” and “nullification or impairment” must be proven by the complainant 
was indeed a difficult burden to discharge when compared to a later requirement - the 
proof of “prima facie nullification or impairment” - which has been introduced by the 
Superfund case. In effect, the new test only requires that the violation of GATT be 
established, and once this is done the prima facie nullification or impairment will be 
presumed. As a result, the panel does not need to consider the trade impact of the 
measure.
32 See Italy - Discrimination Against Imported Agricultural Machinery, adopted on 23 October 1958, 
BISD 7S/60.
33 United States - Taxes on Petroleum and Certain Imported Substances, adopted on 17 June 1987, BISD 
34S/136.
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As for the “non-violation” case, the dispute settlement process could be initiated 
when the trade of one member was affected by the measure of another member even 
though the measure of the latter was not inconsistent with the GATT’s obligations. The 
nullification or impairment of the complainant’s benefits under GATT in this case 
would be found if the measure taken by the respondent “could not reasonably have been 
anticipated” by the complainant at the time it (the complainant) negotiated for a 
concession.34
In any case, the member who contemplates initiating the WTO’s dispute 
settlement proceedings is required to “exercise its judgment as to whether action under
o r
[the dispute settlement process] would be fruitful”. This is because although the DSU 
provides for the panel procedures and the appeal, it is preferred that a mutually 
acceptable solution is found among the disputing parties.
3.2.3. The Burden of Proof
The burden of proof is customarily borne by the complainant. However, where the 
respondent would like to invoke any exception provided under GATT, the burden of 
proof would be borne by the respondent - a shift in the burden of proof. This allocation 
of the burden proof had been a practice of GATT 1947 and still continues to be 
followed. For example, in the United States - Measure Affecting Imports of Woven 
Wool Shirts and Blouses form India, the Appellate Body noted: “a party claiming a 
violation of a provision of the WTO Agreement by another [m]ember must assert and 
prove it claim.” Once this was done, “the onus then shifted to [the respondent] to bring 
forward evidence and argument to disprove the claim”.
34 See The Australian Subsidy on Ammonium Sulphate. Working Party report adopted on 3 April 1950, 
BISD 11/188, at 193; Treatment by Germany of Imports of Sardines, adopted on 31 October 1952, BISD 
IS/53; and EEC - Payments and Subsidies Paid to Processors and Producers of Oilseeds and Related 
Animal-feed Proteins, adopted on 25 January 1990, BISD 37S/86.
35 Art. 3(7) of the DSU.
36 Adopted on 23 May 1997, WT/DS33/AB/R.
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3.3. Trade and Environment Dispute Resolution
Trade and environment dispute resolution has been associated with the practice of 
GATT and WTO for the past two decades. A typical scenario under which a trade and 
environment dispute would arise under the realm of GATT/WTO is as follows: a 
complaining party claims that its benefits under GATT have been nullified or impaired 
as a result of the other GATT/WTO party using trade measures in order to pursue its 
environmental goals. Benefits under GATT against which have often been contested are 
Art. I (the MFN treatment), Art. Ill (the national treatment) and Art. XI (prohibition of 
quantitative restrictions).
Art. I obligates a member of the GATT/WTO not to accord favourable treatment 
to another member without equally extending it to all other members. Accordingly, 
“any advantage, favour, privilege or immunity granted by any contracting party to any 
product originating in or destined for any other country shall be accorded immediately 
and unconditionally to the like product originating in or destined for the territories of all 
other contracting parties”. (Emphasis added.) In effect, Art. I encourages members of 
the GATT/WTO to follow the non-discrimination practice vis-a-vis one another. The 
same practice is also required to be observed within the jurisdiction of the GATT/WTO 
member. Art. Ill prescribes that a GATT/WTO member shall not treat imports of 
another member less equally to its domestically produced goods. More specifically, Art. 
111(1) provides that internal taxes and other internal charges, and laws, regulations and 
requirements affecting the internal sale, offering for sale, purchase, transportation, 
distribution or use of products, and internal quantitative regulations requiring the 
mixture, processing or use of products in specified amounts or proportions, should not 
be applied to imported or domestic products so as to afford protection to domestic 
production. Art. 111(4) further provides that imports are to be treated no less favourably 
than the “like” domestic goods in respect of all laws, regulations and requirements 
affecting their internal sale, offering for sale, purchase, transportation, distribution or 
use. In effect, Art. Ill prohibits use of an unequal measure on both tax or non-tax basis 
against foreign imports.
With respect to goods before they cross the border, Art. XI prohibits use of 
quantitative restrictions in the forms of quotas, licences, or other measures on imports
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and exports. An aim of this article is to reduce the use of non-tariff barriers (NTBs)n 
which have increasingly become common, since volume-based restrictions could cause/ 
market distortion more easily than the price-base mechanism such as taxes and tariffs,/
Environmental exceptions under GATT are commonly perceived to be 
contained in Art. XX. Paragraphs which are most relevant to environmental protection 
axe paragraphs (b) and (g). Art. XX(b) allows an exemption from the GATT’s 
obligation for measures which are “necessary to protect human, animal or plant life or 
health”; and Art. XX(g) provides an exception for measures “relating to the 
conservation of exhaustible natural resources if such measures are made effective in 
conjunction with restrictions on domestic production or consumption”. However, not 
only do these preliminary environmental thresholds need to be satisfied, the measure 
must also pass the test contained in the introductory clause (the chapeau) of Art. XX 
before the measure may be deemed justified on the environmental ground and exempted 
from GATT. The chapeau provides:
Subject to the requirement that such measures are not applied in a 
manner which would constitute a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable 
discrimination between countries where the same conditions prevail, or a 
disguised restriction on international trade, nothing in [GATT] shall be 
construed to prevent the adoption or enforcement by any contracting 
party of measures...
What one can see immediately is that the word “environment” has not been used 
in any part of the provisions under Art. XX of GATT. Arguments have thus been raised 
as to whether Art. XX is wide enough to cover environmental protection per se as well 
as health and safety, and depletion of natural resources as contained in Art. XX(b) and 
(g) respectively. On the one hand, Shrybman, for example, argues that Art. XX(b) and 
(g) only covers a narrow range of policy. Thus, Art. XX(b) was argued to cover only the 
measures for health and safety reasons while the scope of Art. XX(g) was only as wide 
as covering only exhaustible natural resources that were necessary for economic well 
being.37 On the other hand, Chamovitz, for instance, interprets the scope of the GATT 
so-called “environmental exceptions” as wide enough to cover almost all aspects of 
environmental protection for the reason that the drafters of GATT did not think that it
37 S. Shrybman, ‘International Trade and the Environment: An Environment Assessment of the General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade’, 20(1) Ecologist (1990) 30.
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was necessary to explicitly spell out the word “environment” while the drafters had 
already recognised the existence of international environmental agreements. Amidst 
the debate regarding the scope of Art. XX environmental exceptions, the present trend is 
that the wider interpretation of Art. XX is preferred. However, it would be preferable if 
the word “environment” is clearly mentioned in Art. XX in order to prevent any later 
confusion. Understandably, the omission of the word “environment” when GATT was 
first drafted in 1940’s was not accidental. This is because the need for environmental 
protection was not apparent at that time.39 But now, since the perception on 
environmental protection has undoubtedly been changed it might be timely to reconsider 
inserting the word “environment” in the GATT articles.
To some extent, the WTO regime has rectified the linguistic defect of GATT 
through its new provisions. Examples of the pertinent provisions are: the preamble of 
the WTO Charter, the Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT Agreement), and 
the Agreement on Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures (SPS Agreement).40 The 
preamble of the WTO Charter recognises:
that their relations in the field of trade and economic endeavour should 
be conducted with a view to raising standards of living, ensuring full 
employment and a large and steadily growing volume of real income and 
effective demand, and expanding the production of and trade in goods 
and services, while allowing for the optimal use o f the world’s resources 
in accordance with the objective o f sustainable development, seeking 
both to protect and preserve the environment and to enhance the means 
of doing so in a manner consistent with their respective needs and 
concerns at different levels of economic development. (Emphasis 
added.)
38 Steve Chamovitz, ‘Exploring the Environmental Exceptions in GATT Article XX’, 25(5) Journal o f  
World Trade (1991) 37.
39 John H. Jackson, William J. Davey and Alan O. Sykes, Jr., op. cit., at 559.
40 It should be noted, however, that environmental provisions under the framework of the WTO also 
appear in TRIPs, GATS, the Agreement on Agriculture and the Agreement on Subsidies and 
Countervailing Measures. But, these agreements will not be studied in detail here as this thesis tries to 
limit the scope o f study to trade in goods. In summary, TRIPs and GATS contain exceptions for measures 
taken for environmental purposes, similar to those used in GATT. The Agreement on Agriculture 
provides exceptions for direct payments to reduce domestic support for agricultural production if certain 
conditions are fulfilled. The Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures allows use of a 
subsidy to assist domestic industry adaptation to new environmental legislation, not more than 20 percent 
of the adaptation cost.
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On the face, the wordings in the preamble clearly suggest that the WTO is to 
become more environmentally conscious than its predecessor. However, like other 
preambles of international agreements, the preamble of the WTO is not binding. 
Therefore, it can at best only provide a broad guidance of the ways trade liberalisation 
and environmental protection should interact under the realm of the WTO. 
Nevertheless, it has provided some encouraging signal for the environmental community 
that the WTO would take environmental issues more seriously.
The TBT and SPS Agreements, on the other hand, have significantly shed light 
on a move into a new direction in which environmental matters could be accommodated 
by the WTO. Essentially, these two agreements strongly put an emphasis on the 
international harmonisation of environmental standards.
Firstly, the TBT Agreement is part of the framework of the WTO, governing the 
use of measures which may be perceived as NTBs, such as standards relating to 
technical performance, environment, health and labour. It is aimed at supplementing 
GATT 199441 by adding amongst other things “discipline on environmental policy 
making”.42 The scope of application of the TBT Agreement is quite wide. It extends to 
all standards formulated by the member governments, including most levels of 
government, of the WTO. Non-governmental standards, are less stringently regulated 
and covered under the Code of Good Practice. The main provision in the TBT 
Agreement which specifically refers to the protection of the environment is Art. 2.2, 
which states:
Parties shall ensure that technical regulations are not prepared, adopted 
or applied with a view to or with the effect of creating unnecessary 
obstacles to international trade. For this purpose, technical regulations 
shall not be more trade-restrictive than necessary to fulfil a legitimate 
objective, taking account of the risks non-fulfilment would create. Such 
legitimate objectives are, inter alia, national security requirements; the
41 It is worth noting, however, that the TBT Agreement had existed before the coming into force of the 
WTO, i.e. it was one of the Tokyo Round side agreements. But, during the pre-WTO era, most o f the side 
agreements had to be ratified separately. Thus, the TBT agreement then was not included as a part of 
GATT 1947. As already described, the WTO has amalgamated all main agreements and side agreements 
concluded before 1995 under one WTO Charter.
42 Zen Makuch, ‘Legal Aspects of Environmental Standards Regulation in GATT’, unpublished paper, 
n.d., at 50. (On file with author.)
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prevention of deceptive practices; protection o f human health or safety, 
animal or plant life or health, or the environment. In assessing such 
risks, relevant elements of consideration are, inter alia, available 
scientific and technical information, related processing technology or 
intended end uses of products. (Emphasis added.)
Immediately, one can see that “the environment” is explicitly mentioned in this 
article. Technically, technical measures which are geared towards an attainment of 
environmental protection, such as eco-labels, recycled content requirements, emission 
standards, could be used. However, the application of Art. 2.2 is somewhat difficult in 
practice as the TBT Agreement places a strong emphasis upon the principle of non­
discrimination and availability of internationally accepted standards.43 For example, 
Art. 2.1 of the TBT Agreement requires that technical regulations shall be applied 
equally on foreign imports and domestic goods.44 Art. 2.4 requires that where relevant 
international standards exist, or their completion is imminent, these standards must be 
used as a basis for the impending domestic technical regulations. In addition, where a 
WTO member wishes to pursue a technical standard which is higher than that set 
internationally, it could do so provided that the international standards, or the relevant 
parts contained therein, are considered to be “ineffective or inappropriate means for the 
fulfilment of the legitimate objectives pursued, for instance because of fundamental 
climatic or geographical factors or fundamental technological problems”. But most 
importantly, the measure adopted by a member of the WTO must be “proportionate”. 
Despite the fact that there is no explicit requirement as such, some legal scholars read 
Art. 2.2 of the TBT Agreement as containing the proportionality threshold. 
Accordingly, “the risks of non-fulfilment of an [environmental] objective would have to 
be proportional to the level of trade-restrictive behaviour which might be accepted in a 
given regulation.”45 And, the measure must not create an unnecessary obstacle to trade. 
However, at date of writing, neither the panel nor the Appellate Body of the WTO has 
yet determined how the TBT Agreement would apply to the TBT measures based on 
environmental justification, it therefore still remains to be seen how the trade and
43 For criticisms on the application of the TBT Agreement, see James Cameron and Halina Ward, The 
Uruguay Round’s Technical Barriers to Trade Agreement, a WWF International Research Report, 
January 1993, (Gland, Switzerland: WWF International, 1993).
44 Art. 2.1 reads: “Parties shall ensure that in respect of technical regulations, products imported from the 
territory of any Party shall be accorded treatment no less favourable than that accorded to the like 
products of national origin and to like products originating in any other country”.
45 Zen Makuch, ‘Legal Aspects of Environmental Standards Regulation in GATT’, supra, note 42, at 50.
72
environment nexus could be addressed by this agreement, and how this agreement could 
enhance the environmental sensitivity of the WTO on the whole.
Secondly, the SPS Agreement is another important legal instrument relating to 
the environment which is incorporated into the framework of the WTO. It only came 
into force at the same time as the WTO, as the SPS Agreement did not exist in the pre- 
WTO era. In essence, the SPS Agreement is aimed at setting basic rules governing food 
safety and standards for animal and plant health.46 What is deemed a “sanitary and 
phytosanitary measure” is provided in Annex A: Definitions paragraph l.47 The SPS 
measure may be used in so far as certain conditions stipulated in this Agreement are 
met. These conditions include: non-discrimination, the use of international standards, 
scientific justification and risk assessment. For example, Art. 2.2 of the SPS Agreement 
requires that an SPS measure is applied only “to the extent necessary to protect, human, 
animal or plant life or health, is based on scientific principles and is not maintained 
without sufficient scientific evidence”. Art. 2.3 provides further that the SPS measure 
shall not “arbitrarily or unjustifiably discriminate between Members where identical or 
similar conditions prevail, including between their own territory and other Members”. 
Neither shall it be used as a disguised trade restriction. An exception to these
46 For general information on the SPS Agreement, see WTO, The WTO Agreement on Sanitary &
Phytosanitary Measures, (Geneva: WTO, 1998).
47 A “sanitary and phytosanitary measure” is defined as any measure applied:
(a) to protect animal or plant life or health within the territory of the Member from risks 
arising from the entry, establishment or spread of pests, diseases, disease-carrying 
organisms or disease-causing organisms;
(b) to protect human or animal life or health within the territory o f the Member from 
risks arising from additives, contaminants, toxins or disease-causing organisms in 
foods, beverages or feedstuffs;
(c) to protect human life or health within the territory of the Member from risks arising 
from diseases carried by animals, plants or products thereof, or from the entry, 
establishment of spread of pests; or
(d) to prevent or limit other damage within the territory of the Member from the entry, 
establishment or spread of pests.
Measures in this place include:
all relevant laws, decrees, regulations, requirements and procedures including, inter 
alia, end product criteria; [PPMs]; testing, inspection, certification and approval 
procedures; quarantine treatments including relevant requirements associated with the 
transport of animals or plants, or with the materials necessary for their survival during 
transport; provisions on relevant statistical methods, sampling procedures and methods 
of risk assessment; and packaging and labelling requirements directly related to food 
safety.
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requirements is provided in Art. 5.7 which allows a WTO member to provisionally 
adopt an SPS measure where scientific evidence is insufficient on the basis of available 
relevant information,48 but it must obtain additional information necessary for more 
objective risk assessment and review such a measure within a reasonable time.
The SPS Agreement also allows a WTO member to pursue an “appropriate 
level” of SPS protection which could go beyond international standards, if “there is a 
scientific justification” or if steps for the determination of an appropriate level of 
protection as specified in Art. 5 of the SPS Agreement are followed49 The SPS 
measure which conforms to international standards, such as those set by the Food and 
Agriculture Organization (FAO) or Codex Alimentarius Commission, or conforms to 
the provisions in the SPS Agreement, would be presumed to be in conformity with both 
the SPS Agreement and GATT 1994 itself.50 Unlike the TBT Agreement, a panel and 
an Appellate Body have already been established to address the application of the SPS 
Agreement in the so-called Beef Hormone case which will be discussed below. i /
Under the GATT 1947 regime, seven trade and environment cases were brought 
to the attention of the panels51 and a few cases have already reached the Appellate Body
48 The information could be obtained from relevant international organisations as well as the SPS 
measures as used by other WTO members.
49 Art. 3.3 o f the SPS Agreement.
50 Art. 2.4 o f the SPS Agreement. This article provides:
Sanitary or phytosanitary measures which conform to the relevant provisions of this 
Agreement shall be presumed to be in accordance with the obligations o f the Members 
under the provisions of GATT 1994 which relate to the use o f sanitary or phytosanitary 
measures, in particular the provisions of Art. XX(b).
51 These cases are as follows: United States - Prohibition of Imports o f Tuna and Tuna Products from 
Canada, adopted on 22 February 1982, BISD 29S/91 (the Canadian Tuna case); United States - Taxes on 
Petroleum and Certain Imported Substances, adopted on 17 June 1987, BISD 34S/136 (the Superfund 
case); Canada - Measures Affecting Exports o f Unprocessed Herring and Salmon, adopted on 22 March 
1988, BISD 35S/98 (the Herring and Salmon case): Thailand - Restrictions on Importation of and Internal 
Taxes on Cigarettes, adopted on 7 November 1990, BISD 37S/200 (the Thai Cigarettes case); United 
States - Restrictions on Imports of Tuna, unadopted, circulated on 3 September 1991, BISD 39S/155; 
reprinted in 30 ILM (1991) 1594 (the Tuna/Dolphin I case); United States - Restrictions on Imports of 
Tuna, unadopted, circulated on 16 June 1994, WT/DS29/R; reprinted in 33 ILM (1994) 839 (the 
Tuna/Dolphin II case); and United States - Taxes on Automobiles, unadopted, circulated on 11 October 
1994, WT/DS31/R (the CAFE case).
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of the WTO. Although these cases have been settled successfully, i.e. the winner was 
found in each dispute, from the perspective of the trade and environment debate these 
disputes have raised a critical question as to whether a trade-environment balance has 
been struck. As described in the last chapter, a successful trade and environment 
dispute settlement is not when a wrongdoer is found but when an equilibrium that 
supports both the process of trade liberalisation and environmental protection is 
achieved. The cases from GATT and the WTO will be reviewed below in order to 
assess if GATT/WTO was able to strike such a balance.
3.3.1. Trade and Environment Disputes under GATT: The Tuna/Dolphin Saga
Under the realm of GATT 1947, the Tuna/Dolphin I case was certainly the highlight of 
the trade and environment dispute resolution. This case offered the GATT panel an 
opportunity to seriously reconsider the trade-environment nexus in the context of 
GATT. In this case, the United States imposed bans on imports of Mexican tuna 
pursuant to the 1972 Marine Mammal Protection Act (MMPA). The MMPA allowed 
bans to be used on tuna which were caught by purse seine nets - a fishing technique that 
could incidentally kill dolphins while tuna were being harvested. The United States also 
imposed embargoes on the intermediary nations since 24 May 1991 on tuna or tuna 
products which were supplied by the Mexican vessels fishing by the above technique. 
The focus of this dispute was whether the US bans on the imports of tuna and tuna 
products from Mexico and intermediary nations were deemed inconsistent with GATT; 
and if so, could the United States justify its measures by resorting to Art. XX of GATT?
The GATT panel found that both primary and intermediary embargoes were 
inconsistent with Art. Ill and XI of GATT. The United States’ attempt to rely on Art. 
XX(b) and (g) as an exception was also found unattainable. Although the panel report 
was not adopted by the GATT Council (the predecessor of the DSB), the Tuna/Dolphin 
I case attracted much criticism from the environmental community and had no doubt
52 These case are: United States - Standards for Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline, adopted on 
20 May 1996, WT/DS2/9,WT/DS/AB/R (the Gasoline case); European Communities - Measures 
Concerning Meat and Meat Products (Hormones). 16 January 1998, WT/DS26/AB/R, WT/DS48/AB/R 
(the Beef Hormone case); and United States - Import Prohibitions of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products. 
adopted on 8 November 1998, WT/DS58/R, WT/DS58/AB/R (the Shrimp/Turtle case).
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transformed GATT to the main enemy of the “green” supporters. The main concern, 
according to Cameron, was that international trade rules would limit the ability of the 
GATT members to protect the environment through their national environmental laws.54
In its reasoning process, the panel first examined whether the US measures were 
internal regulations or quantitative restrictions. Mexican had argued that the US 
measures were quantitative restrictions and thus violated Art. XI of GATT. However, 
the United States argued that its measures were internal regulations enforced at the time 
or point of importation under Art. 111(4) and the Note Ad Article III, i.e. the prohibition 
of imports of tuna and tuna products constituted an enforcement of the regulation of the 
MMPA with regard to domestic tuna harvesting. The panel examined the distinction 
between Art. XI and Art. Ill of GATT and found that the US measures were indeed 
quantitative restrictions inconsistent with Art. XI of GATT. The reasons given by the 
panel was that Art. Ill only applied on tuna as “products”, not how they were caught. 
Thus, the US measures were not found to be under the coverage of Art. Ill of GATT.55 
With regard to Art. XI of GATT, the panel had no difficulty to conclude that the US 
import restrictions were inconsistent with Art. XI for the reason that Art. XI clearly 
prohibits the use of such measures.56
While the United States did not contest the panel’s finding on the Art. XI 
violation, it had argued that its measures were justifiable under Art. XX(b) and (g) of 
GATT. The panel interpreted these articles narrowly, as it was of an opinion that “Art. 
XX is a limited and conditional exception from obligations under other provisions of 
[GATT], and not a positive rule establishing obligations in itself’. Art. XX must 
therefore be invoked specifically by the party seeking to rely on the provisions contained
53 An example of the fierce attack from the environment protagonists can be seen from GATT being 
called “Gattzilla” - named after a Japanese monster (Godzilla) who likes to destroy the world - in a poster 
displayed in Washington. For more examples of criticisms from the environmental community, see Daniel 
C. Esty, Greening the GATT: Trade, Environment, and the Future, (Washington, DC: Institute for 
International Economics, 1994), at 35.
54 James Cameron, ‘The GATT and the Environment’, in Philippe Sands, ed., Greening International 
Law, (London: Earthscan, 1993), 100-121, at 103.
55 See paras. 5.8-5.16 of the panel report.
56 Paras. 5.17-5.19 of the panel report.
57 Para. 5.22 of the panel report.
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therein who would also bear the onus to prove its justification. Thus, rather than 
Mexico has to prove that the United States’ measures were not justifiable under Art.
XX(b) or (g), it was the latter who had to discharge its claim. '■ , , "
IV j
I
With regard to Art. XX(b), the panel found that the United States could not 
justify its measures under this exception for the following reasons. Firstly, the U S /-'  0 f '
\ — v t /V
measures were exercised “extraterritorially”. As no guidance on this particular issue /  ,. U
was provided in GATT itself, the panel therefore resorted to the drafting history of Art.
r .
XX(b) in order to find an answer. The drafting history showed that the drafters of Art.
XX(b) were concerned only with the use of sanitary measures to safeguard human,
r o
animal or plant life or health within the jurisdiction of the importing country/ The 
panel also extended its reasoning as follows: , <//p*~
rit r
If the broad interpretation of [Art.] XX(b) suggested by the United States /,  ^*
were accepted, each contracting party could unilaterally determine the c ^  
life or health protection policies from which other parties could not 
deviate without jeopardizing their rights under [GATT]. [GATT] would  ^ l  [u ’ 
then no longer constitute a multilateral framework for trade among all 0 * ^
contracting parties but would provide legal security only in respect of ^y-CL' f 
trade between a limited number of contracting parties with identical ^  
internal regulations.59 U /
(*!> t
Secondly, the panel considered that even if the US measures could be used 
outside its jurisdiction, they would still fall outside the scope of Art. XX(b) as they were 
not “necessary” for the protection of life or health of human, animal or plant - in this 
case, dolphins. For what makes a measure “necessary”, the panel sought its guidance 
from the earlier GATT case, the Thai Cigarettes case. In that case, the interpretation of 
“necessary” was made in the light of Ait. XX(d) which provides an exception for 
measures “necessary to secure compliance with laws or regulations which are not 
inconsistent” with GATT provisions. The Thai Cigarettes’ panel thus interpreted a 
measure as necessary where neither alternative and GATT consistent, or less GATT 
inconsistent, measures were available.60 Therefore, in the Tuna/Dolphin I case, the US
’8 Para. 5.26 o f the panel report.
59 Para. 5.27 o f the panel report.
60 Para. 74 o f  the panel report. In the Thai Cigarettes case, the Thai import restrictions on the US 
cigarettes were deemed inconsistent with GATT and were not justified under Art. XX(b) because
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bans were found inconsistent with GATT and could not be justified under Art. XX(b) as 
the United States could have attempted international co-operation efforts regarding the 
protection dolphins before employing the bans - hence, the bans were unnecessary.
As for Art. XX(g), the panel turned to another previous panel - the Herring and 
Salmon dispute61 - for some guidance on the interpretation of “relating to the 
conservation of exhaustible natural resources” and “in conjunction with restrictions on 
domestic production or consumption”. In that case, the panel found that a measure 
could only be deemed “relating to the conservation” as such if it was “primarily aimed 
at” such conservation.62 However, the measure “did not have to be necessary or 
essential to the conservation” in the sense used in Art. XX(b). In the same vein, a 
measure would be found “in conjunction with” production restrictions if it was 
“primarily aimed at rendering effective these restrictions”. As a result, the panel in the 
Tuna/Dolphin I case found that the US bans on Mexican tuna and tuna products were 
not justifiable under Art. XX(g). The reason given by the panel was that the US 
embargo was linked to the US maximum incidental dolphin taking rate - the rate which 
the Mexican fishermen were not able to find out the level at which it was set at a 
particular period of time. Accordingly, “such unpredictable conditions could not be 
regarded as being primarily aimed at the conservation of dolphins”.64
The panel also found that measures under Art. XX(g) could not be used outside 
the jurisdiction of the importing state. The reasoning of the panel was that a “a country 
can effectively control the production or consumption of an exhaustible natural resource
Thailand should have used other available measures which were consistent, or less inconsistent, with 
GATT such as advertising bans or the use of labels instead o f import bans.
61 In this case, the United States brought a challenge against Canadian regulations which prohibit the 
exportation or sale of unprocessed herring and salmon on the basis that such prohibition was in violation 
of Art. XI o f GATT and could not be justified under Art. XX. Canada, however, claimed that its 
measures were justifiable under Art. XX(g) as they were integral part of a Canadian fishery resource 
management system. The panel found that such export restrictions were not covered by Art. XX(g) of 
GATT since Canada could promote its fishery management programme successfully without the use 
export restrictions. Thus, the Canadian export restrictions were not “primarily aimed at” conservation of 
herring and salmon. Neither were they “primarily aimed at” rendering effective the restrictions on the 
harvesting of those fish as no similar restrictions were imposed domestically.
62 Para. 4.6 of the panel report.
63 Ibid.
64 Para. 5.33 of the panel report.
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only to the extent that the production or consumption is under its jurisdiction”.65 
Accordingly, the measure could only be primarily aimed at rendering effective 
restrictions on production or consumption within the jurisdiction of a contracting party.
From the panel’s reasoning in the Tuna/Dolphin I case, it is not surprising that 
environmentalists were so provoked. Several issues arising from this case had given the 
environmental community a cause of concern about the GATT’s approach for resolving 
a trade and environment dispute.66 First of all, the environment protagonists were not 
satisfied with the way the panel had handled an issue concerning the use of 
extraterritorial trade measures for environmental purposes. Ward, for example, argues 
that there ought to be a situation where unilateral trade restrictive measures are allowed 
as a matter of environmental policy and GATT. Such a situation could arise, for 
example, when trade measures are used to protect the global commons or global 
warming.67 She argues further that the jurisdiction of a GATT party to protect the 
environment based solely on the territorial basis was inappropriate as it is difficult 
nowadays to specifically differentiate global environmental impacts from those that
/ o
occur domestically. Moreover, environmental protection requires “a more 
sophisticated approach to sovereignty”, i.e. a shared sovereignty and responsibility.69 
Moreover, Cameron and Makuch view the GATT panel’s reasoning on the 
extraterritorial issue as a misunderstanding of the negotiating history and underlying 
rationale of Art. XX(b) and does not bode well for the environmental practice of 
addressing the environmental risk at the source where such a risk lies outside the 
jurisdiction of one country but nonetheless within the area of common jurisdiction, like
* 70the high seas.
65 Para. 5.31 of the panel report.
66 For comments on the Tuna/Dolphin I case, see, for example, Dorothy Black, ‘International Trade v. 
Environmental Protection: The Case of the U.S. Embargo on Mexican Tuna’, 24 Law & Policy 
International Business (1992) 123; Frederic L. Kirgis, ‘Environment and Trade Measures After the 
Tuna/Dolphin Decision’, 49(4) Washington and Lee Law Review (1992) 1221; Philippe Sands, ‘Danish 
Bottles and Mexican Tuna’, 1(1) RECIEL (1992) 28.
67 Halina Ward, supra, note 24, at 276.
68 1bid.
69 Ibid.
70 James Cameron and Zen Makuch, ‘Implementation of the United Nations Framework Convention on 
Climate Change: International Trade Law Implications’, in James Cameron, Paul Demaret, and Damien
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Secondly, environmentalists view the criteria for allowing use of trade-related 
environmental measures under the GATT regime as too restrictive. As the Thai 
Cigarettes and Tuna/Dolphin I cases show, the Art. XX(b) requirement of “necessary” 
was to be construed restrictively. As such, the use of a trade restrictive measure in a 
particular case would be allowed only when the “least trade restrictive” measure was not
71available as an alternative. From the environmental perspective, this is discouraging. 
Legal scholars, like Trebilcock and Howse, note: the panel “ignored the possibility that 
the alternative measures might involve high regulatory and compliance costs, or might
77be impracticable to implement effectively in a developing country”. Moreover, the 
panel seems to ignore the fact that different environmental problems must be addressed 
by different measures. Therefore, there may be a situation where only a trade restrictive 
measure would effectively achieve the envisaged environmental objective even though 
the least trade restrictive alternative is available. It would be better for the panel, 
therefore, to adopt a method of balancing the environmental benefits against the
7Tquantum of trade loss, i.e. a “proportionality test”. Under this test, the panel should 
consider both the precautionary principle and the concept of environmental cost 
internalisation.74
Thirdly, it could be argued that international co-operation as suggested by the
7c
panel in the Tuna/Dolphin I panel is “not a panacea for all environmental issues”.
Geradin, eds., Trade & The Environment: The Search for Balance, (London: Cameron May Ltd., 1994), 
vol. I, 116-146, at 129.
71 Ibid, at 130.
72 Michael J. Trebilcock and Robert Howse, The Regulation o f  International Trade, (London: Routledge, 
1995), at 337.
73 The proportionality test has regularly been used by the European Court o f Justice (ECJ) in performing 
the trade-environment balancing act. For example, see Commission v. Denmark. C-302/86 [1988] ECR 
4607 (the Danish Bottles case). In this case, the ECJ ruled that the Danish law requiring the use of 
approved containers on part o f importers was not disproportionate even so it resulted in the restriction on 
the Community free flow of trade as a lesser trade restrictive measures would not achieve the same level 
of environmental protection. Where the same level of environmental protection could be achieved by a 
lesser trade restrictive measure, the more trade restrictive measure might be found disproportionate. See, 
for example, Commission v. Germany. Case C-131/93 [1994] ECR 1-3303 (the German Crayfish case). 
For more discussion on the proportionality test in the context o f trade and environment, see Joanne Scott, 
EC Environmental Law, (New York: Longman, 1998), 69-70; Montini, Massimiliano, ‘The Nature and 
Function o f the Necessity and Proportionality Principles in the Trade and Environment Context’, 6(2) 
RECIEL{\991) 121.
74 Halina Ward, supra, note 24, at 277.
75 James Cameron and Zen Makuch, supra, note 70, at 130.
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International negotiations also are extremely time consuming and may not produce a 
timely solution. Even if a solution is agreed, different countries still need some more 
time to implement at a domestic level. Additionally, international efforts in the form of 
multilateral environmental agreements (MEAs) which allow use of trade restrictive 
measures technically still run into conflict with GATT Art. XI. So far, no MEAs have 
yet been challenged under GATT, thus one cannot be certain that the panel would allow 
a trade measure pursuant to the ME A to be justified under the so-called environmental 
exceptions under GATT. Indeed, this uncertainty has increased the doubt in the 
effectiveness of international co-operation even more.
Fourthly, criticism could be made with regard to the panel’s consideration of the 
processes and production methods (PPMs) issue. In the consideration of the “like 
products” issue under Art. Ill of GATT, the panel found that products would be deemed 
“like” if they had the same product characteristics. It is worth nothing, however, that 
even though the panel in the Tuna/Dolphin I found that the US bans were quantitative 
restrictions, not internal measures as covered by Art. Ill of GATT, the panel’s reasoning 
regarding Art. Ill still create some negative environmental implications. Most 
importantly, the panel did not consider the way the products were made was relevant to 
the determination of the like products. This could be viewed from the environmental 
perspective as discouraging. Products which are produced by different techniques could 
have different environmental attributes. Accordingly, tuna which are caught by an 
unenvironmentally friendly harvesting technique are different from those caught in an 
environmentally friendly manner. The panel should therefore also differentiate the 
products on the environmental characteristics when determining whether or not the two 
products are “like”. An important effect of finding that the products are not “like” is 
that the two products may be treated differently. As a result, had the panel considered 
the PPMs as a basis for differentiating the products, the Mexican tuna and the US tuna 
would be deemed different and thus the United States could technically treat the 
Mexican tuna differently without violating the GATT Art. 111(4) which requires foreign 
imports and domestic goods to be treated equally.
Not only did the legal reasoning of the panel on the Tuna/Dolphin I case 
seriously worry environmentalists, environmental critics were also concerned about 
some institutional issues related to the dispute settlement process. Notably, criticism
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was made on the way the GATT’s dispute settlement process operated. It has often been 
argued that the GATT’s dispute settlement process operates behind a closed-door, 
resulting in the lack of transparency, democracy, technical competence and fairness.76 
Neither an open court style like the European Court of Justice (ECJ) was adopted nor 
participation from the NGOs was allowed. The secrecy of the panel’s process 
significantly contradicted the modus operandi of the environmentalists who by and large 
prefer a more open approach which allows public involvement.77
Another criticism made against the GATT’s trade and environment dispute 
settlement is the composition of the GATT’s dispute settlement panel. Panellists had 
always come from a trade-oriented background. Thus, it could be argued that these 
panellists did not possess competent knowledge of the environmental issues at hand, 
which enables them to consider the interaction between trade and the environment in a 
balanced manner. Often, more weight had been given to arguments and considerations 
on trade issues.
On the whole, the trade and environment dispute resolution under the regime of 
GATT was seen as dissatisfactory in the eyes of the environmentalists, while the GATT 
personnel strongly disagreed. Several recommendations which arguably would have 
transformed GATT into a more environmentally competent institution and instilled 
more environmental sensitivity in GATT have been proposed by various scholars.78 
Some of the recommendations include: (i) inserting a “trumping clause” in GATT, 
allowing certain international environmental agreements to withstand the challenge from 
GATT, as a waiver of the GATT’s obligations; (ii) making an amendment to GATT by 
adding a new paragraph to Art. XX - paragraph (k) - in a parallel language to Art. XX(h) 
which provides an exception for measures “undertaken in pursuance of obligations 
under any intergovernmental commodity agreement which conforms to criteria 
submitted to the contracting parties and not disapproved by them or which is itself so
76 Daniel C. Esty, Greening the GATT, op. cit., at 52.
77 See the previous chapter, section 2.3.2.1, for a discussion on the environmentalists’ method of doing 
business.
78 For example, see John H. Jackson, ‘Greening the GATT: Trade Rules and Environmental Policy’, in 
James Cameron, Paul Demaret and Damien Geradin, eds., op. cit., 39-51, at 46-47; Daniel C. Esty, 
Greening the GATT, op. cit., 205-224; James Cameron, ‘GATT and the Environment’, supra, note 54, at 
120- 121 .
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submitted and not so disapproved”; (iii) amending the wording in Art. XX(b) or (g) to 
explicitly include “environmental circumstances” which would be exempted; and (iv) 
adding generic language which explicitly provides an exception for specified trade- 
related environmental measures in addition to the chapeau of Art. XX; (v) making the 
GATT’s panel process more transparent through public hearing; (vi) allowing 
submissions from environmental NGOs which would provide the panel with expert’s 
opinions on environmental issues and enhance the panel’s performance of the trade and 
environment balancing act.
3.3.2. Trade and Environment Disputes under the WTO
Having seen the failure of GATT to handle trade and environment issues, the 
environment supporters expected that the WTO with its newly established dispute 
settlement mechanism would improve the way in which trade and environment disputes 
are resolved. Since the WTO arguably is the most powerful international trade 
organisation in the world, it would undoubtedly have a significant impact on 
international trade as well as other trade-related issues, including the environment. The 
CTE was established in 1994 to oversee the trade and environment policy development 
under the auspices of the WTO, however, this committee has not been perceived as 
effective as it was hoped to be. No concrete policy recommendations or workable 
programmes have been set by the CTE in order to enhance the trade and environment
7Qnexus within the WTO’s framework. The CTE can only be seen now as nothing more 
than a venue for discussion. Like its predecessor, the WTO’s DSB has to formulate its 
own way to address the trade and environment issues on the case-by-case basis, in the
OA
light of the existing policy vacuum. The highlights of the trade and environment 
dispute settlement under the WTO regime undoubtedly are the Gasoline and 
Shrimp/Turtle disputes. In the opinion of some commentators, these two cases and the
79 James Cameron, ‘Dispute Settlement and Conflicting Trade and Environment Regimes’, in Agata 
Fijalkowski and James Cameron, eds., Trade and the Environment: Bridging the Gap, (London: Cameron 
May Ltd., 1998), 16-26, at 16.
80 James Cameron and Karen Campbell, ‘Challenging the Boundaries of the DSU through Trade and 
Environment Disputes’, in James Cameron and Karen Campbell, eds., Dispute Resolution in the WTO, op. 
cit., 204-231, at 204; Beatrice Chaytor, Reform o f the WTO's Dispute Settlement Mechanism for 
Sustainable Development, a WWF International Discussion Paper, July 1999, (Gland, Switzerland: WWF 
International, 1999), at 3.
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Beef Hormone decision have, to a certain extent, optimistically changed the way an
Q 1
international trade institution resolves trade and environment disputes.
3.3.2.I. The Gasoline Case
In the Gasoline case, Venezuela and Brazil challenged the United States’ differential 
treatments on imported gasoline contrary to Art. Ill of GATT 1994 and Art. 2 of the 
TBT Agreement. As in the past, the United States relied upon Art. XX(b), (d) and (g) 
for its justifications of the measures in this dispute.
In 1990, an amendment to the Clean Air Act was introduced in the United States 
in order to reduce air pollution, resulting in the promulgation by the Environmental 
Protection Agency (EPA) of the Regulation of Fuels and Fuels Additives: Standards for 
Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline (the Gasoline Rule). The Rule focused on the 
composition and emission effects of gasoline. Accordingly, two types of gasoline could 
be sold in the United States, namely the “reformulated” gasoline and the “conventional” 
gasoline. The former type of gasoline could be sold in the most polluted areas of the 
United States only if a certain degree of cleanliness was met. The latter type could be 
sold elsewhere as long as such gasoline was no dirtier than the cleanliness level based 
on the year 1990. Persons affected by the new Gasoline Rule were all US gasoline 
refiners, blenders and importers. Moreover, the EPA had established two different sets 
of standards for baseline emissions. Firstly, it required domestic refiners who were in 
operation for at least six months in 1990 to formulate an “individual baseline”, 
demonstrating their emissions in 1990.82 For those who were not in operation as such, 
together with importers and blenders of gasoline, it was required that a “statutory 
baseline” was to be complied with. On the part of importers who were also refiners, 
they were further subject to the so-called “75 per cent rule”, calling for a calculation of 
an individual baseline if 75 per cent or more of the refined gasoline were imported into 
the United States. On the basis that the statutory baseline was arguably more stringent 
than the individual baseline and importers of gasoline were subject to such requirement,
81 James Cameron and Karen Campbell, supra, note 80.
82 There were three methods for establishing an individual baseline, ranging from the methods which 
required the most to the least precise data.
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Venezuela contested that the US measures in this case had accorded less favourable 
treatment to importers.
Having failed to settle effectively during consultations, Venezuela requested the 
establishment of a panel from the DSB.83 Brazil also joined in by way of Art. 9 of the 
DSU (the multiple complainants’ provisions) on 31 May 1995. The panel found that the 
Gasoline Rule was inconsistent with Art. Ill and was not justifiable under Art. XX(b), 
(d) or (g). The United States later appealed to the Appellate Body who consequently 
found that the US Gasoline Rule fell within the parameter of Art. XX(g). But, it was 
found that the Gasoline Rule did not satisfy the requirements set forth in the chapeau.
First of all, the panel focused its analysis on the principal articles of GATT 
alleged to be in breach. The first provision to be examined was Art. 111(4), i.e. the 
national treatment provision. With no difficulty, the panel had found that the Gasoline 
Rule was a law affecting internal sale, offering for sale, purchase, transportation, 
distribution or use of gasoline. Thus, the Gasoline Rule fell within the group of subjects 
that can be reviewed if it renders less favourable treatment to foreign like products. 
Then, the panel examined whether the domestic and imported gasoline were “like 
products” in the sense required under Art. 111(4) of GATT. Additionally, once it was 
found that the products in question were “like”, the next question to be asked was 
whether foreign products were treated in a less favourable fashion than the domestic 
counterparts. The panel in this case resorted to earlier practice of GATT. In particular, 
it made cross references to the 1970 Working Party report on Border Tax Adjustments 
and the panel’s decision in the Japan Alcohol case.85 The criteria used were “product’s 
end-uses in a given market; consumers’ tastes and habits, which change from country to 
country; the product’s properties, nature and quality”.86 These criteria were applied by 
the panel in the Japan Alcohol case, i.e. “their similar properties, end-uses and usually
R7uniform classification in tariff nomenclatures”. However, both of these reports had
83 The panel was established on 10 April 1995.
84 Para 6.8 o f the judgment. The Working Party Report on Border Tax Adjustments, L/3464, adopted on 
2 December 1970, BISD 18S/97. (Hereinafter the Working Party report).
85 Japan - Customs Duties. Taxes and Labelling Practices on Imported Wines and Alcoholic Beverages. 
BISD 34S/84 (Japan Alcohol case).
86 Para. 18 of the Working Party report.
85
agreed that the determination of the “like products” were to be made on a case-by-case 
basis. While these criteria were applied in respect of Art. 111(2) (Internal Tax Measures), 
the panel in the Gasoline case saw no reason not to apply them in the light of Art. 111(4). 
Accordingly, the Gasoline panel noted that “chemically-identical imported and domestic 
gasoline by definition have exactly the same physical characteristics, end-uses, tariff
oo
classification, and are perfectly substitutable”, hence they were “like products”.
As to whether the foreign gasoline was treated less favourably than domestic 
gasoline, the panel found that “under the baseline establishment methods, imported 
gasoline was effectively prevented from benefiting from as favourable sales conditions 
as were afforded domestic gasoline by an individual baseline tied to the producer,
OQ
imported gasoline was treated less favourably than domestic gasoline”. Having found 
that imported gasoline was accorded less favourable sales conditions than the domestic 
counterpart, the panel found that the US Gasoline Rule violated Art. 111(4) of GATT.
Next, the panel examined the possibility of exemptions. The panel noted that in 
order for the United States successfully to invoke the so-called environmental 
exceptions, viz. Art. XX(b) and (g), it bore the burden to prove that its measures fell 
under at least one of those provisions. On top of this requirement, the panel noted that 
once the specific exception is satisfactorily proven, the conditions in the chapeau also 
had to be satisfied, hence the “two-tiered test”.
On the whole, the United States, however, did not satisfy the tests laid down in 
the environmental exceptions as delineated earlier.90 The panel, therefore, found that 
the US measures were neither necessary, as to satisfy the “necessity” test under Art. 
XX(b), nor “primarily aimed at” conservation of exhaustible natural resources required 
under Art. XX(g). In respect of Art. XX(b), although the Gasoline Rule was a policy 
within the range of Art. XX(b) exception, the Gasoline Rule had failed to satisfy the 
tests because, inter alia, the United States could not show that there were no other
87 Japan Alcohol case, para. 5.6 of the judgment.
88 Para. 6.9 of the judgment.
89 Para. 6.10 of the judgment.
90 See section 3.3.1, supra.
measure consistent or less inconsistent with GATT in order to justify its differential 
treatment between the domestic and foreign gasolines. As for Art. XX(g) exception, 
since the panel could not see a direct connection between less favourable treatment of 
imported gasoline and the US environmental objectives, it therefore found that the US 
baseline establishment methods were not primarily aimed at the conservation of natural 
resources in the sense used in the Herring and Salmon case. Thus, it had failed to 
overcome the “relating to” test in Art. XX(g). As such, the panel did not even turn to 
consider either whether the US measure was “primarily aimed at rendering effective 
restrictions on domestic production or consumption” or the chapeau.
Upon an appeal against the panel’s finding, the Appellate Body reconsidered the 
US Gasoline Rule and found, with the different reasoning, that it could be deemed 
consistent with Art. XX(g). No doubt, the Appellate Body’s ruling on this issue was 
remarkable as, during the existence of GATT and the WTO, no measures had ever met 
conditions stipulated in Art. XX(g) before. The Appellate Body had noted a number of 
errors made in regard to the ruling on Art. XX(g) of the panel. Firstly, the Appellate 
Body corrected the panel’s attempt to determine whether the less favourable treatment 
of the trade measure was primarily aimed at conservation of natural resources, showing 
that it ought to focus on whether the trade measure itself “related to” (hence primarily 
aimed at) conservation of exhaustible natural resources. Secondly, the Appellate Body 
did not agree with the panel that the “necessity” test applied under Art. XX(b) should 
also be relied upon in Art. XX(g). Thirdly, the panel had overlooked the rule of treaty 
interpretation specified in Art. 31(1) of the Vienna Convention.
Another significant element of this case is that it offered another opportunity for 
the chapeau to be re-examined. According to Chamovitz, this Appellate Body decision 
“marks the first time a trade panel has used the chapeau to rule that a national measure 
violates GATT rules”.91 It is worth noting that while the consideration of the chapeau 
was overlooked at the panel stage, the Appellate Body seemed to stress its importance. 
The Appellate Body has in effect affirmed the “two-tiered” test. Thus, the measure must 
pass the tests for specific exceptions in the first place then it has to pass the tests 
stipulated in the chapeau.
91 Steve Chamovitz, ‘New WTO Adjudication and Its Implications for the Environment’, 19(19) 
International Environment Reporter (1996) 581, at 582.
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Having decided that the chapeau governs the “manner in which the measure is 
applied” rather than the nature or contents of the measure per se, the Appellate Body 
had underscored that the chapeau’s purpose was to “prevent abuse of the exceptions”, 
not to “frustrate or defeat the legal obligations” under the GATT. In compliance with 
such a purpose, the measure “must be applied reasonably, with due regard both to the 
legal duties of the party claiming the exception and the legal rights of the other parties 
concerned”. However, this interpretation of the Appellate Body was criticised as being 
unclear as to whether the Appellate Body intended this to be a new test, and what was 
meant by “legal duties”.92 But what was clear is that the Appellate Body had designated 
that burden to prove compliance with the chapeau on the party invoking the exception. 
And, according to the Appellate Body, this is a heavier burden to discharge than that 
required under, for example, Art. XX(g). The justification was given by the Appellate 
Body, relying heavily upon the interpretation of the Vienna Convention which 
articulates that interpretation must give meaning and effect to all the terms of a treaty. 
Therefore, “the provisions of the chapeau cannot logically refer to the same standard(s) 
by which a violation of a substantive rule has been determined to have occurred”, as it 
would deprive the contents of the chapeau as well as the meaning of Art. XX sub- 
paragraphs.
The Appellate Body then examined specific requirements under the language of 
the chapeau, viz. arbitrary discrimination, unjustifiable discrimination, and disguised 
restriction on international trade. These three requirements, according to the Appellate 
Body, may be read “side-by-side”. They also “impart meaning to one another”. 
“Disguised restriction” on international trade was read by the Appellate Body as 
including disguised discrimination in international trade. Moreover, “concealed or 
unannounced” restriction or discrimination has been opined by the Appellate Body as 
not exhausting the meaning of the terms “disguised restriction” specified in the chapeau. 
But, what is more interesting is that the Appellate Body seemed to mix the meanings of 
disguised restriction, arbitrary discrimination and unjustifiable discrimination together 
without giving each any one its precise interpretation. The Appellate Body thus stated:
92 Ibid., at 583.
“We consider that disguised restriction”, whatever else it covers, may 
properly be read as embracing restrictions amounting to arbitrary or - jV *  ..
unjustifiable discrimination in international trade taken under the guise of 
a measure formally within the terms of an exception listed in Article XX.
v h
The Appellate Body’s statement above prima facie seems to suggest a wide
I
coverage of measures which would not pass the tests under the chapeau. But, for the US
statutory baseline requirement to overcome the test enshrined in the chapeau, firstly, it > lJ
f  ►
had to be imposed without differentiating between domestic and imported gasoline. /T 
Secondly, the US individual baseline scheme could be made applicable to both domestic 
and imported refiners. Indeed, had these things been done, the US gasoline rules would, 
no doubt, have satisfied the chapeau and would have been the first case which did not 
fall foul of the so-called environmental exceptions to GATT. Unfortunately, the United 
States gave reasons for not being able to follow the above pathways, relying heavily on 
physical and financial difficulties for not applying the statutory baselines to all gasoline.
In addition, it justified its measure upon difficulties for not imposing a more stringent 
requirement on the foreign refiners due to foreign verification techniques and 
enforcement. These reasons unfortunately did not succeed in persuading the Appellate 
Body to uphold the US gasoline rules as consistent with GATT’s environmental 
exceptions.
All in all, this decision can be seen to be broadening and narrowing the 
application of Art. XX at the same time. This is because as the panel’s decision I Jj- 
broadened the scope of the specific environmental exception, i.e. Art. XX(g), the I . J h  
Appellate Body has applied the chapeau more stringently.9j In this way, it can be seen 
that a better trade and environment decision has been achieved since while the use of 
trade measures for environmental purposes are not narrowly delimited, the decision also 
shows that they have to be no hindrance to trade liberalisation. Thus, it brings 
satisfaction to both trade and environmental proponents. However, the ruling by the 
Appellate Body was open to criticism for its lack of clear guidance on the specific 
criteria imposed by the chapeau.
i r  1
b James Cameron and Karen Campbell, supra , note 80, at 211.
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3.3.2.2. The Shrimp/Turtle Case
In the Shrimp/Turtle case,94 with some factual resemblance to the Tuna/Dolphin I 
dispute discussed earlier, Thailand, India, Pakistan and Malaysia complained against 
Section 609 of the US Endangered Species Act (ESA), which allowed the imposition of 
an import ban on shrimp and shrimp products harvested in a manner by which sea 
turtles could be incidentally drowned. The applicability of this provision extended to 
both within and outside US territorial waters.
Chronologically, the case originated from the enactment of the Public Law 101- 
162 Section 609 on 21 November 1989. Since 1 May 1991, this law was applied to 14 
countries in the wider Caribbean. Following the ruling in Earth Island Institute v. 
Christopher.95 the effect of Section 609 was extended globally on 1 May 1996. 
Substantively, several elements were contained in Section 609. Firstly, Section 609(a) 
calls for co-operation with other governments to promote international protection of sea 
turtles. Under this provision, the State Department is required to negotiate with other 
governments agreements which require the utilisation of Turtle Excluder Devices 
(TEDs). A description of a TED was given in the panel report as “a grid trapdoor 
installed inside a trawling net that allows shrimp to pass to the back of the net while 
directing sea turtles and other unintentionally caught large objects out of the net”.96 
Under an amendment of the ESA in July 1987, a TED is to be used by all US shrimp 
harvesters. But, exceptions were allowed for vessels which retrieved trawls manually or 
trawled with techniques by which sea turtles were unlikely to be captured, or only 
trawled for a short time during each catch.
Secondly, Section 609(b) allows use of import restrictions on shrimp or shrimp 
products harvested in a manner that threatens the extinction of sea turtles. However, 
imports from harvesting nations were unaffected if a certification was granted by the 
President. This power, however, has now been delegated to the State Department. To
94 For comments on this case, see Charles Arden-Clarke, ed., Dispute Settlement in the WTO: A Crisis 
for Sustainable Development, Discussion Paper, May 1998, (Gland, Switzerland: WWF International, 
1998); James Cameron and Karen Campbell, supra, note 80, at 212; Robert Howse, ‘The Turtle Panel: 
Another Environmental Disaster in Geneva’, 32(5) Journal o f World Trade (1998) 73; David E. Kaczka, 
‘A Primer on the Shrimp-Sea Turtle Controversy’, 6(2) RECIEL (1997) 171.
95 913 F. Supp. 559 (1995).
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obtain the certification as such, the shrimp trawling nations must have adopted, firstly, a 
comparable regulatory programme, in line with the ESP, geared towards protection of 
sea turtles which can be endangered by trawling activities and, secondly, a comparable 
fleet average incidental take rate to US vessels. As an alternative, a certification could 
be obtained if the fishing environment of the trawling nations did not threaten sea turtles 
living therein. Imports of shrimp from uncertified nations, however, were not banned so 
long as the harvests of shrimp were carried out either by artisanal means or from 
aquaculture facilities.
The DSB established a panel in February 1997 after consultations with the 
United States, requested by India, Malaysia, Pakistan and Thailand, had failed to yield 
fruitful results. Interestingly, in the voluminous panel report, it can be seen that the 
United States did not contest its violation of Art. XI of GATT. But, it had largely 
channelled its defences on Art. XX(b) and (g). Accordingly, the United States argued, 
on the basis of Art. XX(b), that its import restrictions were justified because sea turtles 
were threatened with extinction and no other methods were more appropriate than the 
use of TED in order to safeguard against such extinction, hence making import 
restrictions “necessary”. As for Art. XX(g), the United States claimed that sea turtles 
were “exhaustible natural resources” within the meaning previously accepted by panels, 
and its measures were “related to” their conservation. The report of the panel was 
delivered on 15 May 1998, in which the panel ruled that the import bans on shrimp and 
shrimp products of the United States were inconsistent with Art. XI(1) of GATT and 
could not be justified by means of Art. XX provisions. The United States appealed 
against this ruling. The final report of the Appellate Body was dispatched on 12 
October 1998. In the Appellate Body report, it can be seen that the Appellate Body has 
significantly overturned the panel’s reasoning despite reaching the same conclusion on 
the violation of GATT on the part of the United States. The departure of the Appellate 
Body in this instance is extremely important to the jurisprudential development of the 
trade and environment debate since the Appellate Body ruled, contrary to the panel, that 
the United States’ measure to protect endangered sea turtles was consistent with Art. 
XX(g) of GATT while its application failed to satisfy the chapeau requirements. An 
analysis of the case will be provided below.
96 Paragraph 11.15.
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At the panel stage of the dispute settlement process, unlike the earlier practice, 
the focus of the dispute was placed upon an analysis of the language of the chapeau 
rather than the so-called environmental sub-sections of Art. XX.97 Upon such analysis, 
the US measures were found to be “unjustified discrimination between countries where 
the same conditions prevail”. The panel stressed:
In our view, if an interpretation of the chapeau of Article XX were to be 
followed which would allow a Member to adopt measures conditioning 
access to its market for a given product upon the adoption by the 
exporting Members o f certain policies, including conservation policies,
GATT 1994 and the WTO Agreement could no longer serve as a 
multilateral framework for trade among Members as security and 
predictability of trade relations under those agreements would be 
threatened. (Emphasis added in the original.)
As the panel considered the US measures to be inconsistent with the chapeau, it 
felt no need to explore further Art. XX sub-sections, namely Art. XX(b) and (g).
Having lost at the panel stage, the United States then requested that the 
Appellate Body re-examine whether its measure constituted unjustifiable discrimination 
between countries where the same conditions prevail, hence, falling outside the 
coverage of Art. XX exception. The Appellate Body took a different approach. It 
criticised the panel for its failure to follow “customary rules of interpretation of public
Q O
international law”, as required by Art. 3(2) of the DSU. The rule of interpretation 
under customary international law requires that ordinary meaning is given to the words 
in the treaty, read in their context or in the light of the purpose and object of such treaty. 
Thus, by citing the Gasoline case, the correct approach for interpreting Art. XX was to 
concentrate on the “manner” in which the measure has been applied rather than the 
“design of the measure”. This was because the ordinary meaning and purpose of Art. 
XX called for an examination of the former, not the latter.99 Moreover, the Appellate 
Body found that the panel had incorrectly looked into the object and purpose of the 
whole of GATT and the WTO Agreement rather than just the chapeau. The object and 
purpose of the former is very broad, in comparison to that of the latter. Accordingly, the
97 Para. 7.29 o f the panel report.
98 Para. 121 of the Appellate Body report.
99 Para. 122 of the Appellate Body report.
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panel found the measures which “undermine the WTO multilateral trading system” fell 
outside the “scope of measures permitted under the chapeau of Article XX”.100 As for 
the object and purpose of Art. XX chapeau, the Gasoline Appellate Body has 
underscored that the object and purpose is to prevent “abuse of the exceptions of Article 
XX”. Hence, it provides a much narrower scope.
Accordingly, the Appellate Body has re-instated the two-tiered test as applied in 
the Gasoline case. Firstly, it is imperative to examine whether the measure falls within 
the sub-sections of Art. XX. If so, only then should the panel examine if the measure in 
question is applied in accordance with the chapeau requirements.101 Based upon this 
test, the Appellate Body started examining whether the US bans in this case fell under 
Art. XX(g). The Appellate Body, in rejecting arguments by India, Pakistan, Thailand 
and Malaysia, ruled that “exhaustible natural resources” under Art. XX(g) covered both 
finite and non-finite resources, living and non-living.102 The reason for this ruling was 
that the words of Art. XX(g) “must be read by a treaty interpreter in the light of 
contemporary concerns of the community of nations about the protection and
i mconservation of the environment”. The definition of “natural resources” is 
“evolutionary” and “not static”.104 Moreover, as all types of turtles in this dispute were 
listed under Appendix I of the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species 
of Wild Fauna and Flora (CITES), it was therefore difficult to argue that they were not 
“exhaustible”.
As for the “relating to” test enshrined in Art. XX(g), the Appellate Body 
followed the interpretation from the Gasoline case as meaning “primarily aimed at the 
conservation”. Accordingly, the Appellate Body felt it necessary to examine if the 
Section 609 measure was administered in achieving its purported policy goal. Having
100 Para. 123 of the Appellate Body report.
101 This is in a totally opposite direction to interpretation o f the panel, who justified its own approach that 
“as the conditions contained in the introductory provision supply to any o f  the paragraphs o f Article XX, 
it seems equally appropriate to analyse first the introductory provision o f Article X X \  (Emphasis added 
in the Appellate Body report, para. 124.)
102 Para. 139 of the Appellate Body report.
103 Para. 136 of the Appellate Body report.
104 Para. 138 of the Appellate Body report.
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examined this, the Appellate Body found that Section 609 satisfied the “relating to” test 
within the meaning of Art. XX(g). In the words of the Appellate Body:
it appears to us that Section 609, cum implementing guidelines, is not 
disproportionately wide in its scope and reach in relation to the policy 
objective of protection and conservation of sea turtle species. The means 
are, in principle, reasonably related to the ends. The means and ends 
relationship between Section 609 and the legitimate policy of conserving 
an exhaustible, and, in fact, endangered species, is obviously a close and 
real one...
Next, the Appellate Body looked at the “in conjunction with restrictions on 
domestic production or consumption” test under Art. XX(g). Again, relying upon the 
Appellate Body’s interpretation in the Gasoline case which requires “even-handedness” 
in the imposition of restrictions, the Appellate Body in this case examined whether the 
shrimp caught by the US vessels were restricted in pursuant to Section 609 in the same 
way as other imported shrimp. It found that the US measure was applied even- 
handedly, i.e. applied to both US and foreign vessels, hence fell within the Art. XX(g) 
“in conjunction...” test.
Having examined the sub-paragraphs first, the Appellate Body then pursued an 
examination of the chapeau of Art. XX, i.e. the second tier of the test. This is because, 
as the Appellate Body stressed, although the measure provisionally was justified under 
Art. XX(g) it was not automatic that it would also be justified under the chapeau.105 By 
recalling three inherent conditions which must be satisfied, viz. “arbitrary discrimination 
between countries where the same conditions prevail”, “unjustifiable discrimination 
between countries where the same conditions prevail”, and “a disguised restriction on 
international trade”, the Appellate Body found the US measure to be inconsistent with 
these requirements, despite being found to be within the Art. XX(g) type of measure. 
This is because, firstly, while Section 609(a) directs the Secretary of State to negotiate 
bilateral or multilateral agreements for the protection of sea turtles, it did not do so. 
Secondly, having regarded sea turtles as highly migratory, concerted and co-operative 
efforts were indeed necessary. As the United States had only negotiated with some 
countries but none of the Appellees in this case, its act therefore was considered to be
105 Para. 157 of the Appellate Body report.
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“discriminatory” and “unjustifiable”. Moreover, the unjustifiable discrimination was 
also accentuated by the fact that the United States had accorded differential treatment 
for the implementation of its measure. A requirement of a four month period given to 
some and a period of three years given to others to implement the compulsory use of 
TED highlighted this fact. Indeed, the lesser the time, the more onerous it was to 
comply with the United States’ requirement.
As for “arbitrary discrimination”, Section 609 requires countries wanting a 
certification to adopt a comprehensive regulatory programme which bore the same 
conditions as the United States. By not taking into consideration the conditions already 
existing in the exporting countries, the Appellate Body therefore found the United 
States’ rigidity and inflexibility to be arbitrary discrimination. The certification process 
of the United States was further observed by the Appellate Body to deny basic fairness 
and due process,106 as there was no reviewing or appeal procedure for a denial of a 
certificate. Such a lack of procedural fairness and transparency led to the conclusion 
that the US measures was applied in an “arbitrary discriminatory” fashion. Having 
found the two foregone conditions to the contrary, the Appellate Body did not examine 
further the third condition, i.e. “disguised restriction on international trade”.
On the whole, the ruling of the panel in this case has provoked much criticism, 
particularly from environmental supporters. According to some environmental critics, 
the panel “has failed to achieve such a balanced settlement. If adopted, the panel report 
would escalate existing conflicts between the WTO and domestic and international
1 07environmental law and policy”. What these critics are worried about is that the panel 
in the Shrimp/Turtle case has introduced “a new trade-based threshold test for the 
chapeau of Art. XX...[which] marks a new low-point in WTO dispute settlement”.108 
The way the panel went about the tests in the chapeau has also illustrated a discernible 
departure from its previous practice. In that, the panel examined if the measures 
fulfilled the conditions in the chapeau before it examined the specific environmental 
exceptions themselves. By doing so, the panel has inadvertently put the overall aim and
106 Para. 189 of the Appellate Body report.
107 Matthew Stillwell and Charles Arden-Clarke, ‘The WTO Shrimp-Turtle Ruling: International Trade 
versus the Global Environment’, in Charles Arden-Clarke, ed., Dispute Settlement in the WTO, op. cit., 2- 
5, at 2.
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objective of the WTO Agreement above environmental protection, irrespective of its 
legitimacy.
Fortunately, the Appellate Body report, to a certain extent, has alleviated the 
damage - branded by the World Wide Fund for Nature International (WWF) as “a crisis 
for sustainable development” - created by the panel report. In particular, it has re­
established the credentials of the WTO’s dispute settlement regime in the realm of trade 
and environment. In the view of some critics, although the Appellate Body did not 
favour the environmental side of the issue, its finding in the Shrimp/Turtle case has 
arguably struck a good balance between the promotion of trade liberalisation and 
environmental protection. At the very least, this case has provided some encouraging 
indication that in some cases trade measures could justifiably be used for the protection 
of the environment - in this instance, the protection of endangered species. This ruling 
has also reaffirmed the fact, which the Director-General Ruggiero has reiterated from 
time to time, that the WTO does not inhibit its members from protecting their own 
environment as long as the trade liberalisation initiative is observed even-handedly.109
Apart from the foregoing, the Shrimp/Turtle case has also provided a good 
opportunity for clarifing some other side issues pertaining to the working of the WTO’s 
DSB in trade and environment cases, viz. expert evidence, including scientific and 
technical submission, participation from NGOs and the relationship between GATT and 
international law.110 First of all, as it was necessary to establish whether the harm to sea 
turtles justified the erection of a trade barrier, the role of scientific and technical experts 
was quite important. However, the panel in the Shrimp/Turtle dispute did not seem to 
go along this line of thought. As the panel ignored the examination of the 
environmental sub-sections of Art. XX, it therefore did not consider scientific and 
technical evidence. This is because to decide on the violation of the chapeau, which is 
more trade oriented than the sub-sections, it was not necessary to consider the scientific
108 Ibid., at 3.
109 See Renato Ruggiero, Director-General of the WTO, ‘A Global System for the Next Fifty Years’, a 
speech to the Royal Institute of International Affairs at the “Trade, Investment and the Environment 
Conference”, Chatham House, 29-30 October 1998. He stressed that the Shrimp/Turtle Appeal was “the 
clearest sign yet that the world trading system is fully supportive of policies to protect endangered species 
or the environment” and that “the WTO is a strong institutional friend and supporter of the environment”.
110 See Matthew Stillwell and Charles Arden-Clarke, supra, note 107, at 4-5.
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evidence. The panel was capable of deciding for themselves on the trade issue which is 
within their field of expertise. Likewise, the participation by NGOs in the dispute 
settlement process of the WTO was not wholeheartedly supported. In fact, the panel 
explicitly refused participation of NGOs by finding that non-requested information from 
non-governmental sources was incompatible with the provisions of the DSU. In this 
case, two submissions by the NGOs were made, firstly, by the Center for Marine 
Conservation and the Center for International Environmental Law on 28 July 1997 and, 
secondly, by the WWF on 16 September 1997.111 The United States argued that, under 
Art. 13 of the DSU,112 the panel was entitled to consult these two amicus curiae briefs'. 
But, according to the panel, these documents were not intended to be relied upon 
because it did not specifically ask for them.113 The issue of admission of NGOs’ amicus 
curiae briefs was later appealed by the United States. At the Appellate Body stage, a 
different finding was given. The Appellate Body ruled that the entitlement of the panel 
to seek information from any relevant source or experts was “a grant of discretionary 
authority”. Thus, a panel “is not duty-bound to seek information in each and every case 
or to consult particular experts” under Art. 13 of the DSU.114 The Appellate Body has 
further stated “just as a panel has the discretion to determine how to seek expert advice, 
so also does a panel have the discretion to determine whether to seek information or 
expert advice at all”. Implicitly, although this provides encouragement for 
environmental supporters to make their views heard during the WTO’s dispute 
settlement process, it should not be forgotten that the extent of involvement of an NGO 
still largely rests upon the discretion of the panel. But, if more NGOs could make their 
views heard in the dispute settlement process, it should enhance the transparency of the 
WTO system.
111 The document was drafted on behalf o f the WWF by James Cameron and Fiona Darroch, Foundation 
for International Environmental Law and Development (FIELD), London.
112 Art. 13 o f the DSU reads:
(1) Each panel shall have the right to seek information and technical advice from any 
individual or body which it deems appropriate...
(2) Panels may seek information from any relevant source and may consult experts to obtain 
their opinion on certain aspects of the matter....
113 Para. 3.129 of the panel report.
114 Para. 107 of the Appellate Body report.
From the foregoing, it is not surprising that some commentators have labelled 
the WTO’s dispute settlement process “incapable of settling trade disputes in a manner 
that supports sustainable development”.115 Even if the flaws at the panel stage have 
been remedied by the Appellate Body’s efforts, the Appellate Body cannot be said to be 
conclusive in terms of providing guidance for the way trade and environment disputes 
are to be handled in the future, for it did not deal explicitly with the issue of PPMs
which, in essence, was at the heart of the Shrimp/Turtle dispute.116 Accordingly, it has
been commented that it is not clear if this case has signalled a closer linkage between 
trade and environment.117 Thus, it still remains to be seen how close the WTO’s dispute 
settlement system has brought trade and environment closer to one another. That, of 
course, will depend on further clarification of some core issues of the trade and 
environment debate. But, as of now, the Shrimp/Turtle case has at least provided some 
encouragement to the way trade and environment disputes are resolved, especially from 
the environmentalist’s point of view.118 This is neatly summarised in para. 193 of the 
Appellate Body report which reads:
In reaching these conclusions, we wish to underscore what we have not
decided in this appeal. We have not decided that the protection and
preservation of the environment is of no significance to the Members of 
the WTO. Clearly, it is. We have not decided that the sovereign nations 
that are Members of the WTO cannot adopt effective measures to protect 
endangered species, such as sea turtles. Clearly, they can and should.
115 Matthew Stillwell and Charles Arden-Clarke, supra, note 107, at 5.
116 See para. 128 of the Appellate Body report. In that paragraph the Appellate Body stated:
conditioning access to a member’s domestic market on whether exporting members 
comply with or adopt, a policy or policies unilaterally prescribed by the importing 
member may, to some degree, be a common aspect o f measures falling within the scope 
of one or another of the exceptions (a) to (j) of [Art.] XX.
Although it can be seen that the Appellate Body did not deal with the PPMs issue explicitly here, it could 
be argued that a condition of market access based on the PPMs could be interpreted as falling within the 
Appellate Body’s statement. The Appellate Body also did not rule out the possibility that an 
environmental policy based on the PPMs could be justified under Art. XX type of exception.
[i]t is not necessary to assume that requiring from exporting countries compliance with, 
or adoption of, certain policies (although covered in principle by one or another of the 
exceptions) prescribed by the importing country, renders a measure a priori incapable 
of justification under Art. XX.
117 See Prof. Dr. Thomas Cottier, ‘Conflict Resolution in the Future’, a paper presented at the “Trade, 
Investment and the Environment Conference”, Chatham House, London, 29-30 October 1998, at 9.
118 See ‘Turtle Soup’, The Economist, 17 October 1998, 124.
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And we have not decided that sovereign states should not act together 
bilaterally, plurilaterally or multilaterally, either within the WTO or in 
other international fora, to protect endangered species or to otherwise 
protect the environment. Clearly, they should and do. (Emphasis added 
in the original.)
3.3.2.3. The Beef Hormone Case119
This was the very first opportunity for the DSB to address the application of the SPS 
Agreement. Initially, the dispute settlement process began with a consultation with the 
EU on 26 January 1996, from which no attainable compromises were achieved. Thus, 
on 25 April 1996, the United States requested the establishment of a panel under the 
WTO’s dispute settlement regime. The panel was established on 20 May 1996, to
determine whether or not the measure by the EU was incompatible with the SPS and
100other WTO agreements. On 27 September 1996, Canada also requested the 
establishment of a panel for more or less the same issue. The panel was established on 
16 October 1996.121 The EU measure in this case was a ban imposed on trade in meat, 
including meat products, which had been treated with six growth-promoting hormones, 
both within the EU and with other countries. The hormones in this case include 
“natural” as well as “synthetic” hormones. The former encompasses oestradiol - 1713, 
progesterone and testosterone. The latter encompasses trenbolone acetate, zeranol and 
melengestrol acetate (MGA).
The reasons for the ban were the fear that the hormone used in the production of 
meat might increase the chance of health risks such as cancer and reduction in male 
fertility. In effect, the EU exercised the precautionary approach which had been infused 
into its practice. Prior to the advent of this dispute, the diethylstilbestrol (DES)
119 See for commentary, Dale E. McNiel, ‘The First Case Under the WTO’s Sanitary and Phytosanitary 
Agreement: The European Union’s Hormone Ban’, 39 Virginia Journal o f International Law (1998) 89; 
Vem R. Walker, ‘Keeping the WTO from Becoming the “World Trans-science Organization”: Scientific 
Uncertainty, Science Policy, and Factfinding in the Growth Hormones Dispute’, 31 Cornell International 
Law Journal (1998) 251.
120 The dispute under the SPS Agreement can be resolved by the DSB as the SPS is one of the Covered 
agreements under the WTO Charter.
121 See report of the panel, EC Measures Concerning Meat and Meat Products (Hormones') - Complaint 
bv Canada. , 18 August 1997, WT/DS48/R/CAN.
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hormone in meat production had been used in cattle production in order to enhance 
growth by speeding up muscle development and weight gain. Thus, the cattle would be 
ready to be marketed quicker than if they grew naturally.122 In 1980, a scandal in Italy 
broke out in relation to the use of the DES hormone which had resulted in young 
children developing enlarged breasts. Since then the ban on meat treated with hormones 
was authorised in a series of European Council Directives, viz. Directive 81/602,123 
Directive 88/146124 and Directive 88/299.125 However, these three Directives were 
repealed and replaced from 1 July 1997 by Council Directive 96/22 of 29 April 1996.126 
The new Directive prohibits use of hormones for growth-promotion purposes. It also 
prohibits the placing on the market and importing of meat and meat products made from 
animals administered with hormones. But, it provides exceptions if hormones have 
been used for therapeutic and zootechnical purposes.
Against this backdrop, the United States contended that the EU ban was 
unfounded as there was no scientific evidence in its support. As a result, the ban on 
beef trade effectively acted as a barrier to trade.
On 30 June 1997, the panel delivered its final report to the parties in dispute, 
finding that the EU measure in this instance was inconsistent with the WTO’s 
obligations. By and large, the reasons given by the panel were that: (i) the EU ban 
constituted a SPS measure; (ii) the ban was not based on a risk assessment, and thus 
violated Art. 5.1 of the SPS Agreement; (iii) the ban was not based on international
122 According to a 1987 study by the US Department of Agriculture (USDA), the hormone-treated 
animals grow approximately 15 per cent, or 17 days, faster than their untreated counterparts. This account 
was cited in Dale E. McNiel, supra, note 119, at 100.
123 Council Directive 81/602/EEC of 31 July 1981, OJ 1981 L222, 32. This Directive prohibits, subject 
to exceptions, an administration o f substances having either hormonal or thyrostatic action to farm 
animals. Additionally, the Directive prohibits marketing o f meat and meat products produced from 
animals administered with such substances, whether they were domestic or imported. The exceptions are 
allowed when the hormones are used for therapeutic or zootechnical purposes and are administered by a 
veterinarian or under his/her responsibility.
124 Council Directive 88/146/EEC of 7 March 1988, OJ 1988 L70, 16. Promulgated seven years later 
than the first Directive in the series, this Directive prohibits the administration of synthetic hormones for 
any purposes, and o f natural hormones for growth promotion and fattening purposes. Trade, both intra- 
EC and importation into the EC, of meat and meat products made from animals administered with 
hormones is banned, except for therapeutic or zootechnical purposes.
125 Council Directive 88/299/EEC o f 17 May 1988, OJ 1988 L128, 36.
126 OJ 1996 L125, 3.
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standards and was more stringent without justification, and thereby violated Art. 3.1 of 
the SPS Agreement; and (iv) the EU ban was inconsistent with Art. 5.5 of the SPS 
Agreement for being arbitrary or having unjustifiable distinctions, in the appropriate 
level of sanitary protection, resulting in discrimination or a disguised restriction on 
international trade.
Upon such findings, the EU promptly appealed to the Appellate Body on the 
interpretation of the SPS Agreement, which delivered its report on 16 January 1998 
upholding most of the panel’s decisions and declaring the EU ban violated the WTO and 
the SPS rules while reversing the panel’s finding that the EU ban was inconsistent with 
international standards and constituted arbitrary or unjustifiable distinctions in the 
appropriate level of sanitary protection resulting in discrimination or a disguised 
restriction on international trade. The reports will be discussed more substantially 
below.
To begin its analysis on the EU measure, the panel first examined the 
applicability of the SPS Agreement to the EU ban. As the measure in this dispute was 
found to be applied for the purpose of protecting human life or health from residues of 
hormones used in growth-promotion of cattle, it was not difficult therefore to find that 
the SPS Agreement was applicable in this dispute. This was because the SPS 
Agreement covers measures adopted in order to protect human or animal life from
197 • *categories of risks specified in the Agreement. A wide choice of measures for the 
sanitary protection was provided in the Agreement, one of which is a trade ban pursuant 
to the law and regulation of the member of the WTO. Thus, the ban pursuant to the EU 
Directive fell within the scope of what could be classified as the SPS measures, and 
hence fell under the ambit of the SPS Agreement.
However, as the SPS measure of the EU in this case had been adopted prior to 
the coming into force of the WTO Agreement, encompassing the SPS Agreement, the 
next issue examined by the panel was the retrospective application of the SPS 
Agreement. On this issue, the panel ruled that the SPS Agreement had a retrospective 
effect where the sanitary protection measure was already in use before the entry into
127 See footnote 47, supra.
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force of the WTO and remained in force thereafter.128 Therefore, the EU measure was 
found to be within the scope of the SPS Agreement.
Turning to the more substantive provisions of the SPS Agreement, the panel
examined whether the EU ban was based on a risk assessment pursuant to the
requirement in Art. 5.1 of the SPS Agreement. “Risk assessment” is defined in para. 4
of Annex A of the SPS Agreement as “the evaluation of the potential for adverse effects
on human or animal health arising from the presence of additives, contaminants, toxins
or disease-causing organisms in food, beverages or feedstuffs”. Moreover, according to
the panel, “risk assessment” was equated to “a scientific examination of data and factual
studies, not a policy exercise involving social value judgments made by political 
1
bodies”. In any case, the panel interpreted the “risk assessment” as requiring a two- 
step test: (i) identify the adverse effects on human health (if any) arising from the 
presence of the hormones at issue when used as growth promoters in meat. ..; and (ii) if 
any such adverse effects exist, evaluate the potential or probability of occurrence of 
such effects”. (Emphasis added in the Appellate Body report).
However, it is worth noting that the Appellate Body has pointed out that while 
the two-step test advocated by the panel was debatable, it did not consider the test to be 
“substantially wrong”. It was more concerned about the alternative use of the words 
“probability” and “potential”.130 From the viewpoint of the Appellate Body, the 
ordinary meaning of these words conveyed a different connotation, as “probability” 
implied a higher degree of potentiality or possibility. Unfortunately, the Appellate 
Body did not further clarify which terminology it preferred. Instead, it went on to state 
that what was required by “based on” a risk assessment under the SPS Agreement meant 
that “a panel has to determine whether an SPS measure is sufficiently supported or 
reasonably warranted by the risk assessment”. Ip
* v» •
128 Para. 8.27 of the panel report.
129 Para. 181 of the Appellate Body report.
130 Para. 184 of the Appellate Body report.
131 Para. 184 of the Appellate Body report.
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The key issues in the Appellate Body’s interpretation lie in the meanings of
“based on” and “risk assessment”. In respect of the former, the panel interpreted it as
requiring “a minimum procedural requirement”, i.e. “the Member imposing a sanitary
measure needs to submit evidence that at least it actually took into account a risk
assessment when it enacted or maintained its sanitary measure”. (Emphasis added in
original.)132 However, the Appellate Body interpreted the requirement of “based on”
otherwise. It interpreted the phrase as referring to “a certain objective relationship
between two elements, that is to say, to an objective situation that persists and is
observable between an SPS measure and a risk assessment”. (Emphasis added in 
• » 1 ^original.) Thus, the Appellate Body found the panel’s interpretation to be 
unnecessary and an error in law, since the panel required a Member imposing an SPS 
measure to practically carry out a risk assessment while Art. 5.1, in fact, only requires 
that member to show the connection between the measure and a risk assessment without 
having to perform the risk assessment per se.
With regard to the latter, i.e. the “risk assessment”, the risk to be assessed covers 
not only risk ascertainable in a science laboratory but also includes risk in human 
societies, i.e. “the actual potential for adverse effects on human health in the real world
where people live and work and die.”134 Additionally, there needs to be a rational
• • 1 ^  ^  relationship between an SPS measure and a risk assessment, whose determination
could be carried out on a “case-to-case” basis. Having examined the issue, the panel
found that several of the submitted scientific reports relied upon by the EU had met the
requirement of a risk assessment, and all seemed to suggest that the use of hormones in
this case was safe. As it could not be found that any risk assessment reasonably
supported or warranted the ban, both the panel and the Appellate Body found that the
ban was not based on a risk assessment. In effect, this was a violation of Art. 5.1 of the!
SPS Agreement. /
132 Para. 188 of the Appellate Body report.
133 Para. 189 of the Appellate Body report.
134 Para. 187 of the Appellate Body report.
135 Para. 193 of the Appellate Body report.
The next question was whether the EU ban was supported by scientific evidence 
and based on scientific principles as required by the SPS Agreement. On this point, the 
panel had found that the EU did not provide convincing evidence that its measure was 
scientifically justified as “[a] 11 the evidence referred to by the [EU] which specifically 
relates to the use of the hormones at issue for growth promotion purposes concludes that 
the use of these hormones as growth promoters in accordance with good practice is 
safe”.136 This view of the panel was upheld by the Appellate Body.
The SPS Agreement in Art. 3 also requires that the SPS measure is to be based 
on existing international standards, guidelines or recommendations where they exist. 
The panel had found that the EU ban relating to the natural hormones was not so based 
because the EU sanitary measure differed significantly from the level of protection 
under international standards, in this case, the Codex Alimentarius Commission.
Accordingly, the panel found the EU measure to be in violation of Art. 3.1 of the SPS
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Agreement. However, the Appellate Body did not agree with the panel on this issue. 
It explained its contrary finding by suggesting that the panel had erroneously interpreted 
the requirement of “based on” international standards as meaning “conforming with” 
international standards, which signified “obligatory” force and effect. By interpreting as 
the panel had done, it would “transform those [international] standards, guidelines and 
recommendations into binding norms” which was not intended by the SPS 
Agreement.138 Moreover, according to one writer, “based on” was chosen by the 
negotiators of the SPS Agreement to provide some leeway for disparate national \ 
standards.139 The Appellate Body went on to state that a measure based on an 
international standard “may adopt some, not necessarily all, of the elements of the 
international standard”.140 Unfortunately, the Appellate Body did not pursue further 
examination whether the EU ban was in fact “based on” international standards in the 
sense given by itself.
136 Para. 8.137 o f the panel report.
137 Para. 8.77 of the panel report.
138 Para. 165 of the Appellate Body report.
139 Dale E. McNiel, supra, note 119, at 122
140 Para. 171 of the Appellate Body report.
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The level of sanitary protection can be set, however, at a higher level than 
international standards subject to two qualifications, namely (i) the measure results in a 
higher than international standard of sanitary protection; and (ii) the higher level of 
protection can be justified scientifically or must follow from the choice of Member 
States for the appropriate level of protection determined in accordance with 
requirements in Art. 5 of the SPS Agreement, which inter alia includes a risk 
assessment.141 In this case, the panel ruled that the ban, although argued to be 
appropriate for the EU, could not be qualified under this exception because the EU 
measure was found not to be based on risk assessment. The Appellate Body, in 
upholding this finding, dismissed the EU’s appeal on this issue.
The next substantive issue is whether the EU has acted inconsistently with Art. 
5.5 of the SPS Agreement by adopting arbitrary or unjustifiable distinctions in the level 
of protection resulting in discrimination or disguised restriction on international trade. 
The Appellate Body began its analysis by reading together Art. 5.5 with Art. 2.3 (the 
basic rights and obligations of the WTO Members). Within both of these articles the 
distinctions in the level of sanitary protection are not to be “arbitrary or unjustifiably 
discriminatory” and “applied in a manner which would constitute a disguised restriction 
on international trade”. The Appellate Body has noted that the objective of Art. 5.5 is to 
achieve “consistency in the application of the concept of the appropriate level of sanitary 
or phytosanitary protection”.142 Thus, in order to examine whether Art. 5.5 has been 
violated, it is necessary to examine three inherent conditions, viz. that (i) the “Member 
imposing the measure complained of has adopted its own appropriate levels of sanitary 
protection against risks to human life or health in several different situations”; (ii) 
“those levels of protection exhibit arbitrary or unjustifiable differences in their treatment 
of different situations”; and (iii) “the arbitrary or unjustifiable differences result in 
discrimination or a disguised restriction on international trade”.143 These three 
conditions were considered cumulatively by the Appellate Body, thus all of these 
elements must be established prior to the finding of the Art. 5.5 violation.
141 For what “risk assessment” entails, see Art. 5(2) and (3) of the SPS Agreement, which inter alia 
includes taking into account relevant processes and production methods, ecological and environment 
conditions and economic factors.
142 Para. 213 o f the Appellate Body report.
143 Para. 214 of the Appellate Body report.
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For the first condition, in order to be able to determine whether the measure 
adopted would be appropriate in “different situations”, there need to be some common 
elements for rendering possible a comparison. Having examined the EU measure in this 
dispute, five different levels of protection were found as follows:
(i) the level of protection in respect of natural hormones when used for growth 
promotion;
(ii) the level of protection in respect of natural hormones occurring 
endogenously in meat and other foods;
(iii) the level of protection in respect of natural hormones when used for 
therapeutic or zootechnical purposes;
(iv) the level of protection in respect of synthetic hormones (zeranol and 
trenbolone) when used for growth promotion; and
(v) the level of protection in respect of carbadox and olaquindox.144
Having found that several levels of protection existed for the purpose of 
comparison, it was not difficult to satisfy the first requirement of the test. The Appellate 
Body, therefore, could then proceed to an examination of the second prong of the test.
By comparing the levels of protection relating to hormones under the categories 
mentioned earlier, the panel found the difference in the levels of protection between the 
levels of protection of natural and synthetic hormones for growth-promoting purposes 
and between natural hormones for growth-promoting purposes and natural hormones 
occurred endogenously in meat and other foods to be “arbitrary and unjustifiable”. This 
was because
the [EU] had not provided any reason other than the difference between
added hormones and hormones naturally occurring in meat and other
foods that have formed part of the human diet for centuries, and had not
144 Para. 218 of the Appellate Body report.
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submitted any evidence that the risk related to natural hormones used as 
growth promoters was higher than the risk related to endogenous 
hormones.145
However, the Appellate Body considered the contrary to be the case. By not 
having any regulation in place for the hormones occurring endogenously, the Appellate 
Body did not find such practice of the EU to be arbitrary or unjustifiable.
Because the Appellate Body found differently from the panel’s finding, it went 
on to compare other levels of protection, while the panel did not, as it felt it unnecessary 
to do so. The Appellate Body, accordingly, compared the natural hormones used for 
promoting growth and for therapeutic and zootechnical purposes. Having examined the 
frequency and scale of the treatment and the mode of administration of such hormones, 
the Appellate Body came up with a conclusion that the difference in the levels of 
protection relating to these two types of hormones was not arbitrary or unjustifiable.146 
This was because the hormones for therapeutic and zootechnical purposes were used 
sparingly and could only be administered by a qualified veterinarian or under his/her 
responsibility. Hence, there was a clear difference between these two types of 
hormones.
In comparing the levels of protection of natural and synthetic hormones for 
promoting growth and carbadox and olaquindox,147 the Appellate Body found the
* * 1 4 8difference in their levels of protection to be unjustifiable on the basis of seven 
reasons presented by the EC in its case.149 For example, carbadox and olaquindox were 
argued to be anti-microbial agents, rather than hormones; carbadox and olaquindox were 
available commercially in prepared feedstuffs in certain dosages and less open to abuse 
than the growth-promoting hormones; and carbadox was only used in a very small 
amount and hardly leaves residues in pork meat.
145 Para. 220 of the Appellate Body report.
146 Para. 225 of the Appellate Body report.
147 Carbadox and olaquindox are “anti-microbial agents or compounds which are mixed with the feed 
given to piglets (maximum age of four months)”. Para. 226 o f the Appellate Body report.
148 Para. 235 of the Appellate Body report.
149 See para. 228-234 o f the Appellate Body.
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For the last requirement, i.e. “resulting in discrimination or a disguised 
restriction on international trade”, the panel followed the Gasoline case by interpreting 
the terms “arbitrary discrimination”, “unjustifiable discrimination” and “disguised 
restriction on international trade” side-by-side as they imparted meaning to one 
another.150 As this test has to be performed on a case-by-case basis, in this instance, the 
panel found three reasons for the difference in the levels of protection concerning 
carbadox and olaquindox vis-a-vis growth-promoting hormones had resulted in 
discrimination or a disguised restriction on international trade. These are: (i) the “great 
difference” in the levels of protection between hormones; (ii) the absence of any 
plausible justification to support the difference between the levels of protection by the 
EU; and (iii) the import ban which, by its nature, restricted international trade. The 
panel further justified its finding, inter alia, by reading into the EU ban “de facto 
discrimination against imported beef produced with growth promotion hormones.”151 
However, the Appellate Body found the finding of the panel to be “unjustified and 
erroneous as a matter of law”, and reversed that finding accordingly as it could not share 
the same view with the panel that the import ban in beef treated with growth-promoting 
hormones was a disguised trade restriction.
It is worth noting too that another issue appealed by the EU was an allocation of 
the burden of proof in the SPS Agreement proceedings. The panel found that the 
“evidentiary burden” rested upon the member imposing the SPS measure. In other 
words, the burden to show consistency with the SPS Agreement rests with the defending 
party all the way through. However, the Appellate Body did not agree with this. 
Having established that the panel erred in its interpretation on this issue, it found that it 
was for the complaining party to establish a prima facie case of inconsistency with a 
provision of the SPS Agreement before the burden of showing consistency with that 
provision shifted to the defending party.
The findings of the WTO’s dispute resolution body have led some writers to 
question the role played by the WTO. One writer has argued that the WTO should not 
become the “World Trans-Science Organization”, as it has no authority to regulate the
150 See the Gasoline case, supra.
151 Para. 243 of the Appellate Body report.
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1 ^9level of, and relating policies to, health and safety of its members. Understandably, 
allowing the WTO to assume such a role would hinder the level of sovereignty accorded 
to each nation under international law in setting its own environmental policies. 
Although this seems to be the view taken by the panel in the Beef Hormone case, it can 
be seen from the Appellate Body’s ruling that with respect to the SPS measure, the 
WTO at least is prepared to accept, subject to some prevailing conditions, the disparity 
between each government to set its own environmental standards. According to some
commentators, the Appellate Body’s clarification on this issue “opens the door to a
• 1 better integration of trade and environmental policy”. Nonetheless, other writers
argued that the panel and the Appellate Body have failed to deal effectively with the
complex and difficult issues raised by the Beef Hormone dispute.154
On the whole, the Beef Hormone case can be considered as “a major decision in 
WTO jurisprudence with potentially widespread repercussions for environmental and 
public health policy in a number of areas”.155 In the light of growing concerns relating 
to modem health and safety issues, this case has indeed provided an important yardstick 
when the SPS measures are brought before the WTO’s dispute settlement system.
152 Vem R. Walker, supra, note 119, at 255.
153 James Cameron and Karen Campbell, supra, note 80, at 209.
154 Dale E. McNiel, supra, note 119, at 93.
155 Jake Caldwell, ‘The WTO Beef Growth Hormone Ruling: An Analysis’, in Charles Arden-Clarke, ed., 
Dispute Settlement in the WTO, op. cit., 10-13, at 10.
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APEC: Trade and the Environment
In this chapter, an introduction to APEC will be given. It aims at providing readers who 
are not familiar with APEC with some background information. This chapter consists 
of three sections. Section one will briefly give an historical account of APEC and 
delineate the essence of APEC. Then, section two will discuss some of APEC’s trade 
and environmental activities as carried out by APEC and its organs. In the last section, 
issues relating to trade and environment disputes will be examined in the context of 
APEC.
4.1. The Background of APEC
“APEC” is an acronym for the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation, comprising 21 
member “economies” across the Pacific Ocean.1 These are: Australia, Brunei, Canada, 
Chile, China, Taiwan, Hong Kong, Indonesia, Japan, Malaysia, Mexico, New Zealand, 
Papua New Guinea, Peru, the Philippines, Russia, Singapore, South Korea, Thailand, 
the United States and Vietnam.
Historically, APEC began as an informal discussion group whose aim was to 
foster regional economic co-operation among its members in the light of the growing 
economic interdependence around the world, especially in the Pacific Rim, and the fear 
that the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations would not materialise. In 
November 1989, under the then Australian Prime Minister, Bob Hawke, APEC was 
formally inaugurated at a ministerial meeting, attended by 12 founding members. The 
three Chinese members joined APEC in 1991. Mexico and Papua New Guinea were 
admitted in 1993 and Chile joined the group in 1994. More recently, APEC’s 
membership expanded to include Russia, Vietnam and Peru in 1998.
1 It should be noted that the word “economies” is commonly used to represent members o f APEC. This 
is because not all members of APEC are recognisable States under international law.
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Since its inception, APEC has developed gradually. However, specific 
objectives of APEC were not developed until the materialisation of the Seoul 
Declaration in 1991.3 Four main objectives were set out by this Declaration, which are: 
(i) to sustain the growth and development of the region for the common good and to 
contribute to the growth and development of the world economy; (ii) to enhance the 
positive gains from the increasing interdependence, by encouraging the free flow of 
goods, services, capital and technology; (iii) to develop and strengthen the open 
multilateral trading system in the interest of the Asia-Pacific members and all others; 
and (iv) to reduce barriers to trade in goods and services among members and in 
manners consistent with the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT).
The Declaration further stipulates two co-operation methods for all APEC’s 
activities, viz. the recognition of diversity in the members’ economic development, 
social and political systems; and the need for open dialogue and consensus and respect 
for the views of all members.
In its early stages, APEC could only be seen as no more than a forum which 
provided an opportunity for APEC personnel to meet. But, gradually APEC has turned 
into something more than that, albeit lacking in concrete institutional structures and 
legal frameworks. The landmark event for APEC’s development was the 1994 Bogor 
Meeting of APEC leaders which produced the Bogor Declaration of Common Resolve 
(hereinafter the “Bogor Declaration”).4 Despite only being a non-binding instrument, 
this Declaration is not only significant in setting a broad aim for APEC to pursue open 
trade by eliminating impediments to economic co-operation and integration, in my view 
it also marks the beginning of APEC’s move into the 21st century. In doing so, the 
Bogor Declaration sets target dates for achieving free trade and investment in APEC by 
the year 2010 for developed members and 2020 for developing members. The Bogor
2 In addition, many other countries and economies have shown interest in joining APEC, such as India, 
Macau, Mongolia, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, Ecuador, Panama and Columbia. See ‘China Seeks Senior 
Status in APEC’, Asian Business Review, June 1996, 8. However, APEC has been careful about 
admitting new members as it believes that too many members from diverse backgrounds may jeopardise 
the workability o f APEC as a whole, particularly in the areas of trade liberalisation and facilitation.
3 1991 Seoul APEC Declaration, in APEC Secretariat, Selected APEC Document 1989-1994,
(Singapore: APEC Secretariat, 1995), 61-64.
4 The Bogor Declaration, 15 November 1994, in APEC Secretariat, Selected APEC Documents 1989- 
1994, op. cit., 5-8. See Appendix A.
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Declaration has also paved the way for later initiatives to follow, notably the Osaka 
Action Agenda in 1995s and the Manila Action Plan for APEC (MAPA) in 1996.6
Over the years, APEC may be perceived as the world’s most economically 
dynamic region. Its economic performance, both individually or as a group, has been 
astonishing. According to one of APEC’s sources, in 1994 the 18 members of APEC 
had an aggregate Gross National Product (GDP) of US$ 13 trillion. This represented an 
approximation of half of the world’s total annual output. In addition, about 46 percent 
of global trade in commodities originated from APEC members. In 1995, the APEC’s 
combined GDP rose to US$ 15.6 trillion, and it is believed to be continuously growing.8 
According to APEC officials, based upon 1997 figures, the inclusion of Russia, Vietnam 
and Peru at the meeting of APEC in 1998 was expected to produce a combined GDP of 
US$ 14 trillion, accounting for approximately 58 percent of world income and 47 
percent of total world trade.9
The success of APEC is partly due to its composition of members. APEC 
encompasses three members of the G-7 nations: the United States, Canada and Japan; 
four “East Asian Tigers”: Singapore, South Korea, Hong Kong and Taiwan; and a group 
of “Newly Industrialised Countries” (NICs), comprising Thailand, Malaysia and 
Indonesia. Unquestionably, several domestic economic and political reforms in these 
Asian members have, within the past decades, led to their magnificent economic 
growth. Most of them have even outperformed their European counterparts. China, in 
particular, has played an important role in APEC’s economic windfall. China has 
already been placed as the third largest economy in the world, after the United States
5 The Osaka Action Agenda: Implementing o f the Bogor Declaration, in APEC Secretariat, Selected 
APEC Documents 1995, (Singapore: APEC Secretariat, 1995), 5-123.
6 Manila Action Plan for APEC, available from the APEC Secretariat in Singapore at 
http://www.apecsec.org.sg.
7 APEC Secretariat, Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC), (Singapore: APEC Secretariat, 1996), 
at 1.
8 Andr£ Dua and Daniel C. Esty, eds., Sustaining the Asia Pacific Miracle: Environmental Protection 
and Economic Integration, (Washington, DC: Institute for International Economics, 1997), at 13.
9 Michael Richardson, ‘Divided and Distracted, APEC Prepares to Meet’, International Herald Tribune, 
14-15 November 1998, at 1.
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and Japan,10 and with its continuing trade and investment reforms, in awaiting 
membership of the World Trade Organization (WTO), it has the potential to grow even 
more.11
Another reason for APEC’s success is the way APEC has progressed
19pragmatically. It has been argued that APEC has to be pragmatic because of its 
diversity. Such diversity can be seen in terms of culture, language, religion, politics 
and, most importantly, the level of economic development. Throughout the 
development of APEC, therefore, sensitive issues have normally been omitted from 
discussion, at least until such time as APEC feels ready to deal with the issue. For 
example, common economic interests have been identified by all members before any 
concrete work programmes are designed, as opposed to setting up an economic work 
agenda which some of the members have no capability to fulfil.
4.2. The Organisational Structure of APEC
Like other international organisations, APEC cannot operate without a necessary 
institutional infrastructure. In comparison to other existing regional institutions - like 
the European Union (EU), North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) or 
Association of South-East Asian Nations (ASEAN) - APEC’s organisational structure 
was loosely constituted.
Since its inception, the highest organ of APEC had been the Ministerial 
Meetings, usually from the ministry of trade or economy from each member of APEC. 
The meetings have been arranged annually, and alternately chaired by Asian and non- 
Asian member.
10 See International Monetary Fund, Staff Studies for the World Economic Outlook, (Washington, DC: 
IMF, 1993); World Bank, World Development Report, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993).
11 See for a discussion on China and its trade liberalisation reforms, Yongzheng Yang, ‘China’s WTO 
Membership: What’s at Stake?’, 19 (6) The World Economy (1996) 661.
12 See Hugh Corbet, ‘Why and How the APEC Process is Working’, 14(4) Journal o f  Northeast Asian 
Studies (1995) 4.
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Diagram C: APEC’s Organisational Structure
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In 1993, the President of the United States, Bill Clinton, hosted an 
unprecedented informal meeting of leaders of APEC at Blake Island on 20 November. 
Since then, the so-called Leaders’ Summit has been held immediately after each 
Ministerial Meeting. Over the history of APEC, the summits have been held in Seattle, 
United States (1993); Bogor, Indonesia (1994); Osaka, Japan (1995); Manila, the 
Philippines (1996); and Vancouver, Canada (1997). The 1998 summit was held in 
Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia. At the end of each summit, the leaders agree on an annual 
Declaration which sets out broad objectives and vision for APEC to follow. 
Significantly, what the leaders’ summits have contributed to APEC is that they have
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elevated APEC from meetings of economic bureaucrats to those of high-level political 
leaders.13 Indirectly, this has heightened the recognition of APEC in the global arena.14
Policy goals will then be designated to senior officials to carry out. Normally, 
these senior officials are foreign or trade ministry bureaucrats, at the assistant secretary 
or vice-ministerial level. They meet regularly, approximately three to five times a year, 
at the Senior Officials’ Meeting (SOM). Their tasks are to co-ordinate and oversee 
activities of APEC’s committees and working groups, and carry out APEC’s work in 
between the annual Ministerial Meetings and ad hoc special Ministerial Meetings. 
These special Ministerial Meetings were attended by ministers of APEC members 
specifically responsible, inter alia, for trade, environment, energy, finance, 
telecommunications, science and technology, and human resource development.
In 1992, a permanent Secretariat of APEC was established in Singapore by the 
Bangkok Declaration.15 However, the Secretariat is very small and only modestly 
funded. It comprises an executive director, deputy executive director, eight to nine 
professional staff and just over a dozen supporting staff who are recruited locally. 
Despite its size, the Secretariat has played an important role in carrying out day-to-day 
work and co-ordinating all activities of APEC. It has been argued that because positions 
at the Secretariat are rotated quickly, this has caused difficulties and discontinuity in the 
operation of the Secretariat.16 Nonetheless, the establishment of the permanent 
Secretariat has marked the turn of APEC from loose arrangements into a fully fledged 
international organisation.17
13 David K. Linnan, ‘APEC Quo Vadis?’, 89(4) American Journal o f International Law (1995) 824, at 
826.
14 ‘Assessing APEC’, 21(6) China Business Review (1994) 6.
15 Bangkok Declaration on Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) Institutional Arrangements, 
Bangkok, 10 September 1992, in APEC Secretariat, Selected APEC Document 1989-1994, op. cit., 77-79.
16 Dajin Peng, The Rise o f  a Pacific Community? Evolution and Trends o f  Asia Pacific Economic 
Cooperation, Ph.D. Thesis, the Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs, November 
1995, at 263.
17 Shaun Seow and Phua Kok Kim, ‘APEC to Focus on Freer Trade for Region’, Straits Times, 12 
September 1992, 1.
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Specific areas of APEC’s activities have been carried out by three permanent 
Committees, Ad hoc Policy Level Group on Small and Medium Enterprises (SMEs),18 
and ten working groups. The three Committees are the Committee on Trade and 
Investment (CTI),19 the Budget and Administrative Committee (BAC),20 and the 
Economic Committee.21 These committees are to report to the ministers through the 
SOM. They also represent key organs in carrying out key areas of APEC’s activities. 
For example, the CTI is one of the key organs of APEC in assisting the implementation 
of trade liberalisation and facilitation components of the Osaka Action Agenda. As will 
be discussed in the next chapter, in relation to the dispute settlement aspect, the CTI has 
also been entrusted to develop a dispute settlement mechanism specifically designed for 
APEC. The Economic Committee’s main task is to enhance APEC’s capability for 
analysing economic trends and studying specific economic issues, especially cross­
cutting issues. For example, in 1996 the Economic Committee specifically agreed a 
work plan which inter alia covers research on economic instruments for environmental 
protection under the economic and technical co-operation (ECOTECH) scheme.22
Ten working groups focus their work on specified areas as follows: fisheries, 
human resources development, industrial science and technology, marine resource 
conservation, regional energy co-operation, telecommunications, tourism, trade and 
investment data, trade promotion, and transportation. As will be seen later, relating to 
environmental protection, some of these working groups have already incorporated 
environmental considerations into their work programmes. However, it is still 
questionable whether such effort will be enough to protect the APEC’s environment 
without establishing, for example, a separate environmental working group to oversee 
an overall implementation of environmental protection in APEC.
18 Established at the 1994 Ministerial Meeting in Jakarta, Indonesia.
19 Established at the 1993 Ministerial Meeting in Seattle, United States.
20 Established at the 1993 Ministerial Meeting in Seattle, United States.
21 Established at the 1994 Ministerial Meeting in Jakarta, Indonesia.
22 See for a summary o f this work, David Black, The Experience with Economic Instruments in APEC 
Economies, paper presented at a Workshop on Economic Instruments Toward Sustainable Cities in 
APEC. (On file with author.)
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Outside these APEC organs, there also exist a number of advisory groups: the 
APEC Business Advisory Council (ABAC), the Pacific Business Forum (PBF), and the 
Eminent Persons Group (EPG). ABAC was established in November 1995 at the 
Ministerial Meeting in Osaka. Its purposes are to provide advice on the implementation 
of the Osaka Action Agenda and other specific business sector priorities. The PBF was 
set up in 1993 by APEC leaders in order to “identify issues APEC should address to 
facilitate regional trade and investment and encourage the further development of 
business networks throughout the region”.24 Out of these three, however, the most 
important advisory group is the EPG, which was set up by the ministers in 1992. This 
non-governmental think-tank group had played a significant role in developing and 
implementing a vision for APEC. Its reports have contributed towards the way APEC is 
heading, especially in the earlier stage of APEC’s development. However, the EPG 
was only an ad hoc advisory group and has ceased existence since 1995. It was not 
responsible for carrying out its recommendations. Thus, each APEC member remains 
responsible for carrying out its tasks. Currently, not only has the EPG been 
discontinued, the PBF has also been dissolved. Only the ABAC still remains operative 
and holds its periodic meetings.
From the brief description of APEC’s organisational structure above, it can 
clearly be observed that at present there is no specific organ dealing with dispute 
resolution issues. Disputes between members of APEC have hitherto been resolved 
either bilaterally or in other fora. However, this may change in the near future as APEC 
is now in the process of developing its own dispute resolution mechanism.
23 See for further details in APEC Secretariat, Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC), op. cit., at 4- 
5.
24 APEC Leaders Economic Vision Statement, Blake Island, Seattle, 20 November 1993, in APEC 
Secretariat, Selected APEC Documents 1989-1994, op. cit., 1-3, at 2.
25 The three reports produced by the EPG were: A Vision for APEC: Towards an Asia-Pacific Economic 
Community (1993), Achieving the APEC Vision: Free and Open Trade in the Asia-Pacific Region (1994), 
and Implementing the APEC Vision (1995).
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4.3. Trade Liberalisation in APEC
Generally speaking, when one talks about trade liberalisation a concept of economic 
integration inevitably springs to mind. Throughout the history of APEC, the promotion 
of economic integration has been associated with the aim of APEC. At the very first 
meeting of APEC ministers in Canberra in 1989, the focus of the meeting was the call 
for support for a multilateral trading system, apart from the obvious purpose of 
establishing APEC itself. In particular, this meeting urged APEC members to promote 
the successful completion of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations.26 
The ministers strongly believed in all “open multilateral trading system” and they did 
not envisage that APEC “should be directed to the formation of a trading bloc”. 
However, at this meeting it was not yet felt appropriate to discuss the issue of trade 
liberalisation.27
In July 1990, the ministers met again in Singapore. The focus of the meeting 
was still the push towards the conclusion of the Uruguay Round, for APEC ministers 
recognised that all countries depended on the open multilateral trading system.28 With 
regard to the work on trade liberalisation, APEC ministers agreed that it would be 
“desirable to reduce barriers to trade in goods and services among [members], so long as 
such liberalisation was consistent with GATT principles and was not to the detriment of 
other parties”.
At the third meeting in Seoul, in 1991, the ministers focused on finalising the 
structure of APEC. No substantial progress was reported in terms of trade liberalisation. 
However, one significant step was taken to further the trade liberalisation initiative, i.e. 
ministers adopted the Seoul Declaration. Apart from setting up goals for APEC, the 
Declaration also formulated a concept of “open regionalism”, which has since remained 
the central philosophy of APEC.
26 See APEC Ministerial Meeting, Joint Statement, Canberra, Australia, 6-7 November 1989, in APEC 
Secretariat, Selected APEC Documents 1989-1994, op. cit., 35-36.
27 Hugh Corbet, supra, note 12.
28 See APEC Ministerial Meeting, Joint Statement, Singapore, 29-31 July 1990; also see APEC 
Declaration on the Uruguay Round, Singapore, 30 July 1990, in APEC Secretariat, Selected APEC 
Documents 1989-1994, op. cit., 47-52; and 53.
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Unfortunately, the concept of open regionalism is by no means clear. However, 
a definition of open regionalism has been attempted by one economist. According to 
him, open regionalism is a “regional economic integration without discrimination 
against outsiders”. Thus, open regionalism seems to combine the concepts of “open 
trade” and “regionalism” together. Technically, the former, like GATT, allows all 
countries to share the same preferential treatments in trade that one country accords to 
another, whereas the latter tends to promote a limited circle of beneficiaries who may 
share trade advantages among themselves without extending them to others, hence 
encouraging protectionism. But, open regionalism seems to offer the best of both 
worlds. Thus, while APEC members advance trade preferential treatments to other 
members, they have to do the same for non-APEC members.
In words of C. Fred Bergsten, a chairman of the EPG, open regionalism 
represents:
an effort to resolve one of the central problems of contemporary trade 
policy: how to achieve compatibility between the explosion of regional 
trading arrangements around the world and the global trading system as 
embodied in the [WTO]. The concept seeks to ensure that regional 
agreements will in practice be building blocks for further global 
liberalization rather than stumbling blocks that deter such progress.30 
(Emphasis added.)
In contrast to any other years in the history of APEC, the 1993 Ministerial 
Meeting in Seattle was followed by the unprecedented First APEC Leaders’ Summit.
i
This informal summit not only brought APEC leaders closer together, according to 
one commentator, it also provided an opportunity for presidents and prime ministers of 
APEC members to agree on stalled trade and co-operation issues at other levels of the 
APEC’s framework.32 In the Leaders Economic Vision Statement, the leaders called for
29 Ross Gamaut, Open Regionalism and Trade Liberalization: An Asia-Pacific Contribution to the 
World Trade System, (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1996), at 1.
30 C. Fred Bergsten, ‘Open Regionalism’, in C. Fred Bergsten, ed., Whither APEC?: The Progress to 
Date and Agenda for the Future, (Washington, DC: Institute for International Economics, 1997), 83-105, 
at 83.
31 Particularly, this was the first time President Bill Clinton met with the Chinese President, Jiang Zemin, 
after the Tiananmen incident. However, the Prime Minister Mahatir Mohammed of Malaysia refused to 
attend.
32 ‘Forum for the Future’, Far Eastern Economic Review, 27 November 1997, 39 at 44.
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APEC members to “take concrete steps to produce the strongest possible outcome in 
Geneva”, i.e. to bring about a completion of the Uruguay Round. In addition, the 
leaders urged for strengthening liberalisation in regional trade and investment and 
facilitating regional co-operation.
Preceding the summit was the Fifth Ministerial Meeting. Specific reference 
must be made to the adoption of a Declaration on Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation 
Trade and Investment Framework.34 This is the first piece of concrete agreement of its 
kind. Its essence was to provide a framework designed to promote co-operative effort in 
liberalising trade and investment between APEC members. Institutionally, ministers 
agreed that the CTI was to be established to co-ordinate and oversee trade and 
investment liberalisation in APEC.
Up to 1994, trade liberalisation efforts in APEC had merely been rhetoric and 
did not substantially add to what APEC members had already been obliged to do under 
GATT. The main focus of the meetings seemed to be the promotion of the successful 
conclusion of the Uruguay Round. But, a dramatic step was taken by APEC at the 
Leaders’ Summit in Bogor. As already mentioned, this summit produced the landmark 
Bogor Declaration, containing many important commitments to further trade 
liberalisation in the Asia-Pacific region. In the Declaration, the leaders pledge to reach 
free trade and investment in the Asia-Pacific by 2010 for developed members and 2020 
for developing members.
Although the Bogor Declaration has set forth the free trade goals, it does not 
mean that APEC is to create another free trade area. Indeed, this has never been 
included in APEC’s perspective. However, for some time there have been some
• i t
debates as to whether a Pacific Free Trade Area is feasible. Furthermore, there has 
been a fear that the phrase “free trade in the Asia-Pacific” would “set off alarm bells in
33 APEC Leaders Economic Vision Statement, supra, note 24.
34 Declaration on an Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation Trade and Investment Framework, Seattle, 19 
November 1993, in APEC Secretariat, Selected APEC Documents 1989-1994, op. cit., 92-94.
35 See Ross Gamaut, ‘Option for Asia-Pacific Trade Liberalization: A Pacific Free Trade Area?’; and ‘A 
Pacific Free Trade Area?’, in Ross Gamaut, Open Regionalism and Trade Liberalization, op. cit., 55-79; 
and 142-189.
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capitals around the Pacific Rim”.36 Given that APEC has persistently maintained its 
commitment to open regionalism, it is unlikely that APEC will be transformed into a 
free trade area, like the EU or NAFTA. The possibility of creating an APEC free trade 
area is even dimmer given the fact that the United States does not want to commit itself 
to another binding free trade agreement, particularly with China and Japan, with whom 
it has constantly had uneasy relationships.
Just as much as the Bogor Declaration was the landmark instrument for APEC, 
the Sixth Ministerial Meeting in Jakarta also marked a step forward for APEC. Unlike 
other previous encounters, it was the first meeting to which all 18 members sent 
ministers. With a view to furthering co-operation in APEC, the ministers agreed on 
Non-Binding Investment Principles.38
A year later, APEC moved on to an “action phase”. The Ministerial Meeting in 
Osaka, Japan, in 1995, introduced the Osaka Action Agenda. The Agenda represents a 
blueprint for trade and investment liberalisation, facilitation and ECOTECH, which 
have since become three pillars of APEC’s work. In the setting of the Osaka Action 
Agenda, trade liberalisation programmes were to be carried out upon nine principles, 
comprising: (i) comprehensiveness; (ii) consistency with the WTO; (iii) comparability; 
(iv) non-discrimination; (v) transparency; (vi) standstill; (vii) simultaneous start, 
continuous process and differentiated time tables; (viii) flexibility; and (ix) co­
operation. Rather ambitiously, the starting date of trade liberalisation was set to be 
January 1997. For trade facilitation, the Osaka Action Agenda focuses, inter alia, on 
regulatory co-operation and harmonisation of existing various standards in APEC 
members. These trade and investment liberalisation and facilitation efforts are to be 
carried out on both individual and collective bases. As for ECOTECH, it is to be 
carried out upon the principles of: (i) mutual respect and equality; (ii) mutual benefit 
and assistance; (iii) constructive and genuine partnership; and (iv) consensus building.39
36 ‘Assessing APEC’, supra, note 14.
37 Ross Gamaut, ‘The Western Pacific Paradigm and the Singapore Ministerial Meeting o f the WTO’, in 
Open Regionalism and Trade Liberalization, op. cit., 100-121, at 119.
38 Non-Binding Investment Principles, Jakarta, 1994, in APEC Secretariat, Selected APEC Documents 
1989-1994, op. cit., 117-119.
39 See further, APEC Secretariat, The State o f  Economic and Technical Cooperation in APEC, Report by 
the Economic Committee, November 1996, (Singapore: APEC Secretariat, 1996).
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The main work programmes of ECOTECH target information exchange and capacity 
building.40
The Osaka Action Agenda was approved by the leaders at their summit held also 
in Osaka on 19 November 1995. The Economic Leaders’ Declaration for Action 
reaffirms that:
The Osaka Action Agenda is the template for future APEC work toward 
our common goals. It represents the three pillars of trade and investment 
liberalizations, their facilitation, and [ECOTECH]. Achieving sustained 
economic development throughout the APEC region depends on 
pursuing actions in each of these areas vigorously.41
An ambition envisaged in the Osaka Action Agenda was further elaborated in 
MAPA 1996, which was adopted at the Ministerial Meeting in Manila, the Philippines. 
MAPA contains action programmes for each member of APEC and APEC as a whole, 
viz. “individual action plan” and “collective action plan”. 42 The former allows each 
member to set its own trade liberalisation programme, while the latter aims at the 
promotion of simplified customs procedures and lowering administrative obstacles to 
trade. MAPA also contains “joint activities” for ECOTECH whereunder more than 300 
projects have been listed. To help implement ECOTECH, the ministers at the Manila 
meeting, also endorsed the Declaration on an APEC Framework for Strengthening 
Economic Cooperation and Development.43 This framework serves as guidance for 
APEC members in implementing the ECOTECH scheme. According to a study carried 
out by the APEC Economic Committee, it has been projected that the successful
40 Thirteen work programmes have been set under ECOTECH as follows: trade and investment data, 
trade promotion, industrial science and technology, human resource development, energy, marine resource 
conservation, fisheries, telecommunications and information, transportation, tourism, small and medium 
enterprises, economic infrastructure, and agricultural technology,
41 APEC Economic Leaders’ Declaration for Action, Osaka, Japan, 19 November 1995, in APEC 
Secretariat, Selected APEC Documents 1995, op. cit., 1-4, at 1.
42 Fourteen areas were specified to be undertaken under individual and collective action plans: tariffs, 
non-tariff measures, services, investment, standards and conformance, customs procedures, intellectual 
property rights, competition policy, government procurement, deregulation, rules o f origin, dispute 
mediation, mobility o f business people, and implementation o f the Uruguay Round outcomes. For the 
collective action plan, one more area has also been added, which is information gathering and analysis 
(groundwork).
43 Excerpts reprinted in Donald C. Hellmann and Kenneth B. Pyle, From APEC to Xanadu: Creating 
Available Community in the Post-war Pacific, (Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, 1997), 230-234.
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implementation of MAPA would generate substantial benefits for APEC.44 MAPA 
would raise exports by approximately 3.0 percent from APEC members and 1.8 percent 
from the world. About 0.4 percent or US$ 69 billion permanent increase in 1995 prices 
per annum of the real GDP of APEC members would also be raised.
MAPA was endorsed by APEC leaders at the Fourth Leaders’ Summit, which 
was held immediately after the Ministerial Meeting, in Subic Bay, the Philippines, on 25 
November 1996. Indeed, this has marked an “implementation phase” of APEC trade 
and investment liberalisation.
In 1997, the meetings of APEC leaders and ministers were held in Canada. The 
Vancouver meeting has proved to be something of a dilemma for APEC members. On 
the one hand, APEC has already entered into the implementation phase, requiring 
members to start liberalising as outlined in the Osaka Action Agenda and MAPA with a 
view to meeting the 2010/2020 free trade deadlines. On the other hand, nearly half of 
APEC members, especially those in the Eastern side of the Pacific, have suffered 
economic downturn as a result of the Asian financial crisis. Adding to the discussion 
for further trade liberalisation, facilitation and ECOTECH in APEC, the leaders were 
preoccupied by finding a common solution to ease the tension of such a crisis. 
Nonetheless, the Vancouver meetings have provided an opportunity for assessing the 
compliance of APEC members with MAPA.
Pertinent to the issue of liberalisation, the leaders endorsed in their APEC 
Economic Leaders Declaration that fifteen sectors, as referred to in the Ministerial 
Meeting Joint Statement, were to be liberalised upon an Early Voluntary Sectoral 
Liberalization (EVSL) basis.45 Nine of them were to take effect throughout 1998 on the 
fast track, namely: environmental goods and services, fish and fish products, forest 
products, medical equipment and instruments, telecommunication mutual recognition 
arrangement, energy sector, toys, gems and jewellery, and chemicals. The rest would be 
implemented at the start of 1999. At the same meeting, the leaders also adopted a
44 See APEC Secretariat, The Impact o f Trade Liberalization in APEC, Report by the Economic 
Committee, (Singapore: APEC Secretariat, 1997).
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Blueprint for APEC Customs Modernization, seeking harmonisation and simplification 
of customs clearances by the year 2002. Although some of these works have already 
started, it remains to be seen, however, how far the APEC initiatives are carried out in 
due course given that Japan has been reluctant to liberalise its fisheries and forestry 
industries.46
In 1998, Malaysia was to host the APEC’s annual meetings it its capital, Kuala 
Lumpur. Given the reluctance of Malaysia to participate in APEC right from the start,47 
it has performed its task rather well. Like other previous years, the focus of the 
meetings were trade and investment liberalisation. But the emphasis was more on the 
facilitation and implementation process. With the absence of the US President,48 
leaders and ministers from all APEC members were present at the 1998 meetings. 
Although the meetings were overshadowed by Malaysia’s internal affairs regarding its 
high-level politicians, nevertheless the meetings produced, inter alia, the APEC 
Economic Leaders’ Declaration: Strengthening the Foundations for Growth49 With 
regard to trade and investment liberalisation and facilitation, the ministers reaffirmed 
their commitment to continue the individual and collective actions in order to speed up 
the recovery from the financial crisis and to continue APEC’s liberalisation goals.
45 See APEC Leaders Declaration: Connecting the APEC Community, Vancouver, Canada, 25 
November 1997; and APEC Ministerial Meeting Joint Statement, 21-22 November 1997, available at 
http://www.apecsec.org.sg/minismtg/mtgmin97.htm.
46 ‘Japan Calls on APEC to Focus on Asian Crisis’, Reuters, 5 November 1998.
47 From an APEC historical point o f view, the Malaysian Prime Minister, Dr Mahathir Mohamad was not 
keen on the creation o f APEC. He had preferred his proposition that the East Asian Economic Caucus 
(EAEC), which would not have included the United States in the group, be established. See for 
discussions o f EAEC, for example, Paul J. Davidson, The Legal Framework for International Economic 
Relations: ASEAN and Canada, (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1997), 131-133.
48 However, the Vice-President, A1 Gore, attended in place of President Clinton.
49 APEC Economic Leaders’ Declaration: Strengthening the Foundations for Growth, Kuala Lumpur, 
Malaysia, 18 November 1998; available from the APEC Secretariat, at www.apecsec.org.sg/virtualib/ 
econlead/malaysia.html. In this Declaration, the leaders pledge to “work together to support an early and 
sustained recovery [of the financial crisis] in the region”. Among other things, an emphasis was placed on 
“capacity building across the broad range o f APEC activities, particularly the human resources 
development”.
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4.4. Environmental Co-operation in APEC
In contrast to an initiative to liberalise trade, environmental issues have only been 
modestly dealt with by APEC. However, as the concerns about protecting the 
environment increase, more environmental considerations have gradually been 
incorporated within APEC’s wide range of activities.
There are some valid reasons why APEC should seriously consider 
environmental protection as part of their agenda. Firstly, APEC encompasses members 
who depend a great deal on natural resources, processed or unprocessed, for bringing 
capital to their economies. For example, Thailand is one of the main exporters of 
seafood products, Indonesia and Malaysia are the world’s main exporters of timber. 
Many Asian members, in particular the Asian NICs, have adopted export-oriented trade 
policies in order to elevate their economic prosperity. It flows naturally that more 
natural resources have been exploited both for their own consumption and for export 
purposes. Without careful environmental management, these natural resources will be 
depleted and eventually exhausted.
Secondly, APEC is well endowed with natural resources. For example, APEC 
houses the largest tropical rainforests found outside the Amazon. Indonesia and 
Malaysia possess over two-thirds of the world’s coral reefs, and a significant 
environmental heritage in biodiversity.50 Compared to other regions, APEC has been 
blessed with natural gifts. It, therefore, should not neglect the preservation of its 
ecological inheritance for future generations.
Arguably, these reasons alone may adequately warrant APEC to take 
environmental protection seriously. But, further justification for the need for APEC’s 
environmental agenda can be discerned from the fact that current environmental 
problems have a different magnitude. They can be of a national, regional or even global 
scale. Within the APEC context, members of APEC have already faced a wide range of
50 See Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific (ESCAP), State o f  the Environment in 
Asia and the Pacific, (Bangkok: ESCAP, 1995); United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP), Asia- 
Pacific Environment Outlook, (Bangkok: UNEP, 1997).
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environmental problems.51 At the national level, APEC members, especially the 
developing members, have inter alia encountered air and water pollution, deforestation, 
discharging of toxic chemicals, soil erosion, land degradation, and emission of toxic 
gases. Together with these problems, some APEC cities, like Bangkok and Jakarta, face 
challenges from urbanisation and poverty. Although not being environmental problems 
per se, these problems could exacerbate and accelerate existing environmental 
degradation.
On a regional scale, an acid rain problem is to be noted. Emissions of 
greenhouse gases, for example, have already caused concerns within the Asia-Pacific 
region. Currently, the largest emitter is the United States. But, it has been predicted 
that with the same pace as today’s emission, China’s emission level will be doubled in 
the year 2010. In addition, over-fishing has recently become another aggravating 
environmental problem in the APEC region. Within APEC’s geography, a large part 
constitutes oceans and seas. Seafood is widely consumed in the daily diet. Without 
careful management of commercial aquaculture, APEC’s marine resources will be 
exhausted in the near future.
As for the global dimension, similar to other countries, APEC members 
currently face problems such as climate change, depletion of the ozone layer, and the 
loss of biodiversity. Although these issues have been discussed regularly in 
international fora and there have already been numerous international environmental 
agreements, APEC arguably still needs environmental co-operation in these areas. It 
can be discerned that at the moment international environmental problems are dealt with 
by fragmented international institutions. For instance, under the auspices of the United 
Nations (UN) alone, at least three agencies, in different headquarters, currently 
undertake works on environmental protection, namely: the UN Development
51 See for further discussions on APEC’s environmental problems, Andr6 Dua and Daniel C. Esty, op. 
cit., 33-55. Also see UNEP, Asia-Pacific Environmental Outlook, op. cit. For descriptions of 
environmental problems faced by Asian members of APEC, see ASEAN Secretariat, First ASEAN State o f  
the Environment Report, (Jakarta: ASEAN Secretariat, 1997).
52 See The World Resources Institute, World Resources 1996-1997: The Urban Environment, (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 1996), at 318, where the statistics o f fifty countries with the highest industrial 
emissions of carbon dioxide in 1992 show that the total carbon dioxide emission levels are at 4,881,349 
million metric tons for the United States, and at 2,667,982 million metric tons for China.
126
Programme, the UN Environment Programme, and the UN Commission on Sustainable 
Development. The flaws of international environmental institutions in co-ordinating 
environmental activities have arguably made it necessary for APEC members to co­
ordinate their own environmental programmes. Being such a large conglomeration of 
economies from both sides of the world, APEC arguably could even serve as a substitute 
for a long-awaited global environmental organisation by setting common environmental 
strategies in response to the global environmental problems.
Although environmental initiatives have gained more weight in APEC only 
recently, environmental considerations have, in fact, been incorporated into APEC as 
early as its inception in 1989. The Ministers at their founding meeting in Canberra 
noted the need
to identify more clearly the scope to extend cooperation in other areas, 
including, energy, resources, fisheries, the environment, trade promotion 
and tourism and it was agreed that officials should carry forward 
preliminary work in other areas for consideration at future meeting.54 
(Emphasis added.)
The further environmental co-operation has been called for in the Seoul APEC 
Declaration 1991. But, the significant step forward for the environmental co-operation 
in APEC came in 1993, when the leaders agreed, as one of their initiatives, to develop 
APEC’s policy dialogue and action plans for conserving energy, improving the 
environment and sustaining economic growth.55 As noted by some commentators, 
“with the launching of the Sustainable Development Dialogue by APEC heads of state 
[at the summit in Blake Island], the environmental issues moved unmistakably onto 
APEC’s radar screen”.56 Moreover, at this very summit, the Prime Minister Jean 
Chretien of Canada proposed that an Environmental Ministerial Meeting was to be held 
in Vancouver in 1994. In March 1994, the very first APEC Environmental Ministerial 
Meeting was accordingly held with success. This meeting has produced two milestone
53 Andr6 Dua and Daniel C. Esty, op. cit., at 112-113.
54 APEC Ministerial Meeting Joint Statement, Canberra, 6-7 November 1989, in APEC Secretariat, 
Selected APEC Documents 1989-1994, op. cit., at 39.
55 APEC Leaders Meeting, Initiatives, 20 November 1993, in APEC Secretariat, Selected APEC 
Documents 1989-1994, op. cit., at 4.
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documents, namely an APEC Environmental Vision Statement and a Framework of
c o
Principles for Integrating Economy and the Environment in APEC.
The APEC Environmental Vision Statement proclaims that there is an 
“inseparable linkage between environmental protection and economic growth to build 
an enduring foundation for sustainable development” in APEC. It also calls for 
environmental considerations to be integrated into activities of APEC at all levels. 
Unfortunately, this Vision Statement did nothing more than just set out broad guidelines 
for environmental co-operation in APEC.
The Framework of Principles for Integrating Economy and Environment in 
APEC, however, has gone a step further than the Vision Statement. It sets out nine 
principles in order to help the implementation of the Vision Statement, including: 
sustainable development, internalisation, science and research, technology transfer, 
precautionary principle, trade and environment, environmental education and 
information, financing for sustainable development, and the role of APEC.
Being only non-binding instruments, as are other APEC’s instruments, there is 
no guarantee that all the promises of a grandiose nature contained in these two 
instruments will be fully implemented in reality.59 Despite the scepticism, APEC’s 
working groups have already started incorporating environmental concerns in their 
tasks. APEC at present has ten working groups. Not all working groups, however, are 
environmentally related. Those with some environmentally related activities are the
56 Lyuba Zarsky and Jason Hunter, ‘Environmental Cooperation at APEC: The First Five Years’, 6(3) 
The Journal o f  Environment & Development (1997) 222, at 237.
57 APEC Environmental Vision Statement, Vancouver, Canada, 25 March 1994, in APEC Secretariat, 
Selected APEC Documents 1989-1994, op. cit., 133-134. See Appendix B.
58 A Framework o f Principles for Integrating the Economy and the Environment, Vancouver, Canada, 25 
March 1994, (Singapore: APEC Secretariat, 1994), available from the APEC Secretariat in Singapore at 
http://www.apecsec.org.sg. See Appendix C.
59 See Jennifer L. Haworth and Mark D. Nguyen, ‘Law and Agreement in APEC’, in Paul Davidson, ed., 
Trading Arrangements in the Pacific Rim: ASEAN and APEC, (New York: Oceana Publications Inc., 
1997), 1-15, at 8, where the authors argued that although the non-binding nature o f an agreement enhances 
flexibility and implementation, and especially well-suited APEC due to its multifarious diversity, some 
APEC members who are accustomed to a rule-oriented system are less likely to comply with non-binding 
commitments.
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working groups on regional energy co-operation, marine resources conservation, human 
resources development, tourism, industrial science and technology, and fisheries.
First of all, the Regional Energy Cooperation Working Group was established in 
1990. Its tasks are to identify institutional, regulatory, and procedural features affecting 
investment in energy infrastructure, and to develop a guiding framework to facilitate 
investment. Its work is aimed at improving environmental performance in the energy 
sector in order to promote cost effective and environmentally sound products, systems 
and technologies. So far, several information gathering and dissemination projects have 
been launched to assist its achievement.
Second, the Marine Resources Conservation Working Group was formed to 
promote initiatives to protect the marine resources and environment within APEC, and 
to ensure that the quality of the marine environment continues to yield in socio­
economic benefits. So far, work has already been implemented for managing red tide 
and algal blooms in APEC’s waters, and collecting information for coastal zone 
management.
Third, the Human Resources Development Working Group was created in 1990. 
It has adopted sustainable development as one of its cross cutting themes. The focus of 
this working group is to improve environmental understanding through arranged 
seminars, training, and educational programmes. In October 1996, also under a purview 
of the Human Resources Development Working Group, an APEC Sustainable 
Development Information and Training Network was created with a view to promoting 
domestic environmental management in industries, and enhancing the ability of 
environmental managers within the APEC region.
Fourth, the Tourism Working Group works towards achieving socio- 
environmental sustainability in the tourism industry. Among its work on promoting the 
tourism industry, through promoting human resource development and removal of trade 
barriers in the service sector, this working group has already conducted a study on eco- 
tourism management in order to balance the growth of the tourism industry and 
protection of the environment in APEC.
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Fifth, the Industrial Science and Technology Working Group, established in 
1990, has adopted a contribution to sustainable development as one of its areas of co­
operation under the Osaka Action Agenda. Not much has yet been implemented, 
however, apart from arranging workshops focused, for example, on cleaner air 
technologies and monitoring the marine environment.
Sixth, the Fisheries Working Group was established in 1991 largely for the 
promotion of the conservation and sustainable use of fisheries resources. Some of its 
achievements to date include co-operation in fish harvest and post-harvest technology, 
projects related to market information and trade issues, and workshops on aquaculture 
and destructive fishing techniques.
By and large, it has been observed that although there seems to be plenty of 
environmentally related projects carried out by APEC’s working groups, they are on a 
small scale and mostly ad hoc. In addition, most of them do not extend beyond capacity 
building.60 To date, the work of APEC’s working groups have thus only been modest 
and, according to one commentator, “delivered little of substance”.61
Environmental activities have been taken to a new height by a new project, 
called Food, Energy, Environment, Economic Growth and Population, or, in short, 
FEEEP. FEEEP was first proposed by Prime Minister Murayama of Japan at the 1995 
Leaders’ Summit in Osaka. This sweeping action agenda is to be under the supervision 
of the Economic Committee. As the name suggests, FEEEP addresses five main areas 
pertinent to amelioration of major bottlenecks to sustainable development in APEC.62 
Unfortunately, while the prospect of FEEEP seems optimistic as an engine leading 
towards the long-term .goal of sustainable development in APEC, it has been criticised 
by several commentators. For instance, one commentator has pointed out that “FEEEP
60 APEC Secretariat, Evaluation o f  Economic and Technical Cooperation Programme, as cited by Andr6 
Dua and Daniel C. Esty, op. cit., at 139. From an interview with the former Director o f Sustainable 
Development o f APEC, this comment can also be confirmed.
61 Jason Hunter, ‘FEEEP and the Future o f ECOTECH’, Connectivity, 10 September 1997, (Berkeley, 
USA: Nautilus Institute for Security and Sustainable Development, 1997), at 2.
62 Ippei Yamazawa, ‘How Should We Approach the FEEEP Issue?’ in Shigeru Itoga, ed., APEC: 
Cooperation for Sustainable Development, (Tokyo: Institute o f  Developing Economies, 1998), 11-15, at 
11 .
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had started off on the wrong foot” because it has an “un-funded mandate”. Like other 
APEC activities, the meagre funding undermines the good intention of APEC leaders 
and perhaps undermines the capability of APEC to take a lead on sustainable 
development issues. Other commentators have observed that although FEEEP covers 
“almost everything, [it] emphasises nothing”.64 Moreover, “limited political capital will
be spread thin, making concrete progress on sustainable development unlikely”.65
0
From these comments, it is discernible that APEC’s FEEEP has been viewed 
pessimistically. Of course, there is a long way to go before FEEEP can yield fruitful 
results for APEC’s sustainable development agenda. In the mean time, it is imperative 
that more understanding and precise action plans of its targeted areas and, most 
importantly, sufficient funds are provided. Given FEEEP is still in its early days, it is 
worth waiting to see if its contribution can really match up to its ambitious aims.
Adding to the pre-existing environmental co-operation in APEC, 1996 brought 
about another three important “action programmes” relating to advancing co-operation 
on sustainable development, namely: Sustainable Cities/Urban Management, Clean 
Production/Clean Technology, and Sustainability of the Marine Environment. These 
initiatives were laid out at the First Ministerial Meeting on Sustainable Development in 
Manila,66 and were subsequently endorsed by the leaders at the Summit in Subic in 
November 1996. The follow up of the First Ministerial Meeting on Sustainable
c 7
Development was held in Toronto, Canada, in June 1997.
In substance, Sustainable Cities/Urban Management calls for pollution 
prevention and control, infrastructure development which is environmentally 
sustainable, and addresses poor urban settlements. In doing so, the ministers have
63 Jason Hunter, supra, note 61, at 5.
64 Andr6 Dua and Daniel C. Esty, op. cit., at 141.
65 Ibid.
66 See APEC Ministerial Meeting on Sustainable Development, Action Programme, Manila, Philippines, 
July 11-12, 1996, available from: http://www.apecsec.org.sg/minismtg/mtgsdv96.htm.
67 See further, Institute for International Sustainable Development (USD), ‘APEC Environment 
Ministerial Meeting on Sustainable Development, 9-11 June 1997: A Summary Report on the APEC 
Environment Ministerial Meeting on Sustainable Development’, 6(3) Sustainable Development (1997).
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supported the exchange of information, knowledge and experiences of APEC members 
as a primary machine.
While the previous programme was led by Canada and Japan, Australia, Taiwan 
and the United States were the three predominant members who put forward the work 
programme on Clean Production/Clean Technology in APEC’s broad sustainable 
development agenda. This programme emphasises “making use of the technologies and 
practices that lead to cleaner production so that the APEC [members] can enjoy socio­
economic development while preserving the environment for future generations”.68 In 
achieving this, members of APEC are, inter alia, to promote dissemination of clean 
technologies and experiences, share information on clean technologies and production 
policies through electronic means, promote use of ISO 14000, and provide training 
through the APEC Sustainable Development Training and Information Network.
The Sustainability of the Marine Environment programme has evolved under the 
Marine Resource Conservation Working Group. Its main focus is on integrated coastal 
management approaches, reduction and prevention of marine pollution and sustainable 
marine resources management. Measures employed to realise the goals are familiar: 
information sharing, training, exchange of knowledge, private-public partnership, and 
capacity building.
Unfortunately, like other APEC’s work programmes, these action programmes 
on sustainable development have been criticised notably for setting ambitious plans with 
no implementation efforts. As some critics have succinctly put it, “there exists a serious 
incongruity between the APEC vision and its action programmes”.69 Indeed, this is 
perhaps due to the fact that there is only superficial co-operation among APEC members 
which undermines the construction of any concrete action plans.
In 1997, the Ministerial Meeting and the Leaders’ Summit in Canada set high 
hopes for environmental movement in APEC’s development. This may be because 
Canada has always been at the forefront of environmental protection initiatives, not only
68 APEC Ministerial Meeting on Sustainable Development, supra, note 66.
69 Andr6 Dua and Daniel C. Esty, op. cit., at 141.
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in APEC but in general. As before, only modest results were achieved. Indeed, this is 
partly because the 1997 meetings were dominated by another pressing issue, i.e. the 
financial crisis in Asia. However, environmental issues were not altogether neglected. 
In their Declaration, the APEC leaders have laid out a “vision for the 21st Century” as 
follows:
Intense growth in the economies of Asia-Pacific over the past decade has 
had far reaching impacts on our societies. Growth and employment, as 
well as improved incomes and quality of life, are welcome benefits. In 
all of our societies these positive outcomes have been accompanied by 
structural and environmental pressures. Globalization has emerged as a 
reality. Rapid urbanization and advances in information technology are 
transforming our cityscapes, as well as the way in which we interact.
Our ability to adapt to new developments will determine our success in 
achieving sustainable development among and within societies in the 
region™ (Emphasisadded.)
The leaders have further stressed that “achieving sustainable development 
remains at the heart of APEC’s mandate”. The leaders have also noted APEC’s 
potential for addressing the issue of climate change. In addition, in the Vancouver 
Framework for Enhancing Public-Private Partnerships in Infrastructure Development,71 
the leaders called for public-private co-operation in order to meet, inter alia, 
environmental goals. At the ministerial level, an idea of establishing the APEC 
Environmental Protection Centre in China was also welcomed. As noted above, 
although some references to environmental issues were made at the 1997 meetings, 
neither specific nor realistic goals were set. The meetings have merely provided rhetoric 
reaffirmation of APEC’s broad commitments to sustainable development. This trend 
was repeated at the 1998 meetings in Malaysia. The leaders have merely reiterated the 
significance and pledged the continuation of APEC’s sustainable development agenda 
and FEEEP. They have also endorsed the APEC Framework for Capacity Building 
Initiatives on Emergency Preparedness, aiming at strengthening members’ co-operative 
efforts in tackling natural disasters and emergencies. Apart from these efforts, nothing 
significant has materialised.
70 APEC Economic Leaders Declaration: Connecting the APEC Community, Vancouver, Canada, 25 
November 1997, available at: http://www.apecsec.org.sg/econlead/vancouver.htm.
71 The Vancouver Framework for Enhanced Public-Private Partnerships in Infrastructure Development, 
available on the internet at: http://www.apecsec.org.sg.
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4.5. Trade and Environment in APEC
Addressing trade and environment problems are not easy. As one can see from Chapter 
2, there are several interwoven issues associated with the trade and environment debate. 
APEC, with its economic dynamism and environmental problems, cannot avoid taking 
actions on trade and environment issues if it is to sustain its phenomenon.
In 1995, the World Wide Fund for Nature International (WWF) produced a 
discussion paper, Trade and Environment in APEC: Avoiding Green Protectionism 
While Securing Sustainable Development, as a suggestion of how APEC might 
accommodate environmental concerns in its trade agenda. It has concluded that 
“integration of trade and environmental policies in APEC has barely started, and is 
lagging behind the trade liberalisation process. Unless concrete actions for policy 
integration are taken now, trade liberalisation in APEC will not support sustainable
nodevelopment”. Although this observation was rightly made, given that APEC is 
comparatively young, vis-a-vis other regional or international organisations, and is still 
struggling to grapple with its trade liberalisation and other agenda, at least some credit 
must be given to APEC’s attempt to deal with the complex trade and environment 
issues.
Historically, trade and environment issues are not new to APEC. Dating back to 
the Leaders’ Summit at Blake Island in 1993, the leaders recognised the need to “protect 
the quality of our air, water, and green spaces, and manage our energy resources and 
renewable resources to ensure sustainable growth and provide a more secure future for 
our people”.73 Initially, this has provided a mandate for sustainable development for 
APEC members. This mandate has been taken further by the Bogor Declaration which 
stipulates:
Our objective to intensify development cooperation among the 
community of Asia-Pacific economies will enable us to develop more 
effectively the human and natural resources of the Asia-Pacific region so
72 Charles Arden-Clarke, Trade and Environment in APEC: Avoiding Green Protectionism While 
Securing Sustainable Development, a WWF International Discussion Paper, (Gland, Switzerland: WWF 
International, 1995).
73 APEC Leaders Economic Vision Statement, Blake Island, supra, note 24, at 2.
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as to attain sustainable growth and equitable development of APEC 
economies...
Cooperative programmes in this area cover expanded human resource 
development (such as education and training and especially improving 
management and technical skills), the development of APEC study 
centres, cooperation in science and technology (including technology 
transfer), measures aimed at promoting small and medium scale 
enterprises and steps to improve economic infrastructure, such as energy, 
transportation, information, telecommunications and tourism. Effective 
cooperation will also be developed on environmental issues, with the aim 
of contributing to sustainable development. (Emphasis added.)74
In 1996, the leaders reaffirmed their “commitment to sustainable growth”,75 and 
the First Ministerial Meeting on Sustainable Development was held in Manila. More 
directly related to trade and environment issues, the pioneer on the issue was the EPG. 
In its first report, A Vision for APEC: Towards an Asia-Pacific Economic Community, 
the EPG recommends that:
APEC members should make sure that their trade and environment 
policies are mutually reinforcing, and should endorse a commitment to 
GATT negotiations toward this end. In addition, the members should 
broaden their environmental consultations and coordination to focus 
efforts on standards, data, technologies, and regional approaches to these7Aissues. (Emphasis added.)
From a legal perspective, the 1994 Framework Principles for Integrating 
Economy and Environment in APEC proclaims as one of its principles that “[members] 
should support multilateral efforts to make trade and environmental policies mutually 
supportive, consistent with Principle 12 and other relevant principles of the Rio
77Declaration”. (Emphasis added.) To recall Principle 12 of the Rio Declaration, this 
principle advocates specifically that trade and environmental policies should be 
mutually supportive, trade measures for environmental purposes should not constitute
74 The Bogor Declaration, supra, note 4.
75 APEC Leaders Economic Vision Statement: From Vision to Action, Subic Bay, the Philippines, 
(Singapore: APEC Secretariat, 1996).
76 Executive Summary, EPG Report, A Vision for APEC: Towards an Asia-Pacific Economic 
Community, November 1993, in APEC Secretariat, Selected APEC Documents 1989-1994, op. cit., 9-14, 
at 13.
77 Framework o f Principles for Integrating Economy and Environment in APEC, Principle 6.
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an arbitrary or disguised restriction on international trade, and unilateral trade measures
7o
for environmental purposes outside jurisdiction are to be avoided. However, the legal 
status of the Framework Principles is rather weak as it is not legally binding. The 
Framework of Principles merely represents a moral commitment made by APEC 
members. The compliance of the principles is thus only guaranteed to the extent of the 
member’s willingness to comply, a form of voluntary compliance. In relation to dispute 
resolution, although an APEC member cannot rely on the breach of these principles as a 
ground for initiating the dispute resolution process, these principles may however 
provide useful guidance on the direction in which the dispute should be decided.
From the above sections, it can be seen that the issues of trade and environment, 
taken together in a wider concept of sustainable development, have been well 
recognised in APEC. However, when taken separately the issues of trade liberalisation 
and environmental protection do not receive the same degree of attention. Thus, trade 
activities in APEC seem to have been given a higher priority than environmental 
protection.
4.5.1. Possible Trade and Environment Conflicts among APEC Members
Some writers have already observed that there are several implications of trade and 
environment issues on APEC. From their work, a general conclusion can be drawn that 
trade and environment issues must be addressed as soon as possible if APEC is to 
ensure its sustainable growth.79
Firstly, in APEC, members have already experienced trade and environment 
problems as a result of the use of trade-related environmental measures (TREMs). 
Within APEC itself, the use of TREMs, especially by the United States, has already
OA
caused several disputes among APEC members. The US Superfund Tax and the
78 Principle 12 of the Rio Declaration, The Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, UN Doc. 
A/CONF. 151/5/Rev. 1,13 June 1992; reprinted in 3 1 ILM (1992) 874.
79 See, for example, Andr6 Dua, APEC and Environmental Protection, a paper prepared for Global 
Environment & Trade Study (GETS), 20 June 1996. (On file with author.) Also see Kym Anderson and 
Jane Drake-Brockman, The Trade/Environment Debate and Its Implications for Asia-Pacific, Policy 
Discussion Paper No. 94/23, Centre for International Economic Studies, November 1994, (Adelaide: 
University of Adelaide, Australia, 1994).
80 See Appendix D for selected governing laws of TREMs in APEC member economies.
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Marine Mammal Protection Act (MMPA), for example, have already been challenged 
before the GATT panels on the ground that they hindered trade by according 
discriminatory treatments to their domestic goods on an environmental basis. A number 
of Asian APEC members have been hard hit by the United States’ trade measures.
o 1
Evidence of the bans on China and Taiwan over trade in endangered species, and on 
Thailand and Malaysia over imports of shrimps and shrimp products are but only a few 
examples. In relation to other trading regimes, some APEC members, like Malaysia 
and Indonesia, have already been threatened by the Austrian measures on their timber 
exports. Indeed, these disputes have not only caused economic loss, they have also 
caused political frictions.
Secondly, besides using TREMs on a unilateral basis, TREMs may be used 
pursuant to multilateral environmental agreements (MEAs). At present, nearly all 
current APEC members are signatories to the major MEAs discussed in Chapter 2, 
namely the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna 
and Flora (CITES), the Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer 
and the Basel Convention on the Control of Transboundary Movements of Hazardous 
Wastes and their Disposal. (See Table 1.) Once ratified, each APEC member would 
have to implement these MEAs according to their needs, priorities and natural 
conditions. Therefore, the methods and measures of implementation could vary from 
one member to another. Such variation could result in the loss of competitiveness or the 
use of TREMs. Although it is less likely that the use of TREMs pursuant to these 
MEAs will be challenged, the possibility, however, cannot be ruled out.
81 See Wen-Chen Shih, ‘Multilateralism and the Case o f Taiwan in the Trade and Environment Nexus: 
the Potential Conflicts Between CITES and GATT/WTO’, 30(3) Journal o f  World Trade (1996) 109.
82 See for a discussion on the Shrimp/Turtle dispute in Chapter 3.
83 See Brian F. Chase, ‘Tropical Forests and Trade Policy: The Legality o f Unilateral Attempts to 
Promote Sustainable Development Under the GATT’, 17 Hastings International and Comparative Law 
Review (1994) 349, at 374. In this dispute, the Austrian government introduced legislation in 1992 
relating to timber imports in order to promote sustainable use o f tropical forests in developing countries. 
The law requires use o f “eco-tariff” on products which are composed of 8-70 percent o f wood and 
mandatory “eco-labelling” to differentiate products made of woods harvested in sustainable vis-a-vis 
unsustainable fashion. Against these measures, Malaysia and Indonesia have threatened Austria, in 
retaliation, with trade sanctions against Austrian goods.
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Table 1: APEC Member Economies’ Signatory Status in the Selected MEAs
Member Economy CITES Montreal Protocol Basel Convention
Australia X X X
Brunei X X
Canada X X X
Chile X X X
China X X X
Hong Kong
Indonesia X X
Japan X X X
Korea X X X
M alaysia X X X
Mexico X X X
New Zealand X X X
Papua New Guinea X X
Philippines X X X
Singapore X X
Taiwan
Thailand X X X
USA X X X
Sources: APEC Economic Committee, Survey on Trade-Related Environmental 
Measures and Environment-Related Trade M easures in APEC, (Singapore: APEC 
Secretariat, 1999); Mingsan Khawsa-aad and Pisamai Phurisinsitti lamsakulrattana,
Trade VS Environmental Problems: From G ATT to WTO, (Bangkok: National 
Resources and Environment Division, Thailand Development Research Institute 
Foundation, 1997), (in Thai - G am  Ka VS Punha Singwadlom: Jark G ATT thung Ong- 
garn Ka Lok .)
N ote: The table is based on information before the three new APEC members were 
admitted.
Thirdly, in addition to the existing practice in the United States, other APEC 
members, have increasingly used eco-labelling schemes in order to promote “green 
products”. (See Table 2.) The advantage of eco-labels is to provide consumers with 
environmental information so that they can make informed choices. But, eco-labels, as 
noted previously, can also create trade distortion. This is because if the consumer 
behaviour is influenced by the preference for environmentally friendly products, the 
competitiveness and market access of products which are not environmentally friendly 
will be affected. This is particularly so where eco-labels are mandatory, i.e. where the 
law requires a label to be obtained before a product can be brought into the market. In 
effect, the mandatory labelling schemes will prevent the sale of unlabelled products. So 
far, no mandatory eco-labelling schemes have been practised in APEC, most schemes 
existing in APEC are voluntary, i.e. labels are granted voluntarily by public or non­
governmental bodies in order to raise consumers’ environmental awareness. The effect 
of trade distortion created by such schemes, therefore, is not as serious as when the
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mandatory labelling schemes are used. However, it should not be forgotten that 
different criteria in granting eco-labels may still cause discrimination between trading 
partners especially those who cannot satisfy the criteria.
Table 2: Eco-labelling Schemes in Selected APEC Member Economies
APEC Member Economy Eco-labelling Scheme
Australia Environmental Choice
Canada Environmental Choice Program
China China Environmental Labelling
Hong Kong Energy Efficiency Labelling
Japan ECO Mark
Korea ECO Mark
New Zealand Environmental Choice
Singapore Green Label Singapore
United States Green Seal
Source: APEC Economic Committee, Survey> on Trade-Related Environmental 
M easures and Environment-Related Trade M easures in APEC , (Singapore: APEC 
Secretariat, 1999).
Fourthly, the use of environmental subsidies is also widespread in the APEC 
region as many members of APEC are developing countries who still rely heavily on 
the agricultural sector as their main breadwinner. Such environmental subsidies may 
distort the competition between agricultural goods from developing and developed 
members of APEC. So far, a number of APEC governments have granted subsidies in 
order to promote environmental protection. For example, Australia’s Natural Resource 
Management (Financial Assistance) Act 1992 provides financial assistance for projects 
relating to soil conservation. China, as another example, has granted subsidy and 
favourable tax for environmental protection aiming at pollution reduction and cleaner 
production.84
Judging from the foregoing trend, there is a compelling reason to believe that 
trade and environment tension leading to the disputes among APEC members will 
continue. There are two ways to deal with the ongoing and future trade and 
environment problems in APEC. Firstly, APEC could consider formulating an APEC 
trade and environment policy and, secondly, APEC could deal with the trade and
84 APEC Economic Committee, Survey on Trade-Related Environmental M easures and Environment- 
Related Trade M easures in APEC, (Singapore: APEC Secretariat, 1999), at 30-32.
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environment problems through the dispute resolution process. These options will be 
discussed below.
4.5.2. APEC Trade and Environment Policy
Based on the foreseeable trade and environment tension as discussed in the preceding 
section, it would be in APEC’s own interest if it seriously takes an initiative to 
formulate an APEC-wide trade and environment policy in order to prevent the conflicts 
between the trade and environment paradigms from arising, which may undermine 
economic and diplomatic relations between APEC members.
In order to create a successful trade and environment policy for APEC, it might 
be necessary for APEC to restructure its institutional arrangement and policy-making 
process. With regard to the institutional reform, APEC might consider establishing a 
trade and environment committee to oversee the work on trade and environment 
relationship, similar to the Committee on Trade and Environment of the WTO. 
Alternatively, APEC might establish an APEC Environmental Committee or an 
Environment Working Group. The purposes for these environmental organs are, for 
example, to provide a discussion forum for APEC’s trade and environment agenda; and 
to undertake a study on trade and environment issues and co-operate with various 
working groups of APEC on environmental issues. Moreover, it has been suggested 
that an APEC Environmental Advisory Committee, based on the model of ABAC, be 
created with a view to receiving input from NGOs, business community and other 
sources. This Advisory Committee, in turn, would provide advice to APEC leaders and 
ministers so that an appropriate trade and environment policy for APEC could be 
formulated.
As for the policy-making process, it is imperative that trade and environment 
issues must be addressed otherwise sustainable development would not be achieved by
85 An idea of establishing an APEC Environmental Committee, Environmental Working Group, or 
Environmental Eminent Persons’ Group has already been proposed. Although it has been argued that 
there is some value in creating such an organ, it is unlikely to be forthcoming in the near future. See 
Daniel C. Esty, ‘Trade and Environment in APEC’, and Hideaki Shiroyama, ‘Environmental Policy in 
APEC’, in GETS and Global Industrial and Social Progress Research Institute, Japan-United States 
Collaboration on Trade and the Environment, Draft Final Report, February 1997, 87-102 and 104-120.
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APEC.86 As a starting point, Esty suggests that APEC should address the following 
three issues.87 Firstly, APEC should base its trade and environment agenda on the 
concept of cost internalisation, based on the polluter-pays-principle. Secondly, APEC 
should reduce, and eventually eliminate, environmentally harmful subsidies with a view 
to curbing trade distortion. And, thirdly, APEC should focus on the prevention of the 
“race-to-the-bottom” so that an APEC member would not be encouraged to lower its 
environmental standards in order to increase its competitiveness. At the same time, an 
APEC member should not use its own environmental standards as a barrier to trade.
However, both institutional and policy reforms may pose some difficulties for 
APEC. This is because APEC does not see the necessity to create a separate organ for 
trade and environment issues. It is believed that trade and environment issues are 
sufficiently implemented through various APEC mechanisms. However, the lack of co­
ordination and integrating institution might repeat the mistake that has been experienced 
by the fragmented United Nations system, resulting in an ineffective trade and 
environment agenda.88
From an administrative angle, however, it can be foreseen that the policy reform 
will pose more difficulties to APEC than the institutional reform. This is largely due to 
the fact that APEC is composed of members from diversified backgrounds. Within this 
largely diverse group, the interests of each APEC member are not always in line with 
one another. The experience of developing members, vis-a-vis developed members, in 
APEC tends to show that their priorities lie in economic development rather than in 
environmental protection. Additionally, different environmental policies and standards 
have been practised by different members of APEC. This makes the formulation of an 
APEC environmental standard extremely difficult. Thus, it may take a long time before 
a common trade and environment policy among APEC members can be negotiated.
86 Daniel C. Esty, ‘Trade and Environment in APEC’, supra, note 85.
87 For more discussions on the reforms on APEC’s trade and environment agenda, see Daniel C. Esty and 
AndrdDua, op. cit., 145-168.
88 See Chapter 2.
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4.5.3. The Need for an APEC’s Trade and Environment Dispute Resolution 
Mechanism
Given that many of the exports of APEC members, particularly the Asian member 
economies, are environmentally sensitive,89 it is likely that trade and environment 
disputes will continue to arise among APEC members. Pending the development of a 
framework for APEC’s trade and environment policy in order provide a long-term 
solution, if it would at all materialise, APEC would indeed benefit from establishing a 
mechanism for resolving trade and environment disputes in a mean time. Otherwise, 
such disputes might cause economic as well as ecological damages to APEC as a whole. 
As noted by Esty and Dua, there is a pressing need for the creation of the APEC’s trade 
and environment dispute resolution mechanism as there are no fora which can resolve 
trade and environment disputes in the way that trade and environmental priorities are 
rightly balanced, even the WTO.90 Moreover, the trade and environment disputes must 
be addressed by an environmentally sensitive dispute resolution mechanism in order to 
prevent ecological concerns and the trade-environment tension from undermining the 
APEC’s regional economic relations.91 Thus, the APEC’s trade and environment 
dispute resolution mechanism should be established with a view to yielding a balance 
between trade and environmental interests as well as promoting sustainable 
development within the Asia-Pacific rim and APEC’s integrity as a whole.
The creation of an APEC’s own dispute resolution mechanism for trade and 
environment disputes will also have some collateral implications. Firstly, such a 
mechanism would especially benefit APEC members who are not yet members of the 
WTO, for example China, Russia and Vietnam, and whose exports are likely to be 
challenged on environmental grounds from the developed countries, like the United 
States, due to the lax environmental standards. Secondly, if the APEC’s trade and 
environment dispute resolution mechanism could strike a trade-environment equilibrium 
during the dispute resolution process, it might well serve as a model for resolving trade
89 It is also worth noting that the goods currently under the EVSL scheme are prone to trade and 
environment disputes as they are in one way or another related to the environment.
90 Daniel C. Esty and Andr6 Dua, op. cit., at 163.
91 Daniel C. Esty, ‘Trade and Environment in APEC’, supra, note 85, at 100.
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and environment disputes for other regional or global dispute resolution mechanisms, as 
APEC represent a microcosm of the world.
The next chapter will examine whether or not APEC’s dispute resolution 
mechanism could deal with trade and environment disputes in a balanced fashion and 
whether or not the creation of the APEC’s trade and environment dispute resolution 
mechanism is possible.
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Chapter 5
APEC Dispute Mediation Service and its Potential 
for Resolving Trade and Environment Disputes
Disputes between member governments can have a negative impact on the evolution of 
the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) in promoting a free trade and 
investment environment. Not only can they impair the economic relationship between 
APEC members, they can also affect their diplomatic relations. But, worst of all, the 
friction between APEC member governments could ultimately jeopardise the APEC’s 
integrity as an institution and its overall development process. It is necessary, therefore, 
that APEC create a dispute resolution mechanism in order to ease the conflicts between 
APEC members and to smooth the operation of APEC.
As discussed in the preceding chapter, trade and environment disputes have 
already become, and will continue to be, a cause for concern among APEC members. In 
order to prevent such disputes from harming the APEC progress, APEC needs to be able 
to address them in an appropriate manner. In other words, APEC must be able to strike 
a balance between trade and environmental priorities.
This chapter is aimed at providing an introduction to an APEC’s dispute 
resolution mechanism - the Dispute Mediation Service (DMS) - and assessing its 
potential to resolve trade and environment disputes among APEC member governments. 
It will be divided into seven sections. The first section will briefly discuss the genesis of 
the DMS. In the second section, a discussion on the mediation technique of dispute 
resolution will be given. The purposes of this section are to shed light on what 
mediation entails, and to review advantages and disadvantages of resolving a dispute by 
mediation. The APEC’s DMS will be examined in detail in section three. Issues which 
will be discussed include the nature of the DMS, its scope and procedures. The fourth 
section will discuss some reasons why mediation would work for resolving disputes 
between APEC members.
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Section five will examine how mediation might help resolve trade and 
environment disputes among APEC members in the balanced fashion, based on some 
legal and institutional considerations. Section six will posit that the DMS could also be 
used before the trade and environment conflict escalated into a full-blown dispute, a 
form of “dispute avoidance”. To illustrate how the DMS could be used as a dispute 
avoidance mechanism, the Shrimp/Turtle dispute will be used as a case study for the 
reasons that the dispute directly involved some of the present members of APEC: 
Thailand and Malaysia as complainants, and the United States as a respondent; and the 
case represents a classic scenario of the trade and environment dispute, i.e. trade bans 
were used to prohibit imports of unenvironmentally friendly products. The last section 
will address the relationship between the APEC’s DMS and the dispute settlement 
regime of the World Trade Organization (WTO). By drawing an analogy from APEC’s 
promise to conduct its trade liberalisation programme in the manner consistent with the 
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), this study posits that the DMS of 
APEC should also operate coherently with the WTO’s dispute settlement system with a 
view to fostering the intricate relationship between regionalism and multilateralism.
5.1. The Genesis of the DMS
At the moment, APEC does not have enforcement mechanisms in the form of legal 
instruments. The presence of a dispute resolution mechanism in APEC could 
potentially ameliorate or at least ease the tension of disputes, especially before they 
escalate into a matter for the WTO.1 For instance, this would prove useful for tensions 
between the United States and Japan on the automobile industry, the United States and 
China on intellectual property rights, labour issues and human rights, and the United 
States and Thailand on environmental protection. Another reason why the dispute 
resolution mechanism is potentially essential for APEC is that Western companies who 
invest in the Asia-Pacific region have a growing interest in an effective international 
commercial dispute resolution as a means to enhance the trade and investment 
environment.2
1 Somkiat Tangkijvanich, Dispute Mediation, a paper prepared for the roundtable seminar on “Trade 
Facilitation: Implications an Opportunities o f Trade Liberalization o f APEC towards Thailand”, 19 
September 1997, Asia Hotel, Bangkok, Thailand. (In Thai.) (On file with author.)
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Due to its diversity, APEC has found it difficult to formulate its own dispute 
settlement mechanism. The principal division lies between the two so-called “camps”, 
viz. the Asian members who prefer an informal style of dispute settlement and the 
Western members who prefer a formal adjudicatory approach like that of the WTO.4 
Despite such conflicting viewpoints, it seems that members of APEC have agreed to 
adopt the formulation of a dispute resolution mechanism in the form of a dispute 
mediation service - the DMS.
Although the DMS was not mentioned until 1994, the work on the DMS in fact 
started in 1993 by the Eminent Persons Group (EPG) of APEC. In its report, A Vision 
for APEC, the EPG recognises that “APEC could provide a valuable forum for 
consultations to improve the dispute settlement process”.5 The EPG further notes: “It is 
essential to ensure that disputes are settled quickly, fairly and without introducing 
needless uncertainties into regional trade”.6 Together with the weaknesses of the 
GATT’s dispute settlement system, the EPG proposed that APEC’s own dispute 
settlement mechanism be established in order to handle regional disputes. At this stage, 
there was no mention of the form in which the APEC’s dispute settlement mechanism 
would take shape, hence the DMS was not mentioned. There was even a consideration 
that the APEC’s mechanism should be built on the model of either the present dispute 
settlement mechanism of the WTO, the US-Canada Free Trade Agreement, or the North 
American Free Trade Agreement. However, the EPG did recognise that mediation 
could be a vital approach for resolving disputes between APEC members.
2 Brendan P. McGivem, Introductory Note to APEC Dispute Mediation Experts’ Group Reports on a 
Voluntary Consultative Dispute Mediation Service, Vancouver, 17-18 June 1995, 35 ILM (1996) 1102.
3 See James Cameron and Tanya White, ‘Dispute Mediation in APEC: Bridging the Legal and Cultural 
Gaps’, in GETS and Global Industrial and Social Progress Research Institute, Japan-United States 
Collaboration on Trade and the Environment, Draft Final Report, February 1997, 122-148. (On file with 
author.)
4 Ibid., at 126.
5 APEC Secretariat, A Vision for APEC: Towards an Asia Pacific Economic Community, Report of the 
Eminent Persons Group, (Singapore: APEC Secretariat, 1993), at 39.
6 Ibid.
7 APEC Secretariat, A Vision for APEC, op. cit., at 40.
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A year later, it became clear that the DMS was to be a chosen choice of 
mechanism for resolving disputes between APEC members. In its 1994 report, 
Achieving the APEC Vision, the EPG makes a remark as follows:
we believe that bilateral disputes of the intensity of the recent past could 
threaten the positive evolution of the community of Asia-Pacific 
economies. Conversely, the evolution of that community requires it to 
provide additional avenues that can help to resolve economic disputes 
among its members. Combining these needs with the objective realities 
of the region, we believe that APEC should develop a dispute mediation 
mechanism that emphasizes mediation rather than arbitration. Hence, 
we recommend that APEC create a [DMS] that would provide assistance 
in resolving economic disputes among its members.8 (Emphasis added.)
The need to create the DMS has also been reiterated by the APEC leaders in 
November 1994. In their annual declaration, the leaders stated:
Trade and other economic disputes among APEC [members] have 
negative implications for the implementation of agreed cooperative 
arrangements as well as for the spirit of cooperation. To assist in 
resolving such disputes and in avoiding [their] recurrence, we agree to 
examine the possibility o f  a voluntary consultative dispute mediation 
service.9 (Emphasis added.)
As the EPG ceased in 1995, the work on the DMS has since been continued by 
the Dispute Mediation Expert’s Group (DMEG) under the auspices of the APEC 
Committee on Trade and Investment (CTI). The first chairman of DMEG is Jonathan 
Fried, the Director General for Trade Policy at the Canadian Department of Foreign 
Affairs and International Trade. Up to the time of writing, DMEG has had four 
meetings. The first meeting was in Vancouver, Canada, on 17-18 June 1995; the second 
meeting was in Singapore, on 22-23 April 1996; the third meeting was also in 
Singapore, on 21-22 April 1997; and the fourth meeting was held in Bangkok, Thailand, 
in April 1998. The next meeting was expected to be held in Singapore in April 1999.
8 APEC Secretariat, Achieving the APEC Vision: Free and Open Trade in the Asia Pacific, Second 
Report of the Eminent Persons Group, (Singapore: APEC Secretariat, 1994), at 23.
9 The Bogor Declaration, 15 November 1994, in APEC Secretariat, Selected APEC Documents 1989- 
1994, op. cit., 5-8.
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DMEG is composed of government delegates, representing each member of 
APEC, from different ministries responsible for trade and investment dispute resolution. 
In the case of Thailand, for example, delegates to the DMEG meetings are from the 
Ministry of Justice and the legal division of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The 
meeting is chaired by the Chairperson of DMEG with an assistance from the Director 
for Dispute Mediation Service programme of APEC. The work of DMEG so far 
includes: periodic reviews of the DMS progress; and organisations of symposia and 
seminars on the subjects relating to dispute resolution.
Before the DMS will be discussed in more detail, a brief discussion on the 
theoretical basis of mediation will be provided with a view to providing some general 
understanding of the nature of mediation.
5.2. The Theoretical Basis of Mediation
5.2.1. The Fundamentals
Mediation is a form of alternative dispute resolution (ADR) which has been practised 
around the world for some years.10 It can be seen as a “facilitative process in which 
disputing parties engage the assistance of an impartial third party, the mediator, who 
helps them to try to arrive at an agreed solution of their dispute”.11 The goal of 
mediation is to achieve an outcome which provides a compromise between the needs of 
the disputing parties. According to Prof Lon Fuller, the central quality of mediation is 
“its capacity to reorient the parties toward each other, not only by imposing rules on 
them, but by helping them to achieve a new and shared perception of their attitudes and 
dispositions toward one another”.12 A third party mediator’s role in the mediation
10 ADR can be defined as “a range of procedures that serve as alternatives to litigation through the courts 
for the resolution of disputes, generally involving the intercession and assistance o f a neutral and impartial 
third party”; see Henry J. Brown and Arthur L. Marriott, ADR Principles and Practice, 2nd edition, 
(London: Sweet & Maxwell, 1999), at 12. However, ADR may be given a wider definition which also 
includes inter-party negotiations; see for example, Michael Palmer and Simon Roberts, Dispute 
Processes: ADR and the Primary Forms o f Decision Making, (London: Butterworths, 1998). Hence, 
ADR covers a wide range of non-judicial dispute resolution techniques, comprising both non-adjudicatory 
and adjudicatory processes, which include negotiations, mediations and arbitration.
11 Henry J. Brown and Arthur L. Marriott, op. cit., at 127.
12 Lon Fuller, ‘Mediation - Its Forms and Functions’, 44 Southern California Law Review (1971) 305.
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process is to facilitate the parties to reach their own solution. Thus, mediation can be 
seen as a hy-brid of negotiation and arbitration. The former is a process of 
communication between disputing parties which involves an exchange of information in 
order to find a common understanding or joint decision-making.13 The latter is a kind of 
dispute resolution which involves a participation of a third party acting as an umpire in 
the process, who will decide the outcome on behalf of the disputing parties.14
Most mediation is voluntary. It is up to the disputing parties to agree among 
themselves to resolve their dispute by mediation. However, in some cases mediation is 
mandatory, thus parties have no choice but to enter into the mediation process. In 
addition, it is not uncommon to find modem contractual agreements requiring an 
attempt to resolve the dispute by mediation before other means. It must be noted, 
however, that in either of these types of mediation, it is still the parties who control the 
proceedings. The mandatory mediation could only compel the parties to a negotiating 
table, but could not compel them to negotiate.15
The process of mediation can be divided into several stages, a variation of which 
depends on each case. Moreover, different persons may divide the stages of mediation 
differently but in all cases three common stages may be determined: before mediation, 
during mediation and after mediation.16 In each of these stages, there are various steps 
which may further be identified. However, any identification may not be said to be 
definitive as it can vary from one case to another, but some essential steps of the 
mediation process may be identified as guidance below. (See Table 3.)
13 For a general discussion on negotiation, see Michael Palmer and Simon Roberts, op. cit., 63-100; P.H. 
Gulliver, Disputes and Negotiations: A Cross-cultural Perspective, (New York: Academic Press, Inc., 
1979).
14 For a general discussion on arbitration, see Michael Palmer and Simon Roberts, op. cit., 212-222.
15 Henry J. Brown and Arthur L. Marriott, op. cit., at 136.
16 Ibid., 154-188.
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Table 3: Stages and Steps of the Mediation Process
Stages Steps
Before Mediation ■ Engaging the parties in the mediation forum
■ Obtaining commitment and agreeing mediation 
rules
■ Preliminary communications and preparation
During Mediation ■ Establishing the venue and meeting the parties
■ Establishing the issues and setting the agenda
■ Information gathering
■ Managing and facilitating discussions and 
negotiations
■ Employing impasse strategies
After Mediation ■ Concluding the mediation and recording the 
outcome
■ Post termination
Source: Henry J. Brown and Arthur L. Marriott, ADR Principles and Practice, 2nd 
edition, (London: Sweet & Maxwell, 1999), 154-155.
In recent years, mediation has been used as an alternative to the court 
proceedings in a number of areas including international affairs, family matters, 
commercial disputes, labour issues and environmental disputes.17 The success of 
mediation can be attributable to several factors. The main ones, however, are the parties 
themselves, the mediator and the issue at hand. These issues will be explored in detail 
below.
5.2.1.1. The Parties
In mediation, the focus lies in bringing the disputing parties to a solution which can be 
accepted by both sides with the assistance of a third party mediator. The key players in 
the mediation process therefore are the parties themselves. A large part of whether a 
mediation will produce some fruitful results rests upon the disputants’ willingness to 
negotiate a compromise. As the basis of mediation is consensus-finding, there needs to 
be a presupposition of willingness of the parties before the mediation process can even
17 See Henry J. Brown and Arthur L. Marriott, op. cit., 131-135. For the use o f mediation in 
international affairs, see J.G. Merrills, International Dispute Settlement, 3rd edition, (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1998), 27-43.
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be contemplated as a way of resolving their dispute otherwise the exercise of mediation 
would fail even before it started.18
Once the mediation process starts, it is up to the parties to clarify some 
administrative matters such as the rules and procedures to be used for their case, the 
venue and the time-frame for mediation. It is also up to the parties to try to co-operate 
with the mediator and each other in order to find a solution which every party can 
support. After all, it is up to the parties themselves who retain control over the 
possibility of settlement and the terms upon which the outcome is agreed. In practice, 
other factors may have some important influence on the position of the party to 
compromise, for example the bargaining position of the party, the relationship between 
the parties and the interest of each party. These factors could indeed make consensus- 
finding somewhat difficult. Nevertheless, as long as the parties are willing to subject 
their dispute to mediation and are ready to find a consensual outcome, there is a good 
chance that a compromise may be forthcoming.
5.2.I.2. The Mediator
The second most important player in the mediation process is a mediator whose 
intervention transforms a dyad of a dispute into a triadic interaction. A skilled mediator 
plays a very important part in helping disputants successfully reach their own solution. 
According to Fuller, a skilful mediator can speed up the negotiations between the 
parties, reduce the likelihood of miscalculation and help the parties reach a sounder 
solution.19 In principle, a mediator plays the role of a facilitator in the mediation 
process, rather than an adjudicator as in the case of arbitration. As such, he is not 
empowered to pass a judgment or give a decision that binds the parties in the dispute.20 
However, the degree of intervention of a mediator may vary from case to case which
18 John Harrison, ‘Environmental Mediation: The Ethical and Constitutional Dimension’, 9 Journal of  
Environmental Law (1997) 79, at 81.
19 Lon Fuller, supra, note 12.
20 P.H. Gulliver, Disputes and Negotiations, op. cit., at 209.
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91opens the door for various categorisation. Some of the categories will be discussed 
below.
(i) Passive and Active Mediator
In the “passive role” the mediator only exercises his skills in order to help parties 
communicate to one another and encourage the process of information exchange 
between them. The mediator may just sit quietly in the mediation process and allow his 
presence to assert some pressure on the parties to “observe minimal courtesy to each 
other, to reduce personal invective, and to listen and respond with some relevance”.22 
The philosophy behind this observation has been noted by Rehmus: “A wise mediator 
once said that the mere presence of an outsider in collective bargaining negotiations, 
regardless of anything he says or does, brings about a change in the behavior of the
9*3parties at the bargaining table”.
Alternatively, the mediator may act as a go-between who relays a message of one 
party to another. This role is particularly significant where the parties are distant from 
one another. During the mediation process, the mediator’s role extends to the creation 
of a general ambience, both conducive to and supportive of negotiations.24 According 
to Palmer and Roberts, this could be achieved by ensuring that parties acknowledge and 
adhere to some basic ground rules such as some normative understandings about the
9 ^conditions of exchange.
Once the communication starts, the mediator should make sure that the 
viewpoints of each party are clearly articulated and heard by the other party. Should the 
mediation proceed smoothly and there is a possibility that a solution may be reached, the
21 Gulliver, for example, has differentiated the role played by a mediator as follows: virtually passive, 
chairman, enunciator, prompter, leader and arbitrator. See P.H. Gulliver, Disputes and Negotiations, op. 
cit., at 220-228. Another author has divided the role o f mediator into evaluative and facilitative. See 
Leonard Riskin, ‘Mediator Orientations, Strategies and Techniques’, 12(9) Alternatives (1994) 111, at 
111-113.
22 P.H. Gulliver, Disputes and Negotiations, op. cit., at 221.
23 C. M. Rehmus, ‘The Mediation o f Industrial Conflict’, 9 Journal o f  Conflict Resolution (1965) 118, 
as quoted in P.H. Gulliver, Disputes and Negotiations, op. cit., at 221.
24 Michael Palmer and Simon Roberts, op. cit., at 117.
25 Ibid.
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mediator should make sure that the parties understand what options are available to 
themselves and their implications on each other’s situation.
However, in some circumstances a mediator may be required to take more 
responsibility which extends his role beyond a mere facilitator, hence an “active” role. 
In this case, the mediator may act as a chairman during the mediation process, keeping 
order and directing the mediation process. He may repeat the points made by the 
parties, emphasise them and direct the parties as to whether those issues should be 
continued or discarded from the negotiation. The mediator may also make some 
administrative decisions, such as the venue and time of mediation. In some 
circumstances, the mediator may be required to remind the parties on the norms and 
rules pertinent to the case or even give his or her own opinions and recommendations to 
the parties where the impasses cannot be broken. It is worth noting, however, that in 
any case the mediator does not have to limit his capacity to just one role.26 The 
mediator may strategically change his role to suit the changing circumstances or his own 
personality and tactics. Flexibility is therefore a vital attribute of a successful mediator.
In an extreme case, a mediator may assume the role of an active arbitrator. The 
method of dispute resolution which includes a transition from mediation to arbitration is 
commonly termed “med-arb”, an abbreviated form of “mediation-arbitration”. Having 
originated in America, the rationale behind the change of the role by the mediator is that 
the dispute can be settled by arbitration rather than mediation. But, instead of initiating 
an entirely new process, the parties may continue their case in a different mode by the 
mediator’s role change. The med-arb approach could therefore be distinguished from 
mediation which is followed by a separate process of arbitration. This is because the 
arbitrator in the med-arb method is the same person as the mediator whereas the 
arbitrator in the separate process is another person altogether.
26 P.H. Gulliver, Disputes and Negotiations, op. cit., at 226.
27 For a general discussion on med-arb, see Alexander H. Bevan, Alternative Dispute Resolution: A 
Lawyer’s Guide to Mediation and Other Forms o f  Dispute Resolution, (London: Sweet & Maxwell, 
1992), 8-10.
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One clear advantage of the med-arb transformation is that the parties will save 
time and costs. As argued by Brown and Marriott, such transformation is to be agreed at 
the very beginning of the dispute resolution process, hence before mediation is 
attempted. This is to prevent a later confusion regarding the format of the mediation 
process and the role of the mediator.
However, the med-arb process could raise some important considerations which 
might offset its positive value. Firstly, having known the fact that the dispute resolution 
process would change from the mediation to arbitration mode, should the former fail, 
might inhibit effective negotiation between the parties. The parties may be reluctant to 
disclose certain information which they would like to be kept confidential. Secondly, 
from the mediator’s perspective, a question may be raised as to whether the mediator 
can use prejudicial information which he has learnt from the mediation stage against the 
party during the arbitration process. The dilemma which the med-arbitrator has to face 
could prevent him from performing his role effectively both as a mediator and arbitrator. 
However, two suggestions have been made in response to this situation. First, a “med- 
arb-opt-out” process may be used. This process allows the parties to make a choice if 
they want the mediator to continue as an arbitrator. Secondly, the parties may choose to 
follow a “mediator-advisor” model, proposed by Brett and Golberg.29 In this model, 
where the parties cannot agree on a solution a mediator will provide an advise, as if he is 
an arbitrator, in the form of a non-binding decision. If the parties choose to proceed 
with arbitration, they will have to employ someone else as an arbitrator,
(ii) Disinterested, Interested and Intermediate Mediator
A mediator can be a “disinterested”, “interested” or “intermediate” party to the 
dispute.30 The “disinterested” mediator is a mediator who “is not directly related to 
either disputing parties and his own interests are not directly touched by the dispute or 
by possible outcomes”.31 He may be chosen because of his acknowledged prestige
28 Henry J. Brown and Arthur L. Marriott, op. cit., at 147.
29 See ibid., at 148.
30 P.H. Gulliver, Disputes and Negotiations, op. cit., at 214.
31 Ibid.
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status in the community. The “interested” mediator, by contrast, is a mediator whose 
“own interests make them concerned with the resolution of particular issues in dispute 
and with the disputants themselves”.32 The mediator who is categorised as 
“intermediate” is a mediator who is “more or less equally linked to both” parties in the 
dispute, for example he may have a political or economic tie with both parties.33 In this 
situation, the mediator is accepted by both parties due to his connection with both 
parties. A mediator may accept to mediate because his interests might be affected by the 
disputes. This is particularly so where all three parties belong to the same group of 
network.
(iii) Non-partisan vs. Partisan Mediator
Theoretically, a mediator should act in a “non-partisan” role. In the non-partisan role, as 
defined by Simmel, the mediator is supposed to stand outside the parties’ interests or is 
equally concerned with the interests of both parties.34 In other words, the mediator acts 
neutrally in this situation. The mediator who acts in a partisan role is the one who takes 
side of one of the parties. Although mediators should not take side, in reality they do. 
Gulliver has argued that once the mediator intervened in the dispute it is inevitable that 
he would assert a certain degree of influence on the mediation process, hence the 
mediator became a de facto “party in the negotiations”. Accordingly, the mediator 
cannot be neutral, he merely is a catalyst. But, Gulliver has also admitted that there are 
some mediators who try to be as impartial as possible throughout the mediation 
process.36
A mediator can come from different personal and cultural backgrounds. Such 
backgrounds, according to some writers, can influence the way the mediator conducts 
the mediation process. The mediator can be a lawyer, politician, social worker or
32 Ibid., at 215.
33 Ibid., at 216.
34 Georg Simmel, The Sociology o f  Georg Simmel, (New York: The Free Press, 1950), 149-150.
35 P.H. Gulliver, Disputes and Negotiations, op. cit., at 213.
36 Ibid., at 218.
37 Henry J. Brown and Arthur L. Marriott, op. cit., at 142.
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doctor. Where the case requires some special technicality, an expert from that particular 
field may be chosen. Thus, there is no restriction on the background of the mediator as 
long as he or she possesses the skills which will lead the disputants to an agreed 
outcome. The ability of the mediator also varies. The more skilful the mediator is, the 
greater likelihood that the case will be successfully mediated. Some of the necessary 
skills a mediator should possess include: theoretical knowledge; practical skills; ethical 
awareness; emotional sensitivity; sound judgment; personal empathy; substantive 
knowledge; creativity; flexibility; balance; ability to listen; ability to observe non-verbal 
communications; and ability to question.
In certain circumstances, more than one mediator may be needed. This is 
particularly so in the large commercial dispute where a multidisciplinary team of 
mediators are required, hence “co-mediation”. As noted by Brown and Marriott, co­
mediation inevitably involves larger expenses. But the cost factor must be taken into 
consideration and weighed against the overall benefits of the case, including 
effectiveness and time scale. In a complex case, a team of mediators may work more 
efficiently than a single mediator, for instance an information gathering process could be 
speeded up, hence the dispute could be resolved within a shorter period of time. 
However, a drawback is that co-mediators must work coherently and with respect to one 
another if co-mediation is going to be fruitful.
5.2.I.3. The Issue of the Dispute
The third most important factor for a successful mediation process is the issue of the 
dispute. Despite the fact that mediation has been used in several fields of activity, not 
all cases may suitably be resolved by mediation. However, as the subject matter of each 
case is different, there is no conclusive guidance regarding when mediation is going to 
be an appropriate choice of dispute resolution method. In a study on environmental 
mediation, for example, the author has generalised some criteria which make mediation 
appropriate.39 These are as follows: (i) some element of interdependence between the 
parties must exist, i.e. both parties must have something to exchange on a reciprocal 
basis; (ii) all parties must participate in the mediation process and agree to implement
38 Ibid., at 328-346.
39 John Harrison, supra, note 18, at 83.
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the outcome; (iii) the timing for mediation must be right, i.e. the dispute must be ready 
for negotiations; and (iv) the dispute must not involve a clash of fundamental values or 
moral absolutes.
Moreover, there have been concerns about an inappropriateness of using 
mediation to resolve a multiparty dispute for reasons that this kind of case is complex 
and it is difficult to persuade all the parties to agree on the same thing. Conversely, 
there has also been an argument that the multiparty dispute is appropriate for mediation 
since it is too expensive and complex to litigate.40 The use of mediation to resolve a 
multiparty dispute has also been supported by other writers on the basis that the 
complexity and multiplicity of parties are no hindrance to mediation. Indeed, it is 
inevitable that a multiparty dispute will involve more difficulties and complexities in 
terms of administrative procedures, but this may be overcome by a good organisation of 
the mediation process.
It must be remembered, however, that the guidance mentioned above is by no 
means conclusive. Each dispute must be assessed on its own merits as the success of 
mediation does not solely depend on the issue at hand, it also depends on the parties 
themselves and the mediator in each case.
5.2.2. Pros and Cons of Mediation
There are several pros and cons which are inherent to the mediation technique of dispute 
resolution.41 These considerations need to be taken into account when parties are 
deciding whether or not to use mediation vis-a-vis other available methods of dispute 
resolution. Some of these considerations will be discussed below.
Regarding the pros, mediation, first of all, offers informality and flexibility. 
These positive attributes have been some of the major benefits offered by mediation 
which attract its use. The informality of the mediation process may encourage the
40 Henry J. Brown and Arthur L. Marriott, op. cit., at 149.
41 For a discussion on the pros and cons of mediation, see, for example, Alexander H. Bevan, op. cit, at 
61-67.
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successful resolution of a dispute in some ways. For example, the less formal 
environment may make the parties feel more at ease during the mediation process. The 
parties may focus better on the issues under negotiation as they would feel less 
intimidated. The flexibility allows the parties to choose their own rules and procedures 
for mediation, including the time period, the venue and, most importantly, the mediator, 
it is more likely that they might be more willing to accept the outcome compared to 
when a judgment is involuntarily imposed on them.
Secondly, mediation offers confidentiality. Privacy and confidentiality offered 
by the mediation process are sometimes preferred to the more public nature of litigation. 
One important implication of confidentiality is the ability to save faces of the parties. 
Other dispute resolution methods, especially litigation, often expose the parties to the 
public. As a result, the credibility of the party may be tarnished by an adverse publicity. 
However, as the parties retain authority throughout the mediation process, it is possible 
that some information may be publicly disclosed upon the wishes of the parties.
Besides saving a reputation from publicity, mediation may save faces of the 
parties who have been put into the situation where “they can’t retreat and they do not 
themselves wish to fight”.42 In this dilemma, the parties may use the respect for the 
mediator as an excuse for agreeing on a compromise even though they have no 
alternatives.
Thirdly, mediation offers a better chance to prolong a good relationship between 
the parties. In the court proceedings, parties are compelled to enter into the legal 
process and involuntarily accept the judgment imposed on them. This often results in a 
difficulty, or even an inability, to mend a broken relationship between the parties. In 
contrast, mediation operates on the basis of consent right from the start of the process, it 
is therefore more likely that the disputants will be less aggressive towards one another. 
As a result, the consensus-finding approach of mediation offers the parties a chance to 
co-operate in order to find a common solution instead of concentrate on winning their 
own cases regardless of the parties’ connection which may end in acrimony.
42 P.H. Gulliver, Disputes and Negotiations, op. cit., at 219.
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Fourthly, mediation offers a speedier resolution of the dispute. In principle, this 
is because the mediation process does not follow formal procedures which are time- 
consuming. The experience shows that the court proceedings, for example, may take a 
few years to settle and can be very expensive. As a result, not only will the dispute take 
longer time to be resolved it will also involve more expenses. However, it must be 
admitted that not all mediated cases will take shorter period to be resolved than the 
cases which have been resolved in court. Moreover, there is no guarantee that 
mediation can successfully resolve all cases as the parties’ consensus-finding effort may 
be stalled once an impasse cannot be overcome, hence no common ground. The 
unsuccessful attempt to resolve the dispute by mediation thus may be perceived as a 
waste of time, expenses and effort.
As for the drawbacks, one must firstly consider the fact that mediation can only 
result in a non-binding outcome. Unlike the court or arbitration where the parties can 
legally enforce the judgment, the outcome of mediation is technically non-enforceable. 
It is thus up to the party to morally carry out their obligations. However, this drawback 
can be overcome by the parties entering into a mediation contract in order to safeguard 
against non-compliance with the outcome of the case. Another implication of the non­
binding nature of mediation is that the doctrine of precedent does not apply. Thus, the 
subsequent mediation does not need to follow the outcome of the previous case. The 
absence of the doctrine of precedent could arguably lead to inconsistency in the practice 
of the DMS and make APEC’s jurisprudential development more difficult.
A second drawback of mediation is that the chosen mediator may be 
incompetent. Mediation does not depend on successful proofs of factual and legal 
issues, as it is a consensus-finding practice, as much as the litigation or arbitration 
process. The success of mediation, therefore, mostly depends on the skills of the 
mediator to facilitate the negotiation between the disputants. In practice, it is 
uncommon that a mediator is incompetent. This is because the parties choose the 
mediator themselves and they would ensure that the mediator is competent for their 
case.
A third worry posed by mediation is the power imbalances. In certain 
circumstances, the two parties do not possess the same bargaining position. One party
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may have a stronger bargaining position than another in terms of economic, political or 
other advantages. Where the power imbalances are so significant, mediation is thought
to be inappropriate. However, this is not a view accepted universally.43 One
commentator has argued: “Mediators frequently write and talk of ‘balancing’ power and 
the mediator is enjoined to either disempower the overly powerful party or empower the 
powerless party”.44 In effect, the mediator attempts to strike a balance between the 
parties’ bargaining position. In doing so,
the mediator provides the necessary power underpinning to the weaker 
negotiator - information, advice, friendship - or reduces those of the
stronger. If he cannot balance the power relationship, the mediator can
bargain with or use his power against the stronger negotiator to constrain 
the exercise of his power 45
Accordingly, although some discrepancy in terms of the bargaining power might 
exist between the disputing parties, the mediator could technically use his skills in order 
to adjust any power imbalance, hence making mediation suitable for most cases.
5.3. Mediation under APEC
5.3.1. The Nature of the DMS
Mediation, in the form of the DMS, has now been accepted as an appropriate approach 
for resolving disputes between APEC members rather than other methods of dispute 
resolution.46
Guidance on the nature of the DMS was provided by its pioneer - the EPG - in 
its report, Implementing the APEC Vision 47 Accordingly, the DMS should: (i) apply to
43 Michael Palmer and Simon Roberts, op. cit., at 134.
44 G. Chomenki, ‘Mediating Commercial Disputes: Exchanging “Power Over” for “Power with”,’ in J. 
Macfarlane, ed., Rethinking Disputes: The Mediation Alternative, (London: Cavendish Publishing, 1997), 
163-168.
45 Ibid.
46 See APEC DMEG, Report to CTI on 1997 DMEG Meeting, (Singapore: APEC Secretariat, 1997).
47 APEC Secretariat, Implementing the APEC Vision, Third Report of the Eminent Persons Group, 
(Singapore: APEC Secretariat, 1995).
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all issues, thus ranging far beyond the dispute settlement mechanism in the WTO; (ii) 
emphasise mediation and conciliation rather than arbitration, in which the mediator tries 
to bring the parties together to arrive at their own settlement of the dispute or, failing 
that, offers his or her own proposals for settlement; (iii) feature shuttle diplomacy by a 
mediator moving between the two sides in an effort to reconcile their differences and 
foster a settlement between them; (iv) be implemented by individual mediators chosen 
voluntarily by the APEC members that are parties to a dispute from a list originally 
nominated by each member and maintained by the APEC Secretariat; (v) enable third 
parties to make their views known at the outset of the process; and (vi) encompass a 
second stage through which, if mediation and conciliation fail, a special review panel 
would make an objective assessment of the dispute that would be released publicly if 
one or more of the parties failed to accept its proposals.
Since the dissolution of the EPG in 1995, the group of experts especially 
commissioned for developing the DMS - DMEG - has continued the work on the DMS 
and held periodic meetings in order to update its progress. In pursuing its work, DMEG 
relies upon three premises, viz. (i) any DMS set up within APEC must be 
complementary to, and must not detract from, the newly agreed procedures of the WTO;
(ii) DMS must be entirely voluntary, without prejudice to the rights of any government 
to enforce fully its WTO rights at any time; and (iii) no new institution should be 
created within APEC for the purpose of dispute mediation.48
Further guidance on the operation of the DMS can be found in the 1994 Bogor 
Declaration. The APEC leaders have indicated that the DMS is to be used as a 
“voluntary consultative” dispute resolution mechanism and only to be used as a 
supplement to the WTO’s dispute settlement mechanism. They have further affirmed 
that the WTO’s dispute settlement mechanism is to be “a primary channel for resolving 
disputes” 49 The underlying reason behind the intention of the leaders is that the DMS 
should not duplicate or compete against the WTO’s dispute settlement arrangements.50
48 Brendan P. McGivem, supra, note 2.
49 The Bogor Declaration, supra, note 9.
50 APEC Secretariat, Implementing the APEC Vision, op. cit., at 12.
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5.3.2. The Scope of the DMS
There are four targeted areas where the DMS would be used, viz. (i) the mediation of 
disputes between APEC governments; (ii) the mediation of disputes between APEC 
governments and private entities; (iii) the mediation of disputes between private entities; 
and (iv) the avoidance of trade disputes through increased transparency of laws, 
regulations, administrative guidelines and policies related to trade and investment.
(i) The Mediation o f Disputes between APEC Governments
With regard to the possible disputes between the governments of APEC members, the 
prime channel for resolving such disputes is the WTO’ s dispute settlement mechanism. 
DMEG concluded that the WTO’s Dispute Settlement Understanding (DSU) should be 
resorted to where the WTO’s obligations are involved. In effect, this has reflected the 
intention of the APEC leaders as stated earlier and the guiding principles given by the 
EPG on the nature of the APEC’s DMS. In helping APEC members to familiarise 
themselves with the use of the WTO’s dispute settlement mechanism and the operation 
of the DSU, the meeting of DMEG has acted as a forum where APEC members can 
share their practical experience in using the WTO as a forum for settling the dispute. 
DMEG has also provided further assistance to APEC member economies by organising 
a seminar on the WTO DSU and a simulation exercise of the WTO’s panel process in 
1997.51
For disputes on the matters which fall outside the scope of the WTO, in principle 
they will be left open for the operation of the DMS. DMEG has recommended that the 
Trade Policy Dialogue (TPD) of the CTI should be used in order to allow parties in the 
possible dispute to have a chance to ease out the tension and allow peer review before it 
escalates into a full blown dispute. At the time of writing, no detailed proposals, 
however, have yet been made about the use of the TPD to support the DMS. Perhaps, 
one explanation for the delay in the drafting of the guiding principles for the use of the 
DMS for resolving disputes between APEC governments is due to the fact that there has 
not yet been a conclusive agreement on the use of the TPD as a venue for the DMS
51 See APEC DMEG, Report to CTI on the DMEG Seminar on the WTO DSU, (Singapore: APEC 
Secretariat, 1997).
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among the DMEG delegates. Without any practice of the DMS in resolving 
governmental disputes, it thus remains to be seen how the DMS would operate in order 
to ease the tension between the APEC members where a dispute arises.53
(ii) The Mediation o f Disputes between APEC Governments and Private Entities
There are no set rules or procedures governing disputes between APEC governments 
and private entities. DMEG has encouraged APEC members to accede and utilise 
existing international agreements which contain provisions for settling disputes, like the 
Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards (the New 
York Convention)54 and the International Convention on the Settlement of Investment 
Disputes between States and Nationals of Other States (ICSID).55 So far, nearly all 
APEC members have acceded to these two international conventions.
In order to facilitate the resolution of a dispute under this heading, DMEG 
organised a symposium on Alternative Mechanisms for the Settlement of Transnational 
Commercial Disputes in Bangkok on 27-28 April 1998.56
(iii) The Mediation o f Disputes between Private Entities
As for the disputes between private entities of APEC members, DMEG has undertaken 
studies of the ADR mechanisms currently used under the domestic laws of each APEC 
member including mediation, conciliation, and arbitration. In 1997, a Guide to
52 From the author’s observation during the DMEG meeting in Bangkok in 1998, Thailand strongly 
supported the use of the TPD as a venue for the DMS while Australia, Canada, and Chile were still 
sceptical about this matter.
53 See APEC DMEG, Report for the Committee on Trade and Investment, (Singapore: APEC Secretariat, 
1998).
54 New York Convention, 10 June 1958, in force 7 June 1959, 330 UNTS 3; UKTS 26 (1976), Cmnd. 
3655.
55 18 March 1965, in force 14 October 1966, 575 UNTS 159; UKTS 25 (1967), Cmnd. 3255.
56 For papers presented at this symposium, see The Arbitration Office, APEC Symposium 1998: 
Alternative Mechanism for the Settlement o f Transnational Commercial Disputes, (Bangkok: The 
Arbitration Office, Ministry of Justice, Thailand, 1998).
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Arbitration and Dispute Resolution in APEC Member Economies was published. This 
guidebook provides essential information for APEC members on the laws and 
regulations currently in force in each member economy of APEC and venues to which 
disputes may be taken. However, more seminars on private dispute resolution was felt 
necessary in order to facilitate the use of ADR in APEC member economies.58
(iv) The Avoidance o f Trade Disputes through Increased Transparency
For the purpose of avoiding disputes through an increase in transparency, DMEG has 
called on APEC members to make information regarding their laws, regulations, 
administrative guidance and policies related to trade and investment readily and 
promptly available. Information on these issues should be made available from the 
APEC web-site.59 Furthermore, DMEG has also called for an independent appeal 
procedure for reviewing and correcting any administrative action with regards to trade 
and investment. DMEG, additionally, has underscored the promotion of dialogue and 
understanding to encourage avoidance or resolution of disputes.60
5.3.3. The Procedures of the DMS
Even though the work on the APEC’s dispute settlement mechanism had started since 
1993, no concrete procedural guidelines were developed until 1995. These guidelines 
are provided in Annex 1 to the third report of the EPG, Implementing the APEC 
Vision.61 (See Appendix E.) In these guidelines, several procedural and administrative 
aspects of mediation are discussed, including: the request for mediation; expenses; third 
party’s participation; and the roles and qualifications of the mediators.
57 APEC Committee on Trade and Investment Dispute Mediation Experts Group, International 
Commercial Disputes: A Guide to Arbitration and Dispute Resolution in APEC Member Economies, 
(Singapore: APEC Secretariat, 1997).
58 See APEC DMEG, Report for the Committee on Trade and Investment, op. cit.
59 The address is: www.apecsec.org.sg.
60 APEC Experts’ Group on Voluntary Consultative Dispute Mediation, Report form the Vancouver 
Meeting, 17-18 June 1995, 35 /ZAf (1996) 1107.
61 APEC Secretariat, Implementing the APEC Vision, op. cit.
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In summary, there are three stages of the APEC’s mediation process: (i) 
information gathering; (ii) assessing strengths and weaknesses of each party’s 
arguments; and (iii) stratigising and negotiating. Mediation would be convened once the 
disputing parties have expressed their willingness to participate in mediation to the 
DMS administrator. The location for mediation would then be agreed upon by the 
parties. Unless the parties agreed otherwise, the location for the mediation process 
would be the APEC Secretariat in Singapore.
During the information gathering stage, a joint session would be arranged. This 
meeting would be attended by all parties involved in the dispute, including third party 
who might be “materially affected” by the outcome of the case. The mediator would 
then remind the parties of his function, i.e. to assist the parties to find a common ground 
upon which the settlement would be based, not to pass a judgment on the dispute. Each 
party would make a brief presentation of its case in order to identify the subject matters 
of the dispute. The third party would be allowed to make presentations and clarify its 
interests in the dispute.
The second stage of the mediation process starts when private caucus sessions 
are arranged. In each session, the mediator would meet each party in private and at a 
separate location. The mediator would ask each party to assess the strengths and 
weaknesses of its case and the expected outcome. Discussions during these private 
sessions are to be kept confidential, unless a party gives its consent to disclose the 
information to another party.
At the third stage of the mediation process, the mediator would move back and 
forth between the parties, listening to the points made by one party and relaying them to 
another party, hence facilitating the negotiations. The mediator would have to use his 
skills during these negotiations in order to persuade the parties to reach a compromise. 
Once such a compromise has been reached, the mediator would translate it into a written 
agreement which should be duly signed by the parties. The expenses for the mediation 
process are borne equally by the parties. Third party, however, has to bear its own cost.
With regard to the qualifications of the mediators, the guidelines suggest that 
similar conditions as required in the case of the WTO panellists are to be used.
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Accordingly, the DMS mediators could be one of the followings: former representatives 
of APEC members; individuals who teach or have published on international law or 
policy; a senior trade policy official of an APEC member; or individuals who come 
from the business or private sectors. A list of APEC mediators is to be kept at the 
Secretariat. In each dispute, one to three mediators could be chosen, and they are to act 
in an independent capacity. A potential mediator shall not be chosen if his economy is 
involved in the dispute unless agreed otherwise by the parties, or if his economy is a 
member of a subregional trade arrangement to which any disputing party is also a 
member.
5.4. Why Mediation Works for APEC?
While the WTO’s dispute settlement regime also offers disputing parties an opportunity 
to use mediation as a means of resolving the dispute, the record of the WTO has shown 
that mediation has hardly been used. One might ask, therefore, why mediation would 
work for APEC? There are some compelling reasons to support the use of mediation for 
resolving disputes among APEC member economies. They will be discussed below.
First of all, the DMS is a result of a compromise between the two camps of the 
APEC members: the Eastern and Western economies. APEC members who represent 
the Eastern economies are those of the Asian origin, for example the ASEAN member 
countries and China. The Western economies encompass APEC members who are not 
of the Asian origin, such as the United States, Canada, Australia and New Zealand. 
Differences in terms of culture, religion, legal and political environment, and economic 
development have played an important part in the selection of an appropriate method for 
the APEC’s dispute resolution mechanism.
In general, the Eastern economies adopt the so-called “Asian ways of doing
f/Xthings” philosophy as guidance for their modus operandi. A long history of the ways
62 ASEAN members who are members of APEC include: Brunei, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, 
Singapore, and Thailand.
63 The “ASEAN way” or sometimes “Asian way” was understood to connote the utilisation o f “consensus 
and consent, rather than rule and compulsion”. See Simon S.C. Tay, ‘The Way Ahead for Asia’, in Simon 
S.C. Tay and Daniel C. Esty, eds., Asian Dragons and Green Trade: Environment, Economics and 
International Law, (Singapore: Times Academic Press, 1996), 189-199 at 197. Also see Michael Haas, 
The Asian Way to Peace: A Story for Regional Cooperation, (New York: Praeger, 1989), 2-5. He notes
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Asian nations live their lives shows that they have tried to avoid confrontation as much 
as possible. Evidence of this is the fact that although ASEAN has already established a 
dispute settlement mechanism, members of ASEAN have never resorted to using it.64 
Matters which imply a conflict of interests between ASEAN members are to be resolved 
amicably.65 Other evidence suggesting that Asian nations are not in favour of resolving 
their disputes by adjudicatory means can be seen from the practice of GATT or the 
WTO which often shows that the Western nations are more likely to initiate the dispute 
settlement procedures than their Asian counterparts.66 Perhaps, this may explain the fact 
that Asian members of APEC, particularly China, Indonesia, South Korea and 
Singapore, fully support the formation of the DMS rather than other methods of dispute 
resolution.67
However, from the perspective of the Western members of APEC, the idea of 
using diplomacy as a means of resolving a dispute might not sit well with their cultures. 
These economies tend to prefer the use of an adjudicatory technique for resolving their 
disputes - hence, a rule-based dispute settlement system, like that of GATT or the
that the Asian way developed after the World War II when Asian nations recognised that the international 
relation approach of the Western counties was not suitable for them. It is a “cultural theory of 
international cooperation”, (at 21). See also, Paul J. Davidson, The Legal Framework for International 
Economic Relations: ASEAN and Canada, (Singapore: Institute o f Southeast Asian Studies, 1997), 31-32. 
He noted that the ASEAN way is derived from the Malay concept o f musyawarah and mufakat. The 
former is “the process of decision making through discussion and consultation”. The latter is a traditional 
approach involving “intensive informal and discreet discussions behind the scenes to work out a general 
consensus which then acts as the starting point around which the unanimous decision is finally accepted in 
more formal meeting”.
64 From a personal communication with Dr Vitit Muntrabhom, Faculty o f Law, Chulalongkom 
University, Bangkok, Thailand. From the history o f  ASEAN, the first mention of the dispute settlement 
system came 10 years after the inception of ASEAN. Provisions regarding dispute settlement among the 
ASEAN members are contained in the Declaration o f ASEAN Concord, and the Treaty o f Amity and Co­
operation o f 1976. It was not until 1996 that the ASEAN members agreed on a Protocol on Dispute 
Settlement Mechanism which is to govern the settlement o f disputes arising out o f ASEAN economic 
agreements. For more details on the ASEAN Protocol on Dispute Settlement Mechanism, see Paul J. 
Davidson, op. cit., 153-165.
65 For example, the 1976 Declaration of ASEAN Concord stipulates that “Member states, in the spirit of 
ASEAN solidarity, shall rely exclusively on peaceful processes in the settlement o f intra-regional 
differences”. Another example can be seen from the 1976 Treaty o f Amity and Co-operation which 
provides more binding and treaty-like provisions in Chapter IV - the Pacific Settlement of Dispute. Under 
this Chapter, Art. 13 states that “parties shall at all times settle disputes among themselves through 
friendly negotiations”; and Art. 15 further provides that other steps may be taken only “in the event no 
solution is reached through direct negotiations”.
66 See Brendan P. McGivem, supra, note 2.
67 See further in James Cameron and Tanya White, supra, note 3, where the authors note that Hong Kong 
has rejected the idea o f DMS, and preferred to use the WTO instead.
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WTO, is more preferred. For example, evidence can be seen from the table below 
(Table 4) which shows that the United States, with 61 cases, has initiated the panel 
proceedings under Art. XXIII of GATT more than any other Asian countries.
Table 4: GATT Dispute Settlement Procedures Initiated by APEC Members between 1947-1994
Initiating Member 
from APEC
Consultations 
Under Art. XXII 
of GATT
Consultations 
Under Art. 
XXIII of GATT
United States 27 61
Canada 7 18
Australia 7 13
Chile 10 9
New Zealand 4 3
Japan 2 3
Hong Kong 1 2
Mexico 0 2
Thailand 1 1
The Philippines 0 1
Brunei 0 0
Indonesia 0 0
Korea 0 0
M alaysia 0 0
Singapore 0 0
N ote: Adapted from WTO, Analytical Index: Guide to G ATT Law and Practice , volume 2, 
(Geneva: W TO, 1995).
Given the fact that the Asian economies represent more than a half of the 
APEC’s membership, mediation seems to be the right choice of technique for resolving 
the disputes among APEC members. Mediation is a compromise between the Asian and 
the Western ways of doing things. It would also support the sense of community which 
APEC has tried to build.68 It is evident that the DMS would be useful for APEC 
members as it would provide an alternative forum for dispute settlement in the Asia- 
Pacific rim. Members of APEC who are not yet members of the WTO, like China,
68 APEC Secretariat, Implementing the APEC Vision, op. cit., at 13.
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Taiwan and Russia would clearly benefit from the creation of the DMS as they have no 
right to use the WTO’s dispute settlement mechanism.69
Additionally, given that APEC has not yet translated its commitments into hard- 
law instruments, it is unforeseeable in the near future that APEC would be willing to 
formulate its own rules on dispute settlement based on the model of the WTO DSU. 
Indeed, as the more formal methods of dispute resolution, like arbitration, require rules 
governing their process and procedures, it would not be appropriate for APEC to create 
an arbitration process or the panel process like that of the WTO.70
Secondly, mediation entails a dispute resolution process which is geared towards 
the finding of a consensual solution which is acceptable to all parties to the dispute. It 
does not involve the same degree of formality as required by other methods of dispute 
resolution. The entire operation of mediation depends on the willingness and 
voluntariness of the parties to settle their dispute and implement the outcome. This 
might raise a concern about the effectiveness of the DMS. However, this concern might 
be argued otherwise. Rather than acting as disadvantages, informality, flexibility and 
voluntariness arguably could give advantages to the successful resolution of the dispute 
between APEC members. Firstly, the parties are not subject to any particular rules or 
procedures unless they are set up for themselves Parties could thus discuss a wider 
range of issues or tools for implementation. Unlike the WTO’s dispute settlement 
regime, matters which could be brought before the DMS are not limited only to the 
issues under the rubric of the WTO. Socio-economic issues such as environmental 
protection, competition, labour and human rights could therefore be resolved before the 
DMS. The ability to successfully resolve disputes involving these socio-economic 
issues is important for APEC in the light of the growing tension between APEC
n i
members caused by those issues in the recent years. Secondly, as the disputing parties 
must voluntarily agree on the use of mediation, it is likely that they will try to find a 
solution - so that mediation would not be a waste of time - and implement the outcome 
accordingly - as the parties have formulated such an outcome themselves. Thirdly,
69 APEC Secretariat, A Vision for APEC, op. cit., at 40.
70 APEC Secretariat, Achieving the APEC Vision, op.cit., at 23.
71 APEC Secretariat, Implementing the APEC Vision, op. cit., at 12.
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APEC’s mediation would “offer an intermediate channel between bilateral negotiation
77and the ‘win or lose’ confrontations of the WTO”. In other words, a successful 
mediation would put the disputants in a “win-win” situation.
One should note, however, that the potential of the DMS to resolve disputes 
between APEC members might be undermined as there still exists some issues which 
remain unclarified. Firstly, what is still lacking from the operational aspect of the DMS 
is guidance as to whether the DMS and the WTO’s dispute settlement mechanism could 
be used conjunctively. This issue needs some further clarification, expecially in the 
light of environmental matters which both APEC and the WTO arguably could have co­
jurisdiction. The guiding principles given by the EPG, as expounded previously, only 
provide that all matters under the scope of APEC could be resolved by the DMS. 
However, it has been noted that the purpose of creating the DMS is not to “duplicate or
H'Xcompete” against the WTO’s dispute settlement system. Does this mean that the DMS 
cannot be used to resolve matters concerning the WTO’s issues at all? But if a dispute 
could be resolved in a forum which could better resolve such a dispute, would it not be 
advisable to resolve the dispute there? Trade and environment disputes could arguably 
fall into such a category of dispute. This issue will be discussed in more detail in the 
next section.
Indeed, what is needed in order to resolve the APEC/WTO conflict of laws 
problem is a set of some guiding principles, articulating the determination of the 
jurisdiction and the choice of law in each case. As a suggestion, one model which 
APEC could use as guidance in this regard is NAFTA. More details on this issue will 
be given in the next chapter.
Secondly, according to DMEG, APEC should not create a new institution for the 
purpose of dispute mediation. This might raise concerns about the workload and, 
consequentially, the efficiency of the DMS administrator. As there has been no mention 
of who is the DMS administrator, it is assumed that the APEC Secretariat will take on 
this role. Given that the APEC Secretariat in Singapore employs only a small number of
72 Ibid., at 13.
73 Ibid., at 12.
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staff in comparison to other international organisations such as the WTO, it is 
foreseeable that the work of the Secretariat will be overloaded. As a solution, it might 
be advisable to establish a group of APEC officials, perhaps a couple of staff, who 
would deal with the administration of the DMS. In the long run, this would benefit the 
operation of the DMS if it proved to be successful and frequently in use.
Thirdly, although there have been some guidelines on the DMS, it has been 
argued that the DMS still lacks precision in its definition. At one point, DMEG had 
already attempted to define the DMS. It defined “disputes”, in a narrow sense, as 
differences regarding the implementation or enforcement of rights and obligations, or, in 
a broader sense, as differences regarding policies or objectives not subject to agreed 
rules. “Mediation” was defined as avenues to facilitate the parties directly involved to 
reach a mutually satisfactory resolution of a dispute, rather than to avenues such as 
arbitration or adjudication that involve the imposition of third-party dispute settlement. 
As for “service”, DMEG referred to a forum or procedure, but does not necessarily 
involve a formal mechanism or institution.74 Despite the efforts of DMEG, these 
definitions appear somewhat vague, imprecise and superficial.
Some commentators have further observed that despite the EPG has set out what 
the DMS should be, viz. handling issues beyond that under the WTO, featuring shuttle 
diplomacy, a mediator being chosen voluntarily, and so forth, it has failed to provide the 
exact type of mediation envisioned for the DMS. It also did not state whether the 
mediation would be binding, confidential, or would allow parties to choose their own 
representatives. Furthermore, importantly, the EPG did not strictly keep the meaning of 
“mediation”, it seems that the EPG has combined other aspects of alternative dispute
• j e
resolution into mediation as well. The EPG has suggested that a second stage of the 
DMS process is the establishment of a special review panel, should the mediation fail. 
The EPG has gone even further to describe what the panel stage would entail and the 
time-frame for the panel stage.76 Indeed, the confusion over the real nature of the DMS,
74 APEC Experts’ Group on Voluntary Consultative Dispute Mediation, Report form the Vancouver 
Meeting, op. cit.
75 James Cameron and Tanya White, supra, note 3, at 127.
76 The EPG has suggested that the panel should be requested within 60 days o f the end of the mediation 
process. The panel should be established within 30 days o f the request. In any case, the whole panel
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in my opinion, has opened the door for further interpretation concerning the use of the 
med-arb technique as discussed earlier. As such, could the panel of mediators assume 
the role of the special review panel? Or, does a new panel need to be constituted? 
Moreover, if the EPG intended that the panel stage should also be an integral part of the 
DMS, should it not include the elaboration of the panel stage in its mediation 
guidelines? These issues need to be clarified by APEC before the confusion about the 
DMS could be eradicated. Unfortunately, the work on the DMS with respect to the 
resolution of the dispute between APEC governments has not been developed further by 
DMEG. DMEG seems to emphasise on promoting the understanding of the WTO’s 
dispute settlement mechanism and the exchange of the practical experience of APEC 
members in using such a mechanism. In order to encourage a smooth operation of the 
DMS, DMEG should seriously consider the formulation of the more precise DMS 
guidelines and make them part of APEC’s instruments.
In any case, one must remember that the DMS is only in its infancy and 
evidently falls far short of being fully developed. From an opportunity to attend the 
DMEG meeting in Bangkok, in 1998, and some interviews with DMEG delegates, it can 
be concluded that the concept of the DMS is surprisingly still unclear, even to the 
DMEG delegates themselves. It is hoped that the clarification of the DMS will be 
provided once the DMS issue is discussed at the CTI meeting some time in 1999.
5.5. The Potential of the DMS for Resolving Trade and Environment 
Disputes in the Asia-Pacific Rim
Mediation has been employed for some time for resolving business and environmental 
disputes.77 This is particularly true in the United States and United Kingdom78 and even
70in Asia. More recently, the support for using mediation for resolving trade and
process should take no longer than 90 days. See APEC Secretariat, Implementing the APEC Vision, op. 
cit., at 15.
77 See Christopher Napier, ed., Environmental Conflict Resolution, (London: Cameron May Ltd., 1998).
78 Christopher Napier, ‘The Practice of Mediation in Commercial Environmental Disputes’, in 
Christopher Napier, op. cit., 198-207.
79 Christopher W. Moore, ‘The Practice o f Cooperative Environmental Conflict Resolution in 
Developing Countries’, in Christopher Napier, op. cit., 160-195; Lawrence E. Susskind and Joshua
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environment disputes among APEC members by the DMS seems to have grown among
OA
academia. However, before the potential of the APEC’s DMS can be assessed in the 
light of trade and environment dispute resolution, it should be asked if trade and 
environment disputes can be suitably resolved by mediation. In my opinion, the answer 
is “yes”. Arguably, trade and environment disputes could satisfy all the criteria which 
make the dispute suitable for mediation. To recall these criteria: (i) there must be some 
interdependence between the parties; (ii) all parties must participate in the mediation 
process and agree to implement the outcome; (iii) the dispute must be ready for 
negotiations; and (iv) the dispute must not involve a clash of fundamental values or 
moral absolutes.81 Satisfying the first three criteria is not difficult. This is because, 
firstly, the parties in the trade and environment dispute in APEC are trading partners 
who also are members of APEC, thus they are interdependent. Secondly, as the 
members of APEC have agreed to use mediation as a means to resolve their dispute, it 
could be argued that such an agreement implies that once the disputants have chosen to 
resolve the dispute before the DMS, they undertake to find a consensual solution and 
implement it accordingly. Thirdly, once the trade and environment dispute has arisen 
commercial loss would have been inflicted on the disputants. This arguably makes the 
matter ready to be negotiated as the parties would undoubtedly want to settle the dispute 
as expeditiously as the could. As for the fourth condition, one might argue that trade 
and environment disputes are not suitable to be resolved by mediation for the reason that 
trade and environment paradigms operate differently, as they have different goals and 
modus operandi. However, it could be argued to the contrary that trade and 
environment paradigms do not contradict each other as they could support one another 
and work together in the search for the long-term goal of sustainable development. 
And, as APEC has already expressed its intention to further sustainable development, it
Secunda, ‘Environmental Conflict Resolution: The American Experience’, in Christopher Napier, op. cit, 
16-55.
80 See, for example, James Cameron and Tanya White, supra, note 3; Andr6 Dua and Daniel C. Esty, 
Sustaining the Asia Pacific Miracle: Environmental Protection and Economic Integration, (Washington, 
DC: Institute for International Economics, 1997), 162-164; Charles Arden-Clarke, Trade and 
Environment in APEC: Avoiding Green Protectionism While Securing Sustainable Development, a WWF 
International Discussion Paper, (Gland, Switzerland: WWF International, 1995); Jane Drake-Brockman 
and Kym Anderson, The Trade/Environment Debate and Its Implications for Asia-Pacific, Policy 
Discussion Paper No. 94/23, (Adelaide: Centre for International Economic Studies, University of 
Adelaide, 1994).
81 See section 5.2.1.3, supra.
82 See Chapter 2.
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should not be too difficult to argue that the parties in the trade and environment dispute 
are working towards the same end - hence no conflicts in fundamental values or moral 
absolutes.83
According to Esty and Dua, the ability of the DMS to resolve trade and 
environment disputes would undoubtedly add an extra value to the DMS process. 
However, the true value of the DMS would lie in its innovative structure to address 
trade and environment tensions. In other words, it is imperative that the DMS is created 
with the capability to strike a trade and environment balance. Therefore,
rather than examining whether domestic standards being used to further 
health or environmental objectives are the “least trade restrictive”, the 
[DMS] should focus on assessing whether the measure is reasonably 
tailored to achieving a legitimate public health or environmental goal and 
whether it arbitrarily or capriciously restricts trade.84 (Emphasis
added.)
Implicitly, Esty and Dua seem to place the “proportionality” concept at the heart 
of the trade and environment dispute resolution process of the DMS. Thus, the aim of 
the trade and environment dispute resolution here is not finding whether the trade 
measure in question would produce the least trade restrictive effect on the trade between 
APEC members, but to investigate whether that particular measure could fulfil its 
environmental purpose without placing unnecessary constraint on the trade between the 
APEC members who are the parties of the dispute.85
However, it must be remembered too that the aim the DMS is to encourage the 
disputing parties to reach a consensual solution. Given that both environmental and 
economic gains are at stake in the trade and environment dispute, such a consensual 
solution might be rather difficult to achieve. APEC members indeed may be required to 
give and take in order to reach a solution which is not only acceptable to the parties but 
also promotes the APEC’s goal of sustainable development as a whole.
83 See Chapter 4.
84 Andr6 Dua and Daniel C. Esty, op. cit., at 163.
85 In effect, this reiterates the criteria for formulating a trade and environment dispute settlement 
mechanism proposed by Esty as discussed earlier. See Chapter 2, section 2.3.1.
As there is no evidence on which a conclusion could be drawn as to the potential 
of the APEC’s DMS to resolve a trade and environment dispute at this stage, an 
assessment could only be carried out by speculation. However, APEC could look into 
the experience of GATT and the WTO, as already discussed in the earlier part of this 
thesis, in order to gauge the potential of the APEC’s DMS. The assessment of the 
DMS’ potential will be made in the light of some legal and institutional considerations 
in relation to trade and environment dispute resolution.
5.5.1. The Legal Considerations
In trade and environment dispute resolution, two sets of law need to be considered. 
They are the law governing environmental provisions and the law governing the dispute 
settlement process. These laws will be discussed below.
5.5.I.I. The Law Governing Environmental Provisions
From the legal perspective, the prime concern for the parties in the trade and 
environment dispute is whether a trade measure in the form of ban, quota, or licensing 
requirement could justifiably be used for “environmental” purposes, whose wide 
interpretation would also cover the protection of health and safety of human, animal or 
plant life or health as well as exhaustion of natural resources as contained in Art. XX(b) 
and (g) of GATT. As established in the Gasoline decision and reiterated by the 
Appellate Body in the Shrimp/Turtle case, the test for the justification of trade measures 
for environmental purposes under the WTO regime is based on two principal steps - the 
“two-tier” test. In the first step, the party seeking to rely on the environmental 
justification under GATT Art. XX has to prove that its measure satisfies the so-called 
“environmental threshold” contained in the sub-paragraphs of Art. XX. Accordingly, 
the United States, in the Shrimp/Turtle dispute, for instance, bore the burden to prove 
that its bans on shrimp and shrimp imports from the Asian complaining parties were 
genuinely environmentally-oriented. Then, as the second step, the United States had to 
demonstrate that the bans were not used arbitrarily, unjustifiably or as a disguised trade 
restriction - a kind of “trade threshold”.
The WTO’s approach of resolving trade and environment disputes shows that it 
is a restrictive approach. For example, issues which are to be decided are limited by the 
terms of reference; and parties will place an emphasis on satisfying the test rather than 
finding an outcome with would provide the best solution for both free trade and 
environmental protection.
The determination of the factual and legal issues rests solely in the hand of the 
panel. This, however, could pose dangers to the way trade and environment disputes are 
resolved. As the panel’s decision in the Shrimp/Turtle shows, the panel’s reasoning 
could damage the way trade and environment disputes should be resolved. By starting 
with the test in the chapeau, the panel did not leave any room for the consideration of 
the genuine trade measures for environmental purposes. It is rather fortunate for the 
environmentalists that the Appellate Body has overturned the panel’s reasoning. 
Otherwise, if the panel’s view is upheld and followed by a later panel, it would indeed 
set a dangerous precedent and undermine the ability of the WTO to resolve the trade and 
environment disputes in a balanced manner. On the other hand, the WTO does not 
follow a stare decisis doctrine. It could be argued therefore that the corrective approach 
as used by the Appellate Body in the Shrimp/Turtle case might not be followed in the 
next case. As the panel and the Appellate Body retain the authority in the determination 
of the trade and environment dispute under the WTO’s dispute settlement system, it is 
uncertain to predict the direction in which the trade and environment dispute will be 
resolved in the future. ^
In the mediation process, it is the parties who are in control. The outcome of the 
dispute therefore will be decided by the parties, not a third person and not according to a 
particular set of rules such as GATT. The fact that the parties are in control of the 
proceedings could have some environmental implications. Firstly, wider issues could be 
considered. For example, the parties could refer to the sustainable development 
argument. APEC has already had the Framework of Principles governing the 
relationship between the economy and environment which refers to sustainable 
development and particularly trade and environment issues. The parties could therefore 
refer to this Framework of Principles in their negotiations. Although these principles 
contained in the Framework of Principles do not have the hard-law or binding status,
they could however be argued as forming part of APEC soft-law which should at leasx j  
be voluntarily observed by the APEC members. ,
Secondly, international law could be taken into account. As the 1992 Earth
fr
Summit asserted and reflected in the Framework of Principles for Integrating Economy 
and Environment of APEC, trade and environment should be made mutually supportive. 
Accordingly, international trade and international environmental laws should co-exist ^  U*
within the broad framework of international law. As the scope of mediation is wider y f i  
than the DSU, environmental principles such as precautionary principles or polluter- 
pays-principle could be taken into consideration during the mediation process. In the 
Beef Hormone case, for instance, the panel and the Appellate Body failed to honour the 
precautionary practice of the EU on the basis of insufficient scientific evidence. The 
encouragement to use international standards may also be viewed pessimistically, as 
international standards do not always provide an appropriate standard. Often they are 
set at the lowest common denominator in order to allow the poorest nations to be able to 
participate in the standard setting process and implement such standards.
Thirdly, mediation could allow a wider consideration for the use of trade 
measures for environmental purposes. For example, the processes and production 
methods (PPMs) could be used as a basis for differentiating the treatment between the 
two products. Under GATT, the basis for comparing the treatment of imports and 
domestic goods is the “like product” test. If the products are alike, no differential 
treatment may be undertaken, unless justifications as provided in GATT can be proven.
As already discussed in Chapter 3, the WTO’ panels and Appellate Bodies in the 
Gasoline or the Shrimp/Turtle cases still did not explicitly allow the PPMs as conditions , ^
upon which the products could be differentiated - albeit the Appellate Body in the latter jf . 
has shown some sign of a wider interpretation which might allow the distinction based
r Mon the PPMs. From the environmental perspective, such a practice is discouraging. 1 &
This is because goods could have different environmental characteristics while having 
the same physical attributes. Therefore, the use of trade measures should be allowed to 
regulate goods which have been produced by environmentally harmful methods.
Another issue which the DMS could address is the use of extraterritorial trade |5 r
f i  c r
measures. Extraterritoriality of the trade measures under the realm of GATT 1947 had lVn 0A J,
jU
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provoked much criticism. But even under the WTO regime, the clarification of this 
issue still remains inconclusive - albeit the Shrimp/Turtle case has shown a sign that 
extraterritorial trade measures might be legitimate. Unlike the WTO, the DMS is going 
to be used to resolve the disputes between APEC members. As APEC is a smaller 
community than the WTO, and arguably a closer knitted organisation, the use of 
extraterritorial measures in order to protect the APEC environment, such as migratory 
fish stocks or sea turtles, might be found to be more acceptable. Additionally, as APEC 
has already pursued some work on regional environmental protection, finding a 
justification for extraterritorial measures should be easier than under the WTO system 
under which no common environmental agenda has been developed.
§.§.1.2. The Law Governing Dispute Settlement
As described in an earlier chapter, the dispute settlement process of the WTO is 
governed by the Dispute Settlement Understanding (DSU) - a set of elaborately drafted 
rules, providing details of each stage of the WTO’s dispute settlement process. As the 
DSU comes in the same package as other agreements under the framework of the WTO, 
strict adherence to the DSU is thus required by all members of the WTO. While the 
precise rules and procedures may be argued to provide a more rule-based dispute 
settlement system, and move the WTO’s dispute settlement process a step closer to 
being a judicial process, they might not be the best route to take as far as the resolution 
of a trade and environment dispute is concerned. Admittedly, the disputing parties may 
want to see a “win-lose” situation, hence they do not want a compromise. The WTO’s 
dispute settlement system also provides an enforceable remedy. Therefore, these 
attributes of the WTO’s dispute settlement system might explain why the parties in the 
Shrimp/Turtle case, for example, were willing to resort to the panel process.
Mediation, on the other hand, offers a “win-win” solution. The aim of mediation 
is to find a consensual outcome which is reached by the parties themselves with the help 
of the mediator. The philosophy of mediation would fit in well with the aim of trade 
and environment interrelationship. As a result, it could be argued that the disputing 
parties in the mediation process would try to reach a compromise without concentrating 
on fighting one another with legal criteria.
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In mediation, the parties are in control of the process. They are not restricted by 
the rules like those contained in the DSU. The rules and procedures of the mediation 
process are decided by the parties. Such informality and flexibility could be beneficial 
to trade and environment dispute resolution in some ways. Firstly, the informality of the 
mediation process might encourage disputing parties to exchange their opinions of the 
issues in the dispute. Rather than concentrating on proving the compatibility of the 
measures with GATT, the parties might concentrate on explaining their situation to the 
mediator in a non legal manner, so that the mediator would not be bombarded with legal 
technicality. Secondly, as mediation does not encourage the parties to fight one another 
as they might in the judicial process, it may not be necessary to use a specialist counsel - 
which will incur a lot of expense and not suit the budget of the poorer parties. The cost 
advantage of the mediation technique also has another implication for the developing 
members of APEC. As mediation arguably would incur less cost than the litigation 
method or the WTO quasi-judicial process, more developing members of APEC could 
have more access to the dispute resolution process. Consequentially, those countries 
would have more opportunity to challenge the protectionist trade measures exercised by 
the richer countries.
Where the parties adopt the med-arb style, the situation may be a little different. 
In this case, more rules and procedures will be needed. At the moment, no rules or 
procedures have yet been drafted for the APEC med-arb process, let alone the 
uncertainty of the use of med-arb in APEC, it is worth considering the rules and 
procedures which would allow more environmental considerations to be taken into 
account. Apart from the involvement of appropriate personnel, as will be discussed 
later, one particular issue which needs to be addressed is the burden of proof. While this 
issue is not so crucial in the mediation process, as a ruling from the third person umpire 
is not the aim of the exercise, the burden of proof is very important for judicial and 
quasi-judicial process.
As a customs, in the case of trade and environment disputes, the burden of proof 
issue under the realm of the WTO is borne by the complainant to establish the violation 
of GATT. Once the violation is established, the burden will then shift to the respondent 
to prove its justification for its measures under the relevant provisions for exceptions. 
But, it would be better, from the environmental perspective, if the burden is borne by the
complaining party all the time. The fact that the respondent has to prove its justification 
shows that the environmental value of the measure is always questioned. It also means 
that it is easy to challenge the trade measures for environmental purposes. If the burden 
to prove the compatibility of the trade measures is borne by the challenging party, it 
might consider the initiation of the challenge more carefully, hence less incentive to 
challenge. As a result, less trade-related environmental measures would be challenged. 
APEC could consider the allocation of the burden of proof along the line of the 
foregoing during its med-arb process in order to promote the protection of the 
environment.
Another issue which must be considered in the med-arb process is the source of 
law. One way which the med-arb could help promote the trade and environment 
balance is to ensure that both trade and environmental laws are taken into consideration 
equally. It should allow the mediator/arbitrator to resort to guidance from international 
law, including customary law relating to environmental protection. And where the 
measures are taken pursuant to multilateral environmental agreements, there could be a 
presumption that such measures could be deemed legitimate under realm of APEC.
5.5.2. The Institutional Considerations
Whether or not a trade and environment dispute could be resolved in a balanced fashion 
does not depend only on the law that allows trade measures for environmental purposes 
to be used as a bona fide enforcement tool. Achieving the balance between trade and 
environmental considerations also depends on an institutional arrangement that reflects 
environmental sensitivity. What could make one dispute resolution forum more 
environmentally sensitive than another will be discussed below.
5.5.2.1. An Arbitrator or Mediator with Environmental Background
In a mediation process, it is not compulsory that a mediator should possess some 
relevant knowledge of the issues involved in a dispute. It is sufficient that the mediator 
has the skills to encourage the disputing parties to reach a mutual agreement. But in a 
dispute with a complex nature like a trade and environment dispute - which requires a 
careful consideration of intertwining issues of more or less equal importance - it is
preferable that the mediator has some interest and sound knowledge of both trade and 
environmental issues. Arguably, the more knowledgeable the mediator the better ability 
he has to understand and digest the issues so that he can guide the disputing parties in 
the right direction, i.e. to find a trade and environment equilibrium. And, where the 
mediator is required to act in an active role, the mediator who has a good grasp of the 
subject at hand would be able to rationally perform a complicated balancing act between 
the trade and environmental interests as well as the needs of the disputing parties.
In the DMS process, there would normally be one mediator in each case. 
However, in the proposals of the EPG it was envisaged that there might be some 
circumstances where more than one mediator is needed. In such cases, a panel of three 
mediators could be formed. From the perspective of trade and environment dispute 
settlement, this could possibly mean that at least one of the mediators would come from 
each of the trade and environment domains. As a suggestion, the composition of the 
panel of mediators should idealistically be one with a trade background, one with an 
environmental background, and one with both trade and environment backgrounds. 
This composition would, in my view, provide a perfect combination for the resolution of 
a trade and environment dispute. It offers a balanced panel of qualified mediators from 
the two disciplines. Accordingly, the viewpoints from both trade and environment 
camps would be heard equally and well understood.
In the situation where one of the disputing parties is a developing country, the 
third mediator could be substituted with a mediator from a developing country - 
reiterating the WTO’s practice as provided for in Art. 8(10) of the DSU.86 The benefit 
of having a mediator from a developing country sitting in a panel is that he could at least 
represent a viewpoint of the developing country, who would have a different priority 
from the developed country, with a view to provide a balance in terms of bargaining 
power.
In comparison to the WTO’s panellists and Appellate Body so-called “judges” 
who come from the domain of trade, e.g. trade experts or governmental representatives 
to the WTO, APEC could have a pool of mediators who come from diverse
86 This article articulates: “When a dispute is between a developing country Member and a developed 
country Member the panel shall, if  the developing country Member so requests, include at least one 
panelist from a developing country Member”.
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backgrounds. No affirmative requirements have yet been set by APEC as to what 
qualifications must a mediator have for the DMS process. It is a good opportunity for 
APEC to compile a list of mediators from a wide range of disciplines, including those of 
trade and environment. APEC arguably pursues a wider range of activities than the 
WTO. As discussed in the previous chapter, APEC has also commissioned several 
environmental work programmes among its other activities. The focus of APEC now is 
not solely trade co-operation as when it was originated in 1989. It also expands to cover 
issues such as environmental protection, competition policy, human resources 
development and sustainable development. Moreover, the APEC’s DMS is established 
in order to deal with matters outside the boundary of the WTO. It is foreseeable 
therefore that some environmentally qualified persons could be listed as APEC 
mediators.
In the Gasoline or Shrimp/Turtle disputes, while the trade measures satisfied the 
environment threshold, i.e. the first tier, they failed on both occasions to fulfil the 
conditions contained in the chapeau, i.e. the second tier. Even though it could not be 
said conclusively that the outcomes would have been different had the composition of 
the panels in these cases been a mixture of trade and environment panellists, it would at 
least have given a better impression to the environmental protagonists that the WTO 
was in fact environmentally sensitive. Moreover, by having an environmentalist in a 
panel, it might be possible to argue that more weight could be given to the 
environmental side of the argument. As a result, the main focus of the dispute would 
not rest largely on trade considerations. Arguably, this would enhance the panel’s 
ability to reach a balanced decision as the panellists from trade and environmental 
disciplines will both be present during the deliberation process.
5.5.2.2. An Involvement of Environmental Experts and NGOs
Environmental experts can come from several domains. They may come from 
government officials, environmentally instituted non-governmental organisations 
(NGOs) or a specifically created environmental organ within each trade institution. 
Within the APEC’s framework, environmental expertise could be provided by officials 
from various working groups and committees dealing with environmental matters such 
as those already described in Chapter 4, for example: the Regional Energy Working
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Group; the Marine Resources Conservation Working Group; the Industrial Science and 
Technology Working Group; and the Fisheries Working Group. Alternatively, the same 
kind of expertise might be provided by existing NGOs or other non-state actors in the 
Asia-Pacific region, for example Greenpeace (whose offices are situated in Japan, 
Australia and New Zealand),87 the Worldwide Fund for Nature (WWF)88 and the US- 
based Nature Conservancy (TNC).89
Under the realm of the WTO, environmental expertise so far can only come from 
outsider environmental experts. Experience of the WTO has shown that environmental 
experts from the NGOs cannot present their case during the WTO’s panel process. The 
only way their opinions could be heard is through written submissions in the form of 
amicus curiae brief. In the Shrimp/Turtle dispute, two NGOs - the Center for 
International Environmental Law and the WWF - had already provided an input for the 
panel from the environmental point of view. There should not be any doubt that such 
NGOs can indeed provide the panel with valuable environmental information that can 
assist the panel’s reasoning process. As their practice, the NGOs often keep abreast 
with the development in their particular field of interest, their up-to-date information 
could indeed help the panel’s awareness on the development in the field of 
environmental protection. For example, the NGOs’ opinions could shed light on the 
implications of the trade measure used in each case. Moreover, the NGOs’ information 
could help the panel come to a more even-handedly decided outcome by providing an 
offset against trade considerations which still remain dominant in the trade and 
environment dispute settlement process of the WTO.
Recently, the Appellate Body in the Shrimp/Turtle case ruled that the DSU did 
not prohibit the NGOs from submitting the amicus curiae briefs. But, whether or not 
they would be considered in the dispute settlement process, it still remained at the 
discretion of the panel. Indeed, this case shows that although the Appellate Body has 
opened the door for the future submission of environmental expert’s comments, it still 
remains cautious about allowing use of such information.
87 For further information about Greenpeace, see www.greenpeace.org.
88 See further, www.panda.org.wwf.
89 For more information, see www.tnc.org.
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With regard to the participation of the NGOs in the dispute settlement process, 
the matter still remains contentious. Under the WTO regime, the NGOs are not 
recognised as having a locus standi, they are not allowed in the hearing stage of the 
dispute settlement process of the WTO. Apart from submitting written submissions as 
discussed above, the NGOs could make themselves heard only through the lobbying 
process as an alternative.
By contrast, the DMS process could involve more participation by 
environmental experts and NGOs. An expert in the DMS process could be the mediator 
himself or one of the delegates in the negotiating team which represents the disputing 
party. However, unlike other judicial or quasi-judicial tribunals, like the court or 
arbitration, it is unlikely that an environmental expert would be called as a witness 
during the DMS process as mediation is normally conducted privately. Nonetheless, an 
environmental expert or representatives from the relevant NGOs could consult with the 
mediator during the mediation process, i.e. when the mediator discusses in private with 
each of the disputing parties. Alternatively, environmental expertise could be provided 
during the mediation process by way of written submissions.
One drawback of the environmental expert issue, however, is that one must be 
careful in selecting what information could be provided and who could participate in the 
DMS process. This caution is necessary in order to prevent the DMS process being 
inundated with irrelevant and unnecessary information. This is because while NGOs are 
recognised as being able to play a pivotal role in the development of an APEC wide 
environmental agenda they can also be a nuisance.90 Where the expert is the mediator 
himself, there should be no problem in allowing his involvement during the mediation 
process. But where environmental expertise comes from other non-state actors or 
NGOs, it might be worthwhile considering a test to assess the legitimacy of the 
participation or involvement of those persons. Moreover, to help each party decide 
which information is to be used during the process, an exchange of environmental 
expert’s opinions might be worth considering. What test is to be used will be discussed 
in Chapter 7 where some recommendations will be made.
90 Lyuba Zarsky, ‘APEC, Citizen Groups, and the Environment: Common Interests, Broad Agenda’, 
available from the Nautilus Institute for Security and Sustainable Development, Berkeley, California, 
1995. (On file with author.)
5.6. Dispute Avoidance
In contrast to dispute settlement where the DMS may be used to resolve a dispute once 
it happens, the DMS could be used as a means of dispute avoidance, i.e. preventing a 
conflict of interests between the parties from escalating into a full blown dispute which 
could affect their relationship both economically and diplomatically. Generally, dispute 
avoidance may take the form of policy formation and information dissemination, i.e. 
forming a policy which does not result in a conflict of interest with other parties and 
letting them know about it. Indeed, letting the other trading parties know about what 
laws and measures are going to be used would undoubtedly minimise the discord which 
may arise between them. But, in some instances this may not be adequate. It may be 
necessary that assistance from a third party is required. This is where APEC DMS m a^ 
come in. 0 J ^ X \  1
In the Shrimp/Turtle dispute, a series of consultations had been attempted but k 
without success. But, what needs to be remembered is that consultations were arranged 
after the trade ban had been imposed. By that time, trade loss had already been incurred 
and trading relations between the disputing parties had certainly been made uneasy. 
However, by applying the principle of dispute avoidance provided by the APEC’s DMS 
to this situation, the parties might have prevented the conflict from reaching the same 
magnitude as it did in the real case.
For dispute avoidance to be applied successfully, the initial process of dispute 
avoidance has to start at a very early stage, i.e. before the United States had deployed its 
ban pursuant to its law on the import of shrimp or shrimp products harvested without 
the use of the turtle excluder device (TED) which would affect other countries. From 
the facts of the case, the time for the dispute avoidance process to have taken place 
should be in 1996, just after the revised guidelines (1996 Guidelines), whose effect was 
to extend the scope of Section 609 provision beyond the US jurisdiction, were published 
in compliance with the order of the Court of International Trade (CIT).
From the previous practice of the US government, it should be able to anticipate 
the forthcoming difficulties with other shrimps exporting countries. The trading records 
on the US part should demonstrate that Thailand and Malaysia are two of its main
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exporters of its shrimp and shrimp products. Therefore, the US law which would 
inevitably cause some difficulties to these countries should be discussed with them 
beforehand. Although this may be time consuming, in the long run all parties involved 
could appreciate the amount of benefit created by such a meeting. With all the modem 
technology in the field of communication and the frequency of meetings hosted by the 
APEC forum, it should not be difficult to arrange such a meeting.
In practice it is perhaps unrealistic to expect the US government to foresee all 
affected exporting countries, unless there are no flaws in the transparency relating to the 
publication of measures for environmental purposes which allows ready access to the 
public both domestically and internationally. The US government could, at the very 
least, make its measures known publicly. It could use the forum of APEC to lay its 
cards on the table, for example at the Trade or Environment Ministerial Meeting, or at 
the regularly held Senior Officials’ Meeting. Alternatively, the parties could make use 
of the Trade Policy Dialogue, under the auspices of the Committee on Trade and 
Investment, in order to meet up and discuss an alternative.
The DMS could be novel in that it could introduce the third party during the 
consultation, hence engendering a mediation atmosphere, if parties had found an 
impasse during the meeting. To break the ice, the third party mediator could indeed 
play an important role. This third party mediator would act in the same way and for the 
same purpose as he would in the dispute settlement process. It is also possible that a 
panel of three mediators could be formed, acting as a team of experts, where the case 
involves highly technical, scientific or legal complications.
Among the composition of the panel, at least one mediator each could come 
from the trade and environmental domains. For the same reason as argued in the earlier 
section of this chapter, the intermingling of both trade and environmental mediators 
would facilitate the parties in reaching their compromise. However, a set of guiding 
principles on appointment and conduct of the panellists and the overall process of 
mediation should be formulated as soon as possible. By having guiding principles 
formally drawn up, the credibility and consistency of the mediation process would be 
enhanced. This, in turn, might help attract more members to use the dispute avoidance 
mechanism.
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The panel of expert mediators in the hypothetical DMS Shrimp/Turtle case could 
help bring Thailand, Malaysia and the United States to a sort of conclusion which would 
yield a compromise between the US environmental policy and the trade loss of Thailand 
and Malaysia, amounting to millions of dollars. In so doing, the US government should 
make their terms and goals explicit to the DMS panel, detailing their concerns for 
protection of the sea turtles. At the same time, the Thai and Malaysian governments 
should explain to the panel how much trade loss they will suffer as a result of the US 
law. These governments may persuade the panel to lean in their favour as trade is a 
necessary engine for their economic growth. If trade stalls, their striving for economic 
and developmental betterment would be impaired. The mediators would then exercise 
their skills to persuade each party to reach a compromise. For example, in this case, the 
US may be asked to consider an alternative measure which is more proportionate than 
the trade ban, such as labelling requirements. On the part of Thailand and Malaysia, 
more time to bring their conservation regimes in line with the American’s could be 
agreed upon. Moreover, technical and financial assistance from the US government 
could be provided in order to ensure the compliance with the US law.
Apart from having experts as mediators during the process, non-state actors like 
interested NGOs and industries whose interests are at stake may be allowed to 
participate either by being present at the meeting or by submitting their view in writing 
in the form of amicus curiae briefs. These documents could provide details of how 
necessary the measure in question is in order to secure environmental protection. As an 
alternative, the NGOs from all parties could meet up in parallel to the DMS process. At 
such parallel proceedings, the NGOs could agree upon a common principle or opinion 
which could then be presented to the mediator. This would certainly save time as the 
NGOs would not need to present their opinions individually. In the hypothetical 
Shrimp/Turtle case, Thailand and Malaysia could have their NGOs submit papers 
demonstrating that they have had adequate sea turtle conservation programmes.
At the dispute avoidance stage, the problem of admitting amicus curiae 
documents could be less acute. This is because, at this stage a concrete and legally 
binding decision is not the aim. Instead, the aim of the APEC’s DMS dispute avoidance 
is to steer parties away from the escalation of a conflict of interest into a full blown 
dispute. Thus, the process of dispute avoidance while helping the parties come to their
compromise also provides a channel for non-state actors to contribute their views. This 
aspect could prove to be helpful for the development of the trade and environment 
debate, as information from the non-state actors could be more readily accepted. But 
again, a set of guidelines might be needed in order to prevent the dispute avoidance 
process being inundated with NGO’s papers.
Indeed, adding another function to the existing APEC’s framework would 
involve some financial sacrifice. With the already tight budget of APEC, funding for 
the process of dispute avoidance may have to be provided by the parties in the dispute 
themselves. But, as a number of APEC members are still developing countries, they 
may not be prepared to pay such a large sum of money. Again, if the APEC central fund 
is established, those poor members of APEC would not be denied their chance to 
consult with other trading partners who would introduce a measure for environmental 
purpose which could adversely effect their market access. As the Shrimp/Turtle case 
has demonstrated, a large amount of litigation fees was incurred from the start to the 
finish of the dispute settlement process. By having the APEC central fund in placed) 
Thailand and Malaysia’s legal costs could have been funded partly by such a fund. In 
effect, by shifting some of the legal costs to APEC, it could encourage members to use 
the DMS dispute avoidance avenue.
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Naturally, making all APEC members contribute to the central fund could trigger 
some unwillingness from some APEC members, hence deterring members from using 
the DMS avenue. But when comparing this amount of contribution with the amount of 
trade loss which might result, the establishment of the central fund could prove 
worthwhile.
Apart from the financial constraint, it has to be borne in mind that in order for 
dispute avoidance to work successfully, the main driving force is the political 
willingness of the parties to come together and find a compromise, and such a 
willingness may not be found in all situations. With the alternative of the WTO forum 
which could offer a judicial ruling, the idea of dispute avoidance might be overlooked. 
Some successful results generated by the dispute avoidance process may have to 
materialise before the credibility and confidence in the system are built up.
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Moreover, by dispute avoidance via mediation the parties are more likely to 
reach an outcome which accommodates their interests, rather than focusing on the 
determination of their legal right which can only render a legal compromise at the end of 
the proceeding without achieving the underlying purpose of the measure. In trade and 
environment disputes, this means that, most of the time, rather than the natural resources 
or the environment being preserved, the parties in the dispute have focused on 
redeeming their commercial loss. In the Shrimp/Turtle case, for instance, the parties 
during the dispute avoidance stage could focus their case on how to protect the turtles 
from being incidentally killed by using a proportionate trade measure instead of 
focusing on how to retaliate against the offender. Thus, the goals of both trade and 
environment would be achieved with an optimum result.
If APEC can successfully promote the idea of dispute avoidance, this would be a 
novel means for dispute resolution in the field of trade and environment as no other 
forum would have offered a “two track” environmentally sensitive dispute resolution 
system. (See Diagram D.) The APEC’s DMS dispute avoidance would therefore not 
only be valuable to the Asian members of APEC, by preserving the Asian ways of doing 
business, it will be beneficial to the North American members too. For the latter groups, 
the more choice of forum could mean more chance to pursue their environmental 
priorities.
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5.7.The DMS and the WTO’s Dispute Settlement System
In as much as the trade agenda of APEC needs to proceed in a consistent fashion with 
the WTO’s trade liberalisation programmes, the dispute resolution system of the two 
institutions also need to work coherently. The WTO’s dispute settlement mechanism 
has already been in use for some years and produced several important decisions 
concerning international trade matters. With more trust and credibility given to the 
Dispute Settlement Body (DSB), the Appellate Body and the dispute settlement process 
on the whole, the WTO will indeed continue to be an attractive avenue for resolving the 
disputes among its members. In contrast, the APEC’s DMS is extremely nascent and 
still developing. Its workability or efficiency is still yet to be tested in practice. It is 
thus difficult at this stage to conclusively predict if the DMS will receive the similar 
kind of response that APEC member economies give to the WTO’s dispute settlement 
process. The relationship between the DMS and the WTO’s dispute settlement process 
thus will pose some legal questions which need to be answered including: Do APEC 
members have a choice of forum where a dispute may be resolved?; Can a dispute 
resolved under the framework of APEC be reinitiated before the DSB of the WTO?; and 
Does the use of the DMS mean a waiver of the right to resort to the WTO’s dispute 
settlement mechanism? These questions will be addressed below.
5.7.1. The Choice of Forum
The choice of forum is one of the most important decisions the parties of the dispute 
have to make. In private international law there are rules governing the choice of forum 
under the law of conflicts. However, in public international law there are no such rules. 
Public international law by and large operates by the doctrine of consent.91 Thus, the 
parties are at their liberty to choose the forum for resolving their case. However, where 
the disputants belong to a particular international organisation their choice of forum may 
be limited by the membership of a certain institution. Within the APEC context, at least 
three choices of forum are available to APEC members for resolving their disputes: the
91 James Cameron, ‘Dispute Settlement and Conflicting Trade and Environment Regimes’, in Agata 
Fijalkowski and James Cameron, eds., Trade and the Environment: Bridging the Gap, (London: Cameron 
May Ltd., 1998), 16-26, at 17.
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DMS; the dispute resolution mechanisms of the sub-regional groupings such as 
NAFTA, ASEAN and the Closer Economic Relation Agreement between Australia and 
New Zealand (CER); and the WTO - provided that the disputants are members of the 
WTO. Each of these fora offers a different way of resolving the dispute. Additionally, 
the APEC members may agree to resolve their dispute at the International Court of 
Justice (ICJ) or even the tribunal of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the 
Sea (UNCLOS).
The choice of forum may also be dictated by the issue of the dispute. For 
instance, a trade dispute should be resolved at a trade-oriented forum - like the WTO or 
APEC - and an environmental dispute should be resolved at an environment-oriented 
forum - like that established by the Montreal Protocol, the environmental chambre of the 
ICJ or the UNCLOS tribunal. However, for a dispute which can fall into more than 
one discipline like the trade and environment dispute, it is indeed not easy to decide the 
forum to which the dispute should be brought. The choice of forum in this instance thus 
depends on the law and discipline upon which the parties rely as the basis to bring their 
case. From the practice of the WTO, it has been suggested that where the jurisdiction of 
the WTO and the multilateral environmental agreement (MEA) is overlapped, a dispute 
is to be settled by the dispute settlement of the MEA where both of the disputing parties 
are members of that particular MEA. However, where only one party of the dispute is a 
member of the MEA, but both parties are members of the WTO, an appropriate forum 
for dispute settlement in this situation is the dispute settlement mechanism of the 
WTO.94
From the perspective of APEC, the WTO is to be used as a primary forum for 
resolving a dispute between APEC member governments. It could also be rightly 
assumed that in many cases the dispute would concern the violation of the WTO rules, 
as APEC currently does not have hard-law instruments which give APEC the
92 For a review of the role of the ICJ in environmental disputes, see Patricia W. Bimie and Alan E. 
Boyle, International Law & The Environment, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1992), 136-160.
93 The UNCLOS tribunal has a jurisdiction to deal with marine conservation and pollution disputes. For 
further discussions, see Patricia W. Bimie and Alan E. Boyle, op. cit., at 181-182.
94 See WTO, Report o f the WTO Committee on Trade and Environment, Document WT/CTE/W/40, 7 
November 1996, (Geneva: WTO, 1996), at 11.
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jurisdiction to resolve the dispute. In spite of the preference of the WTO over APEC’s 
mechanism there is yet nothing in APEC literature which prohibits the members from 
resolving the dispute via APEC’s own mechanism. This is especially so where the 
WTO’s ability to deal with some issues still remain questionable. Environmental issues 
indeed fall into these kinds of issue. As discussed in Chapter 3, despite the fact that the 
WTO has resolved trade and environment disputes in a more environmentally friendly 
way than GATT 1947, there are still some loopholes in the WTO system which remain 
to be targets of criticism from the environmental community. Indeed, the APEC’s DMS 
may be able to fill in such a gap. From the perspective of the WTO, to use the DMS in 
order to resolve the dispute should also be welcomed. This is because the DSU already 
provides for the use of mediation (Art. 5 of the DSU) as a means to resolve the dispute 
between the WTO members in parallel to the formal dispute settlement process - the 
establishment of a panel. Moreover, nothing in Art. 5 of the DSU shows any sign of 
prohibition from resorting to mediation outside the WTO system. The use of mediation 
is furthermore encouraged by the fact that the Art. 3(7) of the DSU requires the formal 
quasi-judicial dispute settlement procedures (the panel process) should be requested 
only when the parties of the dispute consider that such a process would yield a “fruitful” 
result.
To sum up, in absence of the rules governing the choice of law in the domain of 
public international law, the disputants have control over the choice of forum for 
resolving their dispute. In many instances, the choice of forum depends on the 
agreement between the parties of the dispute. Also, there are other factors which may 
be influential in the forum shopping process, such as the membership of a particular 
group, the law and issue of the dispute, and the credibility and the performance of the 
dispute resolution mechanism. Advantages which the parties may gain from using the 
DMS in resolving trade and environment disputes have already been delineated in the 
earlier section, it may be advisable therefore that the APEC members choose the DMS 
as an avenue for resolving their dispute.
5.7.2. Can the Dispute be Reinitiated?
Admittedly, it is not often that mediation can result in an agreement between the 
disputants. One might question, therefore, what the parties could do if the DMS failed
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to deliver an outcome. In general, in this situation the parties may seek other means to 
resolve their dispute or preserve the status quo. The latter option, however, is not 
advisable unless the parties no longer have a desire to preserve the relationship between 
themselves. In the context of public international law, the broken relationship could 
have several implications. Some of them may be typified by the use of trade embargoes, 
termination of diplomatic relations, withdrawal from obligations under international 
agreements, and even declaration of war. As a matter of practice, therefore, the parties 
will try to resolve the dispute as far as they can.
Technically, the DSU does not prohibit the re-initiation of the dispute as long as 
the first attempt to resolve the dispute is not via the panel process. In other words, the 
complaining party may request the establishment of a panel in one of these 
circumstances: before mediation commences; at the same time as mediation begins; or 
after mediation fails. The DSU only states that mediation can be used voluntarily, 
subject to the agreement of the disputants,95 and it can be initiated and terminated at any 
time.96 So, mediation can be attempted independently from the panel process. APEC 
members may choose the DMS to carry out mediation as opposed to under the WTO. 
One might ask, however, about the correlation between mediation under APEC and the 
WTO regimes. In theory, there should be no conflicts between the two systems, as they 
operate independently. One party may attempt to resolve the dispute by the DMS first, 
then start all over again under the WTO system. But, this approach would be very 
expensive and time consuming. The better option is to use the DMS as an avenue for 
mediation in the first place, if no outcome could be achieved then the parties might start 
the panel process under the WTO system provided that both parties are WTO members. 
The failure of the mediation process in this case should not be viewed as being futile. 
Instead, one should see the mediation stage as a testing ground for the disputants’ cases, 
so that should the mediation produce an unsuccessful result the disputing parties would 
get a second chance to settle the dispute at the WTO.
95 Art. 5(1) o f the DSU.
96 Art. 5(3) o f the DSU.
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5.7.3. Waiver of the WTO’ s Right?
Another important question one might ask is that once the parties have chosen to use the 
DMS to resolve their dispute does it mean that they have waived their right to settle the 
dispute by the WTO mechanism? The answer to this question indeed depends on the 
parties. The disputants might decide to use the DMS as the only avenue for resolving 
their dispute. In alternative, they might decide to use the DMS first as a testing ground 
for their case then proceed to the WTO’s mechanism in order to obtain a formal ruling. 
As discussed above, there is no prohibition in the DSU or by APEC that the parties 
could not reinitiate the proceedings at the WTO once the DMS had failed. Thus, it 
entirely depends on the parties’ intention whether or not to waive their right to resort to 
the dispute resolution mechanism of the WTO.
However, there is another important factor which needs to be taken into 
consideration. That is the point of law in the dispute. In the dispute which involves 
issues of the WTO, particularly GATT, the parties might wish to use the WTO’s 
mechanism to resolve the dispute since the WTO panel and the Appellate Body would 
no doubt provide an expert’s advice on the law of GATT. But, in the case of trade and 
environment dispute, the parties may decide to submit the case to the forum which is 
more environmentally sensitive. An example may be seen from the NAFTA’s 
experience which will be examined below.
In general, it is therefore up to the parties to weigh their considerations between 
the use of the DMS and the WTO’s dispute settlement mechanism before deciding 
whether or not to waive the right to use the latter. In any intergovernmental disputes not 
only must the parties of the dispute consider the legal issues before any legal 
proceedings may be taken, they also have to consider the political, economic, and 
diplomatic consequences. From the perspective of APEC, frictions between the 
member economies might eventually damage the integrity of APEC as a regional co­
operation institution.
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Chapter 6 
NAFTA as a Model for the DMS?
From the perspective of dispute settlement, if a dispute could be settled it could be said 
that the dispute settlement process has been successful. However, from the trade and 
environment perspective, such a dispute could not be treated as settled successfully 
unless the trade and environment balance has been met. The last chapter has discussed 
how the Dispute Mediation Service (DMS) of the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation 
(APEC) may be used to resolve trade and environment disputes among APEC members. 
Mediation could provide an effective alternative to the dispute settlement mechanism of 
the World Trade Organization (WTO) for resolving trade and environment disputes. 
However, dispute settlement is only a short term solution. It only deals with the 
problem on a case-by-case basis. No guarantee can thus be given that the future 
disputes would be resolved in the same way. In order to ensure the continuity of the 
trade-environment balance through the dispute resolution mechanism, the North 
American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) is chosen with a view to providing guidance 
for APEC.
Reasons for choosing NAFTA as a model are as follows. Firstly, NAFTA has 
been perceived as one of the most environmentally sensitive trade agreements, another 
being the treaties of the European Union (EU).1 As will be seen below, NAFTA has 
owed its “green” reputation to environmental provisions contained in NAFTA itself as 
well as the environmental side agreement. Secondly, APEC more closely resembles 
NAFTA in terms of economic integration progression than the EU which is relatively 
more advanced.2 The EU is now moving closer to becoming a monetary union - a form
1 For discussions on the “green” reputation o f the EU, see, for example, Joanne Scott, EC 
Environmental Law, (New York: Longman, 1998); Emst-Ulrich Petersmann, International and European 
Trade and Environmental Law after the Uruguay Round, (London: Kluwer Law International, 1995).
2 The EU was established by the Treaty on European Union (TEU) of 7 February 1992. This treaty was 
a result o f a summit held in Maastricht, the Netherlands, in December 1991. The TEU, hence, is also 
called the Maastricht Treaty. This treaty aims to provide a deeper integration of Europe economically as 
well as politically. In fact, the evolution of the EU dates back to the 1950s when the European Coal and 
Steel Community (ECSC) was formed. The aims of the ECSC were to promote rationalisation and 
integration of the European steel industry. In 1957, the Treaty o f Rome establishing the European 
Economic Community (the EC Treaty) was signed by six founding Member States, namely France,
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of economic co-operation which requires that not only a common external tariff is 
established but also a unified system of monetary regulation - while NAFTA only 
pursues a free trade arrangement which simply requires the parties to eliminate tariff and 
non-tariff barriers among themselves. Additionally, the EU has a more complex 
institutional arrangement which comprises the EU Commission, Council, Parliament 
and the Courts - the European Court of Justice (ECJ) and the Court of First Instance 
(CFI). It also has the capacity to legislate a uniform environmental law in the form of 
Regulation or Directive which the current structure does not allow APEC to do.3 
Thirdly, as NAFTA is already a sub-regional economic arrangement within the APEC 
boundary, the provisions contained in NAFTA thus would not depart so much from the 
APEC’s practice as APEC (e.g. in the Bogor Declaration) requires that the sub-regional 
groupings should complement the evolution of APEC, and vice versa.
It should be mentioned from the outset, however, that this chapter is not intended 
to suggest that APEC could entirely emulate NAFTA, as this might not be possible due 
to the differences between these two institutions. But, viewed optimistically, APEC still 
can learn from several elements of NAFTA which arguably have made NAFTA one of 
the most environmentally friendly trade institution of our time.
In assessing what aspects of NAFTA could possibly provide a model for APEC 
in terms of trade and environment dispute resolution, a brief account of NAFTA and it 
environmental provisions will be provided. Then, the dispute settlement mechanism of
Germany, Italy and the Benelux countries (comprising Belgium, the Netherlands and Luxembourg). Later 
accessions were made by Denmark, Greece, Ireland, Portugal, Spain and the United Kingdom, raising the 
number o f members to 12. The EC Treaty envisages the creation of, inter alia, a common market which is 
based upon an elimination o f customs duties and quantitative restrictions on import and export in 
commodity and measures having equivalent effect to the quantitative restriction (MEQR). A big leap in 
the evolution of the European integration was the adoption o f the Single European Act (SEA) o f 1986, 
which came into force in 1987. The SEA sets out ambitious agendas leading towards the materialisation 
of the Single European Market under which the free movement o f goods, services, capital and people are 
to be guaranteed. Up to date, the EU is seen as the most advanced form o f economic integration. For 
more discussions on the background o f the EU, see Stephen Weatherill and Paul Beaumont, EC Law: The 
Essential Guide to the Legal Workings o f the European Community, 2nd edition, (London: Penguin Books, 
1995), 1-42; Paul Craig and Grdinne de Burca, EU Law: Text, Cases and Materials, 2nd edition, (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 1998), 3-48.
3 For example, Regulation 259/93 o f 1 February 1993 on the supervision and control o f shipments of 
waste within, into and out o f the Community, OJ 1993 L 30/1; Directive 92/43 o f 12 December 1991 on 
hazardous waste, OJ 1991 L 377/20; Regulation 594/91 on substances that deplete the ozone layer, OJ 
1991 L 67/67; Directive 79/409 of 2 April 1979 on the conservation of wild birds, OJ 1979 L 103/1; and 
Directive 92/43 o f 21 May 1992 on the conservation of natural habitats o f wild fauna and flora, OJ 1993 L 
206/7.
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NAFTA will be briefly examined. The last part of this chapter will discuss aspects 
which APEC could learn from NAFTA in order to help develop APEC’s practice for 
trade and environment dispute resolution.
6.1. NAFTA: A Brief Background
NAFTA is a tripartite trade pact which was entered into by the United States, Canada 
and Mexico on 17 December 1992.4 The NAFTA negotiation process started in 
February 1991 by the enunciation of the then President of the United States, George 
Bush, President Carlos Salinas of Mexico and Prime Minister Brian Mulroney of 
Canada. The actual meeting of NAFTA commenced on 12 June 1991 by trade ministers 
of the three NAFTA members. The series of complex negotiations was completed on 
12 August 1992 which produced a document of more than a thousand pages. NAFTA 
came into force on 1 January 1994.5 NAFTA is expected to provide a “free trade area” 
(Art. 101 of NAFTA) for 360 million consumers and more than $6 trillion in annual 
output.
Historically, the development of NAFTA finds its roots in the formation of the 
Canada-United States Free Trade Agreement in 1988.6 (Hereafter “the FTA” ) To a 
certain extent, NAFTA has been seen either as an extension or improved version of the 
FTA because provisions in NAFTA have largely been borrowed from the FTA.8
4 North American Free Trade Agreement, 8 December 1992, 3 2 ILM (1992) 289.
5 For further background o f NAFTA, see Richard Buckley, ed., ‘NAFTA and GATT: The Impact of  
Free Trade’, Understanding Global Issues, 94/2, (Cheltenham, UK: European Schoolbooks Publishing 
Limited, 1995); D. Lipsey, R. Schwanen and R. Wonnacott, The NAFTA, (Toronto: C.D, Howe Institute,
1994); C. O’Neal Taylor, ‘Fast Track, Trade Policy, and Free Trade Agreements: Why the NAFTA 
Turned into a Battle’, 28 George Washington Journal o f  International Law and Economic (1994) 1; Bijit 
Bora, ‘North American Free Trade Agreement’, in Bijit Bora and Christopher Findlay, Regional 
Integration and the Asia-Pacific, (Melbourne: Oxford University Press, 1996), 168-183.
6 Canada-United States Free Trade Agreement, 22 December 1987, in force 1 January 1989, reprinted 
in 27 ILM (1987) 281. For a brief history of the FTA, see Michael J. Trebilcock and Robert Howse, The 
Regulation o f International Trade, (London: Routledge, 1995), 39-45. The FTA regulates trade in goods, 
services, and investment between the United States and Canada.
7 Michael J. Trebilcock and Robert Howse, The Regulation o f  International Trade, (London: Routledge,
1995), at 45.
8 Gary Clyde Hufbauer and Jeffrey J. Scott, NAFTA: An Assessment, (Washington, DC: Institute for 
International Economics, 1993), at 2.
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However, NAFTA should not be mistaken for a trilateral version of the FTA.9 Rather, it 
is a hybrid version of the FTA. This is because the FTA was negotiated in order to 
accommodate the interests of Canada and the United States, which would be difficult to 
extend to Mexico in the case of NAFTA.10 Moreover, the intentions of the parties to the 
NAFTA negotiations were manifestly different. While an increase in access to each 
other’s market and job creation ostensibly were the main benefits anticipated by 
NAFTA,11 there were other hidden agenda as well.12 For the United States, it saw 
NAFTA as an opportunity to prolong an economic reform of Mexico after President 
Salinas stepped down in 1994. Additionally, the United States wanted to manifest its 
intention to pursue freer trade at any cost, given that NAFTA was negotiated during the 
long course of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations whose success 
was not ascertained at that time. However, the Canadian motive was somewhat 
different. Simply, it did not want to be left out. Canada was concerned that its benefits 
under the FTA would be undermined by the new co-operation between the United States 
and Mexico.
The main aims of NAFTA are: (i) to phase out all tariffs and most non-tariff
barriers (NTBs) to trade in goods and services between the members over 5-15 years;
(ii) to promote fair competition; (iii) increase investment opportunities in member
•  1 ^countries; and (iv) to strengthen the intellectual property protection in North America. 
The implementation of these aims is to be carried out via several activities which, for 
example, include: abolishing all tariffs and NTBs between members over the 15 year 
period; converting NTBs into tariff-rate quotas; establishing the NAFTA rules of 
origin;14 and drafting of rules to protect intellectual property - not just patents, but also
9 Bijit Bora, supra, note 5, at 173.
10 Ibid.
11 Gary Clyde Hufbauer and Jeffrey J. Scott, op. cit., at 3-5. Also see Jorge A. Gonzalez, Jr., ‘The North 
American Free Trade Agreement’, 30(2) The International Lawyer (1996) 345, at 351.
12 See Bijit Bora, supra, note 5, at 172-173.
13 See Art. 102 which sets out the objectives of NAFTA.
14 The NAFTA rules of origin are both complex and stringent. As such, they create an administrative 
barrier to trade. The NAFTA rules of origin apply to all except three products: automotive, textiles and 
some agricultural products. These products are governed by separate rules o f origin. At present, in the 
automotive industry, for example, the percentage o f NAFTA components required before a certificate of 
NAFTA origin can be given is 62.5 percent.
199
copyright, trademark, and trade secrets. Besides trade issues, other issues have also 
been addressed under the framework of NAFTA. These issues include: investment, 
competition policy, financial services, labour and the environment. In my view, these 
issues have arguably made NAFTA one of the most comprehensive regional agreements 
ever concluded in this era.
Institutionally, NAFTA is now administered by a NAFTA Free Trade 
Commission which is composed of cabinet-level representatives or their designees from 
each member country. The functions of the Free Trade Commission are outlined in Art. 
2001(2) of NAFTA, including: supervising the implementation of NAFTA; overseeing 
its further elaboration; resolving disputes arising out of the application or interpretation 
of NAFTA; supervising the work of all committees15 and working groups16 under 
NAFTA; and considering any matter that may affect the operation of NAFTA. The Free 
Trade Commission convenes at least once a year, chaired by each member successively. 
It is supported by a full-time Secretariat of somewhat unique arrangement.17 The 
Secretariat is divided into Sections, one in each member country.18 Its functions are set 
out in Art. 2002(3) of NAFTA which include the administration of the dispute 
settlement provisions of NAFTA, and providing support for the Commission and 
various Committees and Working Groups.
6.2. NAFTA Environmental Provisions
Environmental issues had played an important role during the negotiations of NAFTA. 
At the beginning of the process, NAFTA contained no separate sections concerning 
environmental issues albeit they were addressed sporadically in the agreement. 
However, the environment protagonists considered this to be insufficient. This resulted 
in a separate environmental side agreement being negotiated - the North American
15 There are Committees working on several issues, which include: trade in goods; trade in worn 
clothing; agricultural trade; sanitary and phytosanitary measures; standards-related measures; NAFTA 
small business; and financial services. There is also an Advisory Committee on Private Commercial 
Disputes.
16 The Working Groups are established for issues relating to: rules of origin; agricultural subsidies; trade 
and competition; and temporary entry. Also, there are two Mexican-American Working Groups.
17 Established pursuant to Art. 2002 of NAFTA.
18 These Sections o f the Secretariat are situated in Ottawa, Mexico City and Washington, DC.
Agreement on Environmental Cooperation (NAAEC).19 This landmark agreement was 
concluded on 13 August 1993 by the Canadian Minister for International Trade, Thomas 
Hockin, the Mexican Secretary of Trade and Industrial Development, Jaime Serra, and 
the US Trade Representative, Mickey Kantor. This sub-section will briefly review 
environmental provisions contained in NAFTA itself and the NAAEC.
6.2.1. NAFTA
6.2.I.I. The Preamble
The starting point for environmental provisions contained in NAFTA itself is the 
Preamble which makes some clear references to environmental protection and 
sustainable development. It explicitly enunciates that NAFTA is to:
e6
contribute to the harmonious development of world trade...in a manner p
consistent with environmental protection and conservation, . . .promote ^  \ 
sustainable development...;[and] strengthen the development and  ^
enforcement of enviromnental laws and regulations. (Emphasis added.) ^  V
\j^
Although the preamble does not have binding force in itself, as it does not set
(
out specific obligations to be followed, it still represents the premise of a synergy ^  
between trade, environmental protection and sustainable development, as called for at 
the 1992 Rio Earth Summit. This premise can be affirmed more concretely by the 
NAFTA provisions themselves. The main provisions pertinent to environmental 
protection in NAFTA are Art. 104, Chapter 7B, Chapter 9 and Art. 1114.
19 8 September 1993, 3 2 ILM (1993) 1480.
20 There is a ample literature on NAFTA and the environment. For example, see Alan M. Rugman, John 
Kirton and Julie Soloway, ‘NAFTA, Environmental Regulations, and Canadian Competitiveness’, 31(4) 
Journal o f World Trade (1997) 129; Robert Housman, ‘The North American Free Trade Agreement’s 
Lessons for Reconciling Trade and the Environment’, 30 Stanford Journal o f  International Law (1994) 
379; Daniel C. Esty, ‘Making Trade and Environmental Policies Work Together: Lessons from NAFTA’, 
in James Cameron, Paul Demaret and Damien Geradin, eds., Trade & The Environment: The Search for  
Balance, vol. I, (London: Cameron May Ltd., 1994), 373-386; Pierre Marc Johnson and Andr6 Beaulieu, 
The Environment and NAFTA: Understanding and Implementing the New Continental Law, (Washington, 
DC: Island Press, 1996).
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6.2.I.2. Art. 104
Art. 104 of NAFTA governs the relationship between NAFTA and multilateral 
environmental agreements (MEAs). It technically preserves the right of the NAFTA 
parties to exercise trade measures in accordance with certain MEAs, namely: the 
Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer; the Basel Convention 
on the Control of Transboundary Movements of Hazardous Wastes and their Disposal; 
and the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and 
Flora (CITES).21 Art. 104(1), in particular, allows the trade obligations under NAFTA 
to be trumped by the use of trade restrictive measures under the MEAs. Some other 
bilateral environmental agreements set forth in Annex of Art. 104.1 of NAFTA are also 
given the same privilege as these MEAs.22 Article 104(1) of NAFTA states:
In the event of any inconsistency between [NAFTA] and the specific 
trade obligations set out in: (a) [CITES]; (b) [the Montreal Protocol]; (c)
[the Basel Convention] on its entry into force for Canada, Mexico and 
the United States; or (d) the agreements set out in Annex 104.1; such 
obligations shall prevail to the extent of the inconsistency, provided that 
where a Party has a choice among equally effective and reasonably 
available means of complying with such obligations, the Party chooses 
the alternative that is the least inconsistent with the other provisions of 
[NAFTA].
It is worth noting that Art. 104 is not exclusively drafted as Art. 104(2) of 
NAFTA allows other environmental agreements to be added to Annex 104.1, subject to 
the parties’ agreement in writing. In effect, Art. 104(2) extends the NAFTA overriding 
status to trade obligations under the future MEAs where they are inconsistent with the 
NAFTA’s obligations.
21 Gustavo Alanis-Ortega, ‘What We Can Learn From NAFTA’, in Simon S.C. Tay and Daniel C. Esty, 
eds., Asian Dragons and Green Trade: Environment, Economics and International Law, (Singapore: 
Times Academic Press, 1996), 71-77, at 72.
22 These are the 1986 Agreement Between the Government o f Canada and the Government o f the United 
States of America Concerning the Transboundary Movement o f Hazardous Waste and the Agreement 
Between the United States of America and the 1983 United Mexican States on Cooperation for the 
Protection and Improvement of the Environment in the Border Area.
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6.2.1.3. Chapter 7B
Provisions concerning the North American environmental standards are contained in 
Chapter 7B of NAFTA. In particular, this chapter provides an imprint of rules 
concerning sanitary and phytosanitary (SPS) measures.
In substance, Chapter 7B provides that an SPS measure may be adopted, 
maintained, or applied by each member where such a measure is “necessary for the 
protection of humans, animals, or plants’ life or health in its territory, including a 
measure more stringent than an international standard, guideline, or 
recommendation”.23 (Emphasis added.) In addition, the measure shall be scientifically 
based, not be maintained where the scientific basis no longer exists, and based on a risk 
assessment appropriate to the circumstances.24 The SPS measure in question is further 
required to ensure the granting of non-discriminatory treatment to the like goods of 
another member or non-member alike, hence guaranteeing the national treatment and 
the most-favoured nation (MFN) principles,25 and to ensure that such an SPS measure 
does not amount to an unnecessary obstacle or disguised restriction on trade between 
NAFTA members 27
6.2.1.4. Chapter 9
Chapter 9 of NAFTA sets out rules with regard to technical barriers to trade (TBT) in 
general which inter alia include those related to safety, the protection of human, animal 
or plant’s life or health, and the environment. With regard to the TBT measures, Art. 
904 of NAFTA sets out basic rights and obligations whereby each member may adopt, 
maintain, or apply any standards-related measures so long as they accord non-
23 NAFTA Art. 712(1). For provisions on international standards, see NAFTA Art. 713, whereby inter 
alia the SPS measure which conforms to the international standards, guidelines or recommendations is 
presumed to be consistent with Art. 712.
24 NAFTA Art. 712(3)(a), (b), (c). For an elaboration o f the risk assessment and appropriate level of 
protection, see NAFTA Art. 715, where a list o f what to be taken into account is given.
25 NAFTA Art. 712(4).
26 NAFTA Art. 712(5).
27 NAFTA Art. 712(6).
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discriminatory treatment to the like goods28 and do not create unnecessary obstacles to 
trade between NAFTA members. Each member may set its own level of protection 
that it considers appropriate30 in accordance with the risk assessment procedures.31 
Standards which are set by each member shall be based upon existing international 
standards or those whose completion is imminent, unless they are not appropriate to its 
climatic, geographical, technological, or infrastructural circumstances, or fail to live up 
to the standards the member considers appropriate. Moreover, if the international 
standards are relied upon, there will be a presumption that the member’s standard is 
neither discriminatory nor an unnecessary obstacle to trade.
6.2.I.5. Art. 1114
Unlike the foregoing provisions, Art. 1114 has set NAFTA apart from any other trade 
agreements by including the subject of “investment and the environment” in the trade 
context.34 Art. 1114(2) discourages the NAFTA parties to waive environmental 
obligations or lower environmental standard purposely to attract foreign direct 
investment. It further provides that should such an incident occur, “consultations” can 
be resorted to “with a view to avoiding any such encouragement”.35
28 NAFTA Art. 904(3).
29 NAFTA Art. 904(4).
30 NAFTA Art. 904(2).
31 NAFTA Art. 907(2).
32 NAFTA Art. 905(1) and (2).
33 Richard B. Stewart, ‘The NAFTA: Trade, Competition, Environmental Protection’, 27(3) The
International Lawyer (1993) 751, at 760.
34 For a detailed discussion on NAFTA investment provisions and the environment, see Robert 
Housman, Reconciling Trade and the Environment: Lessons from the North American Free Trade 
Agreement, (Geneva: UNEP, 1994), 18-21.
35 Although this provision is well received by the environment protagonists, its implementation still
remains doubtful. This is because Art. 1114(2) does not provide any further details o f what to do if
consultations fail. All it requires is that parties shall consult.
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6.2.2. The NAAEC
The NAAEC is an environmental side agreement that exists alongside the NAFTA trade 
pact with a view to committing the parties to effectively enforce their environmental 
laws and regulations. Its purpose is not to alter the trade basis of NAFTA but reinforce 
the environmental provisions contained in it. This undertaking is reaffirmed in the 
preamble of the NAAEC itself which states:
Convinced of the importance of the conservation, protection, and 
enhancement of the environment in their territories and the essential role 
of cooperation in these areas in achieving sustainable development for 
the well being of present and future generations...[and] reconfirmed the 
importance of the environmental goals and objectives of the NAFTA, 
including enhanced levels of environmental protection.
Ten objectives of the NAAEC are set out in Part One, Art. 1. Primarily, they are 
geared towards the protection and improvement of the environment and the promotion 
of sustainable development. Some of these objectives are: (i) to foster the protection 
and improvement of the environment in the territories of the parties for the well-being of 
present and future generations; (ii) to promote sustainable development based on co­
operation and mutually supportive environmental and economic policies; (iii) to support 
the environmental goals and objectives of NAFTA and avoid creating trade distortions 
or new trade barriers; and (iv) to strengthen co-operation on the development of 
environmental laws and enhance their compliance and enforcement, and promote 
transparency and public participation.
Part Two of the NAAEC encompasses obligations to be followed by the parties, 
including the general commitments (Art. 2), publication of laws, regulations, procedures 
and administrative rulings (Art. 4), government enforcement action (Art. 5), private 
access to remedies (Art. 6), and procedural guarantees (Art. 7). However, what is 
significantly noteworthy is Art. 3 which governs the level of environmental protection. 
While the NAFTA members are to pursue the trade agenda, Art. 3 of the NAAEC also 
mandates that the member “shall ensure that its laws and regulations provide for high 
levels o f environmental protection and shall strive to continue to improve those laws and 
regulations”. (Emphasis added.) By accepting NAFTA’s obligations, the members 
have also undertaken obligations under the NAAEC, as the two agreements come in the
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same package. Thus, from the wordings in Art. 3, trade liberalisation and a high level of 
environmental protection are to be realised simultaneously.
Institutionally, Part Three establishes the Commission for Environmental 
Cooperation or, in short, the CEC (Art. 8). The CEC comprises a Council, a Secretariat 
and a Joint Public Advisory Committee. Details of the roles and responsibilities of each 
of these bodies are provided in Art. 9 to Art. 19. In brief, the Council is composed of 
cabinet-level officers (or the equivalent) representing each member of NAFTA. Its 
principal roles are to oversee the implementation of the NAAEC and the Secretariat, and 
to be responsible for the dispute settlement provisions under this agreement. As will be 
discussed below, this latter role of the Council is quite significant in terms of ensuring 
the balance between free trade and environmental protection in North America. The 
meeting of the Council takes place at least once a year. The Secretariat, staffed by 25 
officials, is to provide technical, operational and day to day administrative assistance to 
the Council and its subordinate groups. Another important task of the Secretariat is to 
consider submissions in regard to the member’s failure to enforce its environmental law 
put forth by any person or non-governmental organisations (NGOs). The Council and 
the Secretariat are further assisted by the Joint Public Advisory Committee, composed 
of five non-governmental individuals from each NAFTA member. The Committee will 
advise the Council on matters of a technical and scientific nature and provide other 
information to the Secretariat where demanded.
Collectively, the CEC has an important role to play in the enforcement of 
NAFTA environmental protection.37 It has two methods of securing compliance with 
the parties’ environmental laws and regulations. Firstly, the CEC could prepare factual 
reports and make them publicly available in order to attract public attention in the hope 
that the public pressure would make the offender take the necessary corrective actions. 
Secondly, the Secretariat could initiate a dispute settlement process where it considered 
a party had shown “a persistent pattern of failure to enforce its environmental laws and 
regulations, through appropriate government action”.38
36 For a further discussion on the institutional aspect of the CEC, see Pierre Marc Johnson and Andr£ 
Beaulieu, op. cit., 131-169.
37 Jorge A. Gonzalez, Jr., supra, note 11., at 354.
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The dispute settlement provisions of NAAEC are contained in Part Five, headed 
“Consultation and Resolution of Disputes”. Details of these provisions are given in Art. 
22 to Art. 36, which provide an avenue for consultations39 or an arbitral panel.40 
Additionally, persistent non-compliance with the findings of the panel may result in an 
imposition of “monetary enforcement assessment” 41 It is worth noting, however, that 
Canada is not subject to the use of monetary enforcement assessment provision. A 
different enforcement method for Canada is provided in Annex 36A of the NAAEC, i.e. 
the enforcement procedures have to be brought before the Canadian court in order to 
obtain a court order to that effect. In addition, because the enforcement and jurisdiction 
over the environmental matters in Canada is shared peculiarly between the federal and 
provincial governments, Annex 41 of the NAAEC provides separate rules for Canada 
which allow Canadian provinces to be exempted from the operation of the dispute 
settlement system under the NAAEC.42
Unlike the dispute settlement regime of NAFTA, which will be discussed later, 
individuals and NGOs may petition the Secretariat by virtue of Art. 14 of the NAAEC 
against the failure to enforce environmental laws by the member government. However, 
Art. 14 provisions cannot be relied upon lightly. Several conditions contained in Art. 
14(l)(a-f) and Art. 14(2) of the NAAEC in fact act as important hindrance on the public 
participation in the dispute resolution process of the NAAEC.43 These conditions must
38 For a detailed discussion on the NAAEC dispute settlement regime, see Pierre Marc Johnson and 
Andr6 Beaulieu, op. cit., 171-240.
39 Art. 22 of NAAEC.
40 Art. 24 of NAAEC.
41 Art. 34(4) of NAAEC. Also see Annex 34 of the NAAEC for criteria used in the calculation o f the 
monetary sanction, which include: the pervasiveness and duration o f the persistent pattern; the level of 
enforcement which could reasonably be expected from the party subject to its resource constraints; reason 
for not implementing an action plan; efforts made by the offending party to implement the panel’s 
recommendation; and any other relevant factors.
42 For further discussions on the relationship between Canada and the NAAEC, see Pierre Marc Johnson 
and Andr6 Beaulieu, op. cit., 224-236.
43 Art. 14(1) of the NAAEC reads:
The Secretariat may consider a submission from any nongovernmental organization or 
person asserting that a Party is failing to effectively enforce its environmental law, if the 
Secretariat finds that the submission:
(a) is in writing in a language designated by that Party in a notification to the 
Secretariat;
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be fulfilled before an individual or NGO could exercise its right given by Art. 14 of the 
NAAEC.
6.3. NAFTA’s Dispute Settlement System
NAFTA has opted for a “fragmented” style of dispute settlement system.44 Although 
Chapter 20 of NAFTA provides a channel for resolving a dispute between member 
governments, NAFTA also contains other provisions for dispute settlement. These 
provisions provide for dispute resolution on specific issues under NAFTA, viz: 
investment (Chapter 11); financial services (Chapter 14); and anti-dumping and 
countervailing measures (Chapter 19).
Chapter 11 establishes a dispute settlement mechanism for investment disputes 
with a view to ensuring that all NAFTA investors are treated equally. The disputing 
investor may have recourse to an international arbitral mechanism of one of the 
followings: the World Bank’s International Center for the Settlement of Investment 
Disputes (ICSID); ICSID’s Additional Facility Rules; or the rules of the United Nations 
Commission for International Trade Law (UNCITRAL). The award from the 
international arbitration is also enforceable in domestic courts of the NAFTA members.
(b) clearly identifies the person or organization making the submission;
(c) provides sufficient information to allow the Secretariat to review the submission, 
including any documentary evidence on which the submission may be based;
(d) appears to be aimed promoting enforcement rather than at harassing industry;
(e) indicates that the matter has been communicated in writing to the relevant authorities 
o f the Party and indicates the Party’s response, if  any; and
(f) is filed by a person or organization residing or established in the territory o f a Party.
Art. 14(2) reads:
Where the Secretariat determines that a submission meets the criteria set out in 
paragraph 1, the Secretariat shall determine whether the submission merits requesting a 
response from the Party. In deciding whether to request a response, the Secretariat shall 
be guided by whether:
(a) the submission alleges harm to the person or organization making the submission;
(b)the submission, alone or in combination with other submissions, raises matters 
whose further study in this process would advance the goals o f this Agreement;
(c) private remedies available under the Party’s law have been pursued; and
(d) the submission is drawn exclusively from mass media reports.
44 Gabrielle Marceau, ‘NAFTA and WTO Dispute Settlement Rules’, 31(2) Journal o f  World Trade 
(1997) 25, at 31-32. The author compared the “fragmented” style of the NAFTA dispute settlement 
regime with the “integrated” style dispute settlement system o f the WTO.
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The investor may alternatively choose to seek remedies available in the domestic courts 
of the host country. Chapter 14 provides a dispute settlement mechanism for financial 
disputes through Chapter 20 Section B. As will be seen below, Chapter 20 Section B is 
also used in the resolution of other governmental trade disputes. However, Chapter 14 
provides further that a financial services roster of panel, composed of experts in 
financial law or practice, is to be established in order to handle the financial disputes.
Antidumping and countervailing duties disputes are to be resolved by a dispute 
settlement mechanism provided for in Chapter 19 of NAFTA. In effect, the mechanism 
under this chapter replaces the judicial review process, which may be taken under the 
NAFTA members’ domestic courts, by the establishment of the antidumping and 
countervailing binational panel who would exercise the same standard of review as 
followed by those domestic courts in order to review whether the antidumping and 
countervailing measures in the dispute are consistent with the General Agreement on 
Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and NAFTA.45 Chapter 19 also provides for an 
“extraordinary challenge procedure” in Art. 1904 in which a disputing party may appeal 
against a panel’s decision on the ground of the panels’ impropriety or gross error.
Under Chapter 20, the dispute resolution mechanism of NAFTA ultimately takes 
the form of a GATT-like arbitral panel (Art. 2008) and resembles that of the FTA.46 
The panel is composed of five panellists who are selected from a roster of up to 30 
individuals 47 The panel will produce a preliminary report as well as a final report, for 
which voluntary compliance is required and failing to do so will give the winning 
member the right to a suspension of benefits affected by the other member’s violation 48 
Nevertheless, it must be noted that the retaliation by way of suspension as such must not 
be “manifestly excessive”, as an arbitration may be requested to decide on the 
magnitude of the retaliatory measure 49
45 For more discussion, see Jorge A. Gonzalez Jr., supra, note 11, at 363-365.
46 Richard B. Stewart, supra, note 33, at 761. Also see Jeffrey P. Bialos and Deborah Siegel, ‘Dispute 
Resolution Under NAFTA: The Newer and Improved Model’, 27 International Lawyer (1993) 603, at 
603.
47 NAFTA Art. 2011 (Panel selection) and Art. 2009 (Roster).
48 NAFTA Art. 2019.
49 NAFTA Art. 2019(3).
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Table 5: Stages of the NAFTA’s Panel Process with Estimated Times
Article Stage Estimated Time
Art. 2008 Request for arbitral panel by 
party filed on
Day 0
Art. 2011(1 )(b) Selection o f  Chair to be filed Within 15 days after 
request for arbitral panel
Rule 5 & Art. 2012(3) Terms o f reference may be 
filed within
20 days after filing o f 
request
Art. 2011(1 )(c) Panel selection to be 
completed within
15 days after selection o f 
Chair
Rule 7 Initial written submission 
(complaining party) to be filed 
within
10 days after panel 
selection is completed
Rule 7 W ritten counter-submission 
(respondent) to be filed within
20 days after initial 
written submission
Rule 7 Initial written submission 
(third party) to be filed within
20 days after initial 
written submission
Rule 26 List o f deliberators and others 
attending the hearing to be 
delivered no later than
5 days before the hearing
Rule 21 Hearing to be held To be determined by 
Chair
Rule 32 Supplementary written 
submission to be filed
Within 10 days o f  hearing
Rule 38 Request for scientific review 
board to be filed
Not later than 15 days 
after the hearing
Art. 2016(2) Initial report to be filed Within 90 days after panel 
selection is completed
Art. 2016(4) Comments on initial report to 
be filed
Within 14 days after 
presentation o f initial 
report
Art. 2017(1) Final report due Within 30 days after 
initial report
Source: NAFTA Secretariat, available at www.nafta-sec-alena.org.
Chapter 20 also allows the establishment of a scientific review board, chosen by 
a panel, who may submit a written report on factual issues relating to environmental, 
health, safety or other scientific matters in order to help the panel deliberate so long as 
the disputants have been consulted.
Prior to the panel method it is possible to resort to consultations (Art. 2006), and 
other means of alternative dispute resolution comprising good offices, conciliation and 
mediation (Art. 2007). In this instance, a Commission of cabinet-level representatives 
or appointees from the members will be established purposely to endeavour to resolve 
the dispute promptly.
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A third party who is considered as having a substantial interest in the dispute 
may also participate in the consultations or join in, by a notice in writing, the panel 
proceedings as a complainant. The third party may attend hearings or make 
submissions, both orally and in writing, and is entitled to receive the disputants’ written 
submissions.
6.4. The Relationship between the Dispute Settlement Systems of 
NAFTA and the WTO
NAFTA seems to be the only regional trade agreement which clearly sets out rules in 
relation to the interconnection between the dispute settlement mechanism of a regional 
trade agreement and that of GATT/WTO. This is not a surprise given that NAFTA was 
negotiated during the course of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations 
and all members of NAFTA also are members of GATT/WTO. As a number of 
NAFTA provisions in fact replicate those of GATT, for example the “nullification or 
impairment test”, 50 it is indeed necessary for NAFTA parties to know where they could 
resolve the dispute given that in certain circumstances NAFTA and GATT may have a 
shared jurisdiction to resolve the dispute. In other words, the rules which govern the 
relationship between the dispute settlement mechanisms of NAFTA and GATT/WTO 
act as a safeguard against duplication of dispute settlement proceedings.
In general, the relationship between the two dispute settlement regimes is 
governed by Art. 2005 of NAFTA under a heading “GATT Dispute Settlement”. In this 
article, disputes are perceived to be divided into two set of disputes: trade and 
environment disputes, and other disputes. Although the article does not explicitly 
stipulate such a division, it could be read into the textual language that the article 
intended to treat these types of dispute differently. The right to choose a forum where 
the dispute could be settled is provided in Art. 2005(1) which reads:
Subject to paragraphs 2,3, and 4, disputes regarding any matter arising 
under both this Agreement [NAFTA] and [GATT], may be settled in 
either forum at the discretion of the complaining Party. (Emphasis 
added.)
50 See Annex 2004 of NAFTA.
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For both trade-environment disputes, and non-trade and environment disputes, 
Art. 2005(1) provides that the complaining party has the discretion to choose whether to 
resolve their dispute in either NAFTA or GATT. It should be noted, however, that as 
the provision also applies to a successor agreement of GATT, the WTO Agreement 
encompassing GATT 1994 is also covered by this article.51
Exceptions to this general rule are provided in paragraphs (2), (3) and (4) of Art. 
2005. Where the dispute can be settled in both fora, Art. 2005(2) requires that the party 
who initiates a dispute settlement proceeding in GATT shall notify any third party of its 
intention. If the third party does not agree, it shall promptly inform the initiating party 
about it so that they can consult one another in order to find an agreement on the dispute 
settlement forum. If no consensus could be reached, the dispute would normally be 
settled by the dispute settlement mechanism of NAFTA.
Art. 2005(3) and (4) deal specifically with trade and environment disputes. Art. 
2005(3) allows the dispute whose subject matter falls under Art. 104 of NAFTA 
(governing the relationship between the MEAs and NAFTA) to be settled solely by the 
NAFTA’s dispute settlement mechanism. The article provides that it is the 
responsibility of the responding party to make a request in writing, expressing its 
intention to resolve the dispute under NAFTA. Then, the complaining party may act 
upon that request and recourse to the dispute settlement process solely under NAFTA. 
Some commentators have argued that the this provision is important from the trade and 
environment perspective as GATT or any other trade agreement does not provide for 
similar treatment and NAFTA tends to be more environmentally sensitive than GATT.52
Disputes concerning SPS and TBT measures are addressed by Art. 2005(4). 
This article provides that such disputes may solely be settled under NAFTA, if the party 
complained against requests to do so in writing and the complaining party chooses to do 
the same, where the dispute:
51 However, “GATT” will be used throughout this section in order to keep the consistency with the 
NAFTA textual language.
52 Pierre Marc Johnson and Andr6 Beaulieu, op. cit., at 71. Also see Daniel C. Esty, ‘Making Trade and 
Environmental Policies Work Together: Lessons from NAFTA’, supra, note 20. He has also commended 
the NAFTA’s dispute settlement mechanism for charting a “new course o f greater environmental 
sensitivity”.
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(a) [concerns] a measure adopted or maintained by a Party to protect its 
human, animal, or plant life or health, or to protect its environment, 
and
(b) [raises] factual issues concerning the environment, health, safety, or 
conservation, including directly related scientific matters.
Further procedural details of Art. 2005 of NAFTA are elaborated in paragraphs 
(5), (6) and (7). Art. 2005(5) requires the responding party to make a request no later 
than 15 days after the complaining party has initiated the proceedings with regard to the 
matters in paragraphs (3) and (4), and to deliver a copy of a request made pursuant to 
paragraphs (3) and (4) to other parties and to its Section of the Secretariat. Once the 
complaining party receives a request it “shall promptly withdraw from participation in 
[other proceedings] and may initiate dispute settlement procedures under Art. 2007” of 
NAFTA (Good office, Conciliation and Mediation).
For non-trade and environment disputes, Art. 2005(6) of NAFTA prohibits the 
subsequent recourse to another forum once the procedures in the chosen forum have 
been initiated. The last part of this article, however, provides an exception to this rule 
where the dispute is requested to be settled solely under NAFTA pursuant to paragraph 
(3) or (4). The dispute under GATT is deemed “initiated” once the establishment of a 
panel in accordance with Art. XXIII(2) of GATT is requested (Art. 2005(7) of NAFTA). 
As discussed in Chapter 3, the GATT’s dispute settlement system also allows use of 
alternative dispute resolution techniques - like good offices, conciliation and mediation - 
it could be argued that if the parties use these methods to resolve their dispute their right 
to choose the forum for resolving the dispute is not subsequently pre-empted.
6.5. What can APEC learn from NAFTA?
From the earlier discussions in this chapter, it can be seen that the environmental 
provisions in NAFTA could benefit the trade and environment dispute resolution in
53 Art. 2005(6) states:
Once dispute settlement procedures have been initiated under Article 2007 or dispute 
settlement proceedings have been initiated under the GATT, the forum selected shall be 
used to the exclusion o f the other, unless a Party makes a request pursuant to paragraph 
[3] or [4]. (Emphasis added.)
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general. There are several interesting elements of NAFTA that could prove useful for 
APEC as guidance for the formulation of an APEC’s trade and environment dispute 
resolution system. However, given that APEC and NAFTA differ in terms of their legal 
and institutional arrangements it could rightly be assumed that not all aspects of 
NAFTA’s trade and environment elements could possibly be emulated by APEC at 
present. Nevertheless, it could be argued that some of the NAFTA’s elements could still 
be implemented by APEC through different approaches which would suit the APEC’s 
legal and institutional designs. What elements of NAFTA would help APEC resolve 
trade and environment disputes in a balanced fashion and how APEC could implement 
them will be highlighted below.
6.5.1. The Preamble of NAFTA
With regard to trade and environment dispute resolution, the preamble of NAFTA 
serves two purposes. Firstly, it represents the willingness of the NAFTA parties to take 
environmental protection and sustainable development seriously.54 According to 
Johnson and Beaulieu, the preamble of NAFTA has gone far beyond any other 
preambular language contained in any trade agreements by explicitly recognising the 
impact of trade liberalisation on the enviromnent and the need to mitigate such impact.55 
Secondly, the preamble is setting the tone for the “greening” process of NAFTA, i.e. it 
gives NAFTA a sense of being an environmentally friendly institution without 
overshadowing its trade institution status.
These two aspects of the NAFTA’s preamble have some important implications 
on the resolution of trade and environment disputes as well as the formulation of rules 
and policies of NAFTA. Firstly, the preamble provides an important source for 
interpretation of other provisions of NAFTA, particularly the environmental provisions 
contained in NAFTA. Although the preamble is not legally binding in itself, the 
preambular language could be used as guidance for the interpretation of the substantive 
provisions of NAFTA as Art. 31 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties 
recognises that the preamble of an international treaty is a legitimate source for legal
54 Pierre Marc Johnson and Andr6 Beaulieu, op. cit., at 67.
55 Ibid., at 66-67.
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interpretation.56 As such, the NAFTA panel should refer to the preamble when there is 
doubt in the interpretation of the NAFTA’s environmental provisions. Being 
environmentally-oriented, the NAFTA’s preamble arguably should help the NAFTA 
panel to resolve the dispute in a more environmentally benign approach.
Secondly, the preamble would give an environmentally-minded party of the 
dispute the sense of fairness as both trade and environmental issues are considered as 
essential for NAFTA. In this regard, it could be argued that NAFTA creates an 
impression that the dispute resolution process would at least consider both trade and 
environmental arguments on an equal basis. In my opinion, this is an important element 
for the trade and environment dispute resolution as it would instil confidence in the 
disputing parties with regard to the ability of the panel to resolve the trade and 
environment dispute in a balanced manner.
What APEC could learn from the preamble of NAFTA, therefore, is that it 
should create an impression that it is capable of handling trade and environment 
disputes fairly. The question, however, is how APEC could engender such an 
impression given that APEC is not the same as NAFTA in terms of legal arrangement. 
Suffice it to say that APEC would not be able to create an agreement like NAFTA at 
present. APEC, therefore, may have to find another way to create its environmentally 
friendly image. The current image of APEC from the environmental viewpoint is not so 
encouraging. As already discussed in Chapter 4, even though APEC has already 
commissioned a number of important environmental projects, they have only been 
implemented rather shallowly or ineffectively. Most of the work programmes are 
targeted at capacity building and information dissemination.
APEC, however, could make use of its existing Framework of Principles for 
Integrating Economy and Environment in APEC. Most importantly, APEC could give 
more impetus to this Framework of Principles and ensure that it would be seriously 
taken into account when the DMS is requested for resolving trade and environment 
disputes among its members. APEC members should resort to the preamble together
56 Art. 31(2) o f the Vienna Convention on the Law o f Treaties states: “The context for the purpose of the 
interpretation o f a treaty shall compromise, in addition to the text, including its preamble and annexes...”. 
(Emphasis added.)
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with other nine principles contained in the Framework of Principles as guidance for 
trade and environment dispute mediation.
However, one important obstacle concerning the use of the Framework of 
Principles is that not only is the preamble of this Framework of Principles not binding, 
the other principles also do not have the force of law. Technically, the Framework of 
Principles cannot compel APEC members to follow the details contained therein, it 
merely signifies the good will of APEC members to uphold those principles. An APEC 
member also cannot invoke the breach of the preamble or principles as the ground for 
initiating the DMS per se. Thus, the Framework of Principles only represents another 
piece of soft-law instrument promulgated by APEC. However, if APEC members 
regularly resort to the Framework of Principles during the dispute mediation process as 
guidance for the way trade and environment disputes should be resolved, it arguably 
could become a customary practice among APEC members themselves.
6.5.2. The Provision relating to the MEAs
The provision relating to the MEAs under NAFTA has undoubtedly been one of the 
most important contributions of NAFTA towards trade and environment dispute 
resolution. Art. 104 of NAFTA specifically allows trade measures taken in pursuance of 
certain MEAs to override NAFTA’s free trade obligations. From the perspective of 
trade and environment dispute resolution, this is an extremely encouraging move. Art. 
104 has provided an excellent example with regard to the clarification of the 
interrelationship between the MEAs and a trade agreement. With the exception of the 
EU which deal with the MEAs differently, no other trade agreements so far have used
cn
this provision, including the 1994 version of GATT.
However, the party implementing the trade measure as authorised by the named 
MEA might be challenged on the ground that the “least inconsistent” measure with 
NAFTA could be used instead where available. As Makuch argues, the requirement that
57 As the EU is far more advanced in terms of economic integration than any other existing trade 
agreements, and arguably is moving closer to becoming a super-state, the EU does not need to use the 
same provision as Art. 104 o f NAFTA. Obligations of the EU under the named environmental agreements 
contained in Art. 104 o f NAFTA has been made part o f the EU law through the EU secondary 
instruments. Once the MEAs have been made part o f the EU law, they are fully enforceable just like other 
Community law.
the least inconsistent measure is to be used where possible could undermine the 
NAFTA’s environmental goal and also render ineffective the measure undertaken by the 
NAFTA party implementing the MEA.58 Moreover, this requirement would do nothing 
but repeat the deficiency of GATT, as demonstrated for example in the Tuna/Dolphin I. 
which also required use of the measures that were least trade restrictive and GATT 
inconsistent without considering that such measures might not achieve the 
environmental standards envisaged by its member. The better approach from the 
environmental perspective is therefore to allow the trade measures taken in pursuance to 
the named MEA to withstand the challenge form other NAFTA members.59 This is 
because the measures authorised by the MEA are multilaterally negotiated and thus 
should provide an assurance that such measures are internationally accepted as 
necessary.
What APEC could learn from Art. 104 of NAFTA is that, it should recognise the 
legitimacy of the trade measures taken in pursuance of the MEAs. Whether all or only 
some selected MEAs that authorise use of the trade measures would be recognised by 
APEC remains to be explored further. This is because not all members of APEC are 
signatories to the same MEAs.60 For example, Hong Kong and Taiwan do not have the 
recognition of statehood under international law which enables them to sign an 
international treaty. Singapore is not a signatory of the Basel Convention. An 
appropriate option for APEC, therefore, is to follow NAFTA and allow only certain 
MEAs to which all APEC members are signatories to take precedence over APEC trade 
activities. There should also be a presumption that the trade measures authorised under 
the MEAs are legitimate even though they might not be the least trade restrictive 
measures.
What APEC should do in order to give effect to the MEA-based trade measures 
in the light of the suggested recognition is to explicitly include such recognition as one 
of the principles in the Framework of Principles for Integrating Economy and
58 Zen Makuch, ‘The Environmental Implications of the NAFTA Environmental Side Agreement: A 
Canadian Perspective’, in James Cameron, Paul Demaret, and Damien Geradin, op. cit., at 420.
59 Ibid.
60 See Table 1, Chapter 4.
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Environment in APEC and take it into consideration when the trade and environment 
dispute arises as a result of the use of such measures.
6.5.3. The Environmental Standards Setting
As discussed earlier, the environmental standards setting under NAFTA are governed by 
Chapter 7B and 9 of NAFTA. Two kinds of environmental standards are regulated by 
these provisions: the standards relating to the SPS and TBT measures. In effect, these 
chapters of NAFTA provide the precaution against the “downward harmonisation” or 
“dilution of North American standards to their lowest common denominator”.61 Both of 
these chapters explicitly allow a NAFTA member government to set or maintain its own 
level of environmental protection which is considered appropriate, even though the 
domestic level exceeds that set internationally, subject to some qualifications as 
discussed earlier.
As a model for APEC, these provisions could provide the example that a trade 
agreement could also accommodate high environmental standards. Chapters 7B and 9 
give an example of what conditions need to be taken into account in order to legitimise 
the use of the member’s own environmental standard. An advantage which NAFTA 
shows in relation to the trade and environment nexus is that different countries may 
pursue their own environmental standards which they consider appropriate. But in 
doing so, they must ensure that the trade among the members of NAFTA is not affected. 
This provides an excellent model for APEC whose members pursue different 
environmental standards. Although the harmonised standards based on international 
standards are ideal, APEC’s membership ranges from economies situated in the very hot 
to very cold climate, and from very poor to very rich economies. Therefore, each 
economy needs to pursue its own level of environmental protection to suit its 
environmental problems as well as its technological and financial capacity.
Another point which needs to be made with regard to the SPS and TBT 
provisions of NAFTA is that during the dispute settlement process, it is the challenging
61 Sarah Richardson, ‘Some Implications o f NAFTA and the NAAEC for Dispute Settlement’, in James 
Cameron and Karen Campbell, eds., Dispute Resolution in the World Trade Organisation, (London: 
Cameron May Ltd., 1998), 285-310, at 293.
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party who bears the burden of proof. From the environmental viewpoint, this is indeed a 
welcoming practice. The fact that the challenging party has to discharge the conditions, 
especially the scientific and risk assessment criteria, in order to establish that the 
measure pursued by another NAFTA member is inappropriate could well act as a 
deterrent from initiating the dispute settlement process.
J
Although the APEC’s DMS is not the same as the NAFTA’s panel process, thus^
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the burden of proof issue may not be so significant, APEC could require the challenging 
party to undertaken the scientific investigation to prove the inappropriateness of another 
member’s measure. Admittedly, this might be disadvantageous to the developing^ 
members of APEC as they might not have the necessary funding or technical resources y { 
in order to challenge the measures of, for example, the United States or Canada who 
often exercise high environmental standards. But, this difficulty might be offset by the 
fact that the discriminatory element under both chapters are relatively easier to prove. 
Therefore, it seems that NAFTA Chapters 7B and 9 can provide the way to allow the 
proportionate measures to withstand the challenge while discourage the use of 
protectionist trade measures on the environmental basis, hence better for sustainable 
development on the whole.
6.5.4. The NAAEC and CEC
The NAAEC can be seen as one of the highlights of the NAFTA negotiation process. 
As discussed earlier, the NAAEC is an “environmental” agreement by character, 
containing provisions setting out obligations and dispute resolution procedures. 
However, as it also forms a part of NAFTA - by being a side agreement - the NAAEC 
has effectively enhanced the environmentally friendly image of NAFTA. Several critics 
see the creation of the NAAEC as a step closer towards trade and environment 
integration, as the NAAEC was created with a view to achieving sustainable
development and enhancing the level of environmental protection while simultaneously
(\)preserving the objectives of NAFTA. But, the NAAEC has also been viewed rather
62 See, for example, Gustavo Alanis-Ortega, supra, note 21, at 77; and Sarah Richardson, supra, note 61, 
at 297.
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pessimistically, for example, as lacking effective enforcement powers and will only 
have little effect on environmental compliance in North America.
From the perspective of APEC, at least, the incorporation of the NAAEC into 
the NAFTA’s framework provides a good model for the integration of trade and 
environment disciplines where the constitution of the organisation does not permit the 
establishment of common environmental policy. In effect, the NAAEC has gone a step 
further than environmental provisions, which appear in different places in NAFTA, 
which only deal with the interaction of trade and environmental considerations 
predominantly in the context of trade and environment dispute resolution.
However, creating an APEC equivalence to the NAAEC perhaps would be 
unthinkable at this stage. APEC is composed of many different economies from vastly 
diversified backgrounds. It would be extremely difficult to obtain consensus from the 
APEC parties in order to reproduce the NAAEC in the APEC context. Additionally, as 
environmental standards vary from one member of APEC to another, if the enforcement 
o f environmental protection of an APEC member is allowed to be challenged, as 
allowed under the NAAEC, it would only create disorder in APEC. For example, the 
United States would probably challenge many of the environmental enforcement 
initiatives carried out by the Asian members of APEC. China, for example, might 
regularly be challenged just like the way it has been done in the domain of human rights.
Nonetheless, a lesson for APEC from the NAAEC is the establishment of the 
CEC purposely to promote environmental compliance and to play an important role in 
resolving environmental disputes between the NAFTA parties. The CEC is to co­
operate with the NAFTA Free Trade Commission in the trade and environment dispute 
settlement process. The CEC is composed of environmental experts from different 
levels of the NAFTA members’ governments. It is also to provide environmental 
expertise to the Free Trade Commission where necessary.
Indeed, it might be in APEC’s interest to consider creating an APEC counterpart 
to the CEC. APEC at present does not have an organ specifically instituted for
63 Zen Makuch, supra, note 58, at 429.
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environmental purposes. So far, the APEC environmental agenda is implemented 
though various working groups and committees. The creation of an APEC 
Environmental Commission, for example, could be one of a few suggestions. This 
Commission could offer mediation when requested by APEC members. As the 
mediator comes from the APEC Commission, the recognition, credibility and status of 
the mediator would enhance the mediation process.
6.5.5. The Investment Provision
Art. 1114 of NAFTA provides an interesting example for APEC in regard to how 
investment and environmental protection should interact in order to promote sustainable 
development - the “environmental havens” issue. As this article deals with an 
investment issue, it does not directly govern the trade issue like other provisions of 
NAFTA. However, one could argue on the economic basis that investment generates 
trade. Thus, the more foreign direct investment, the more trade will be created. But, 
one must not also forget the fear of the environmental community that more trade could 
also mean more environmental degradation. The purpose of Art. 1114 of NAFTA 
therefore is to curb the use of low environmental standards to attract foreign direct 
investment.
However, the practicality of Art. 1114 has not overwhelmingly been supported 
by critics as this article attracts both positive and negative comments. On the one hand, 
Alanis-Ortega, for example, views Art. 1114 as “one of the most relevant environmental 
provisions of the NAFTA”.64 On the other hand, Makuch, argues that Art. 1114 in fact 
creates a reverse effect. As a result, instead of discouraging the use of lax 
environmental standards to lure foreign direct investment, Art. 1114 encourages 
industries to relocate to the environmental havens, such as the maquiladora region of 
Mexico where environmental standards are already lower than those practised by the 
United Sates or Canada.65 This is because Art. 1114(2) only says that the NAFTA 
parties should not waive or otherwise derogate from measures in order to encourage the
64 Gustavo Alanis-Ortega, supra, note 21, at 73.
65 Zen Makuch, supra, note 58, at423.
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establishment, acquisition, expansion, or the retention of an investment or investor in its 
territory”. It does not use the words that show the sense of a binding obligation.
Another doubtful aspect of Art. 1114 of NAFTA concerns an enforcement 
method. The only remedy provided by Art. 1114 is consultations “with a view to 
avoiding such encouragement” (waiving or lowering environmental standards to attract 
investment), not a binding dispute resolution. Therefore, no sanctions, countervailing 
measures, or imposition of tariffs can be used in order to give “bite” to this article.66 
From the environmentalists’ perspective, it would be a better approach if the tactical 
relaxation of environmental standards could be seen as constituting unfair trade practice,
fnwhich allows remedial measures to be taken by other NAFTA members. Furthermore, 
it has been argued that if Art. 1114 has an environmental character but cannot be 
enforced, the preamble of NAFTA would also be rendered little practical meaning.
As APEC’s activities also include investment, APEC might consider including 
the similar provision in its investment agenda. As APEC’s work programmes are carried 
out voluntarily, it cannot be foreseen that APEC would be able to compel its members to 
obligate themselves not to reduce their environmental standards to attract investment 
from other APEC members. However, what APEC might be able to do is to allow use 
of the DMS where an APEC member tries to encourage foreign direct investment by 
lowering or waiving its environmental standards with a view to avoiding such an act.
6.5.6. The Expert’s Opinions
Expert involvement is another area of NAFTA which could provide a lesson for APEC. 
NAFTA permits the seeking of expert advice during the dispute settlement process 
where the party so requested (Art. 2014). NAFTA also allows an expert review board 
(the Board) to be established, under Art. 2015, where the issue in the case concerns 
environmental, health, safety, or other scientific matters, subject to the request of the 
party of the dispute. The Board’s task is to produce a written report on any factual issue
66 Daniel C. Esty, ‘Making Trade and Environmental Policies Work Together: Lessons from NAFTA’, 
supra, note 20, at 382.
67 Gary Clyde Hufbauer and Jeffrey J. Scott, op. cit., at 95.
68 Ibid.
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concerning those issues. Members of the Board are selected from highly qualified 
independent scientific experts. Art. 2015(4) requires that the NAFTA panel take into 
consideration when preparing its report any comments made by the Board.
As the role of environmental experts has been recognised as indispensable for a 
balanced trade and environment dispute resolution process,69 the establishment of an 
independent expert review board could prove to be useful for resolving trade and 
environment disputes. The Board could provide a more insightful environmental and 
scientific information which could enhance the quality of the outcome decided by the 
panel. The requirement that the panel “shall”, as opposed to “may”, take into account 
the Board’s report provides a further assurance that both trade and environmental 
viewpoints will be considered even-handedly as it is prescribed in a binding language.
With regard to APEC, the creation of a scientific review board is desirable. The 
APEC scientific review board could serve well in the mediation process by providing 
the environmental comments to the mediator as well as the disputing parties, hence a 
better decided mediated outcome. However, it must be remembered that as APEC does 
not have dispute resolution procedures like the NAFTA’s, it will largely depend on the 
wishes of the parties to request for consultations with the scientific review board.
6.5.7. The Diffused Dispute Settlement System
Unlike the WTO’s dispute settlement system, NAFTA opts for a diffused style of 
dispute settlement system comprising dispute settlement regimes for different aspects of 
NAFTA. The main dispute settlement regime is Chapter 20 of NAFTA under which the 
majority of governmental disputes are resolved. Chapter 11 contains a dispute 
settlement regime for investment issues while disputes concerning financial services are 
to be resolved by Chapter 14 provisions. In addition, Chapter 19 deals with dispute 
settlement in relation to anti-dumping and countervailing measures.
69 See, for example, Charles Arden-Clarke, Trade and Environment in APEC: Avoiding Green 
Protectionism While Securing Sustainable Development, a WWF International Discussion Paper, (Gland, 
Switzerland: WWF International, 1995).
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The main form of the NAFTA’s dispute settlement system is a binational arbitral 
panel process. This form is not adopted by APEC at the moment. However, what 
APEC can learn from the NAFTA’s style of dispute settlement system is that APEC 
might consider creating a trade and environment dispute resolution regime as an 
addition to the DMS. The basic mechanism for this new avenue will be the same as the 
APEC’s DMS, i.e. using mediation as the main method of dispute resolution. However, 
in order to differentiate the trade and environment dispute resolution avenue from the 
DMS, some environmental elements could be incorporated in order to enhance a 
balanced decision, for example better access to the DMS for environmental NGOs, and 
the use of an environmentally-minded mediator. The APEC’s DMS might also emulate 
Chapter 14 dispute settlement provision by establishing a roster of trade and 
environment experts who may act as a mediator in a trade and environment dispute.
6.5.8. GATT/WTO and NAFTA
With respect to the relationship between the dispute settlement mechanisms of the WTO 
and NAFTA, Art. 2005 of NAFTA provides an interesting example for APEC. This is 
particularly so in the case of trade and environment disputes. As previously discussed, 
trade disputes with an environmental character receive different treatment from other 
trade disputes. The party defending its trade-related environmental measure taken in 
pursuance of the MEA named under Art. 104 of NAFTA has an option, expressed in the 
term of “may”, to demand to have the dispute be settled by a NAFTA panel, instead of 
GATT/WTO panel even though such a measure might cause nullification or impairment 
to the benefits under GATT. By choosing to settle the dispute this way, the party 
defending its measure could make use of an advantage given by the Art. 104 trumping 
status. Hence, more chance that its measure will survive the challenge.
Similarly, for disputes concerning the use of the SPS and TBT measures, Art. 
2005(4) allows the complaining party to choose to resolve the dispute solely by the 
NAFTA’s dispute settlement mechanism where the defending party makes a request to 
that effect. From the environmental perspective, this is more advantageous because the 
burden of proof for the SPS and TBT measures lies with the challenging party. As a 
result, this could give the SPS and TBT measures which genuinely promote the higher 
environmental standard more likelihood to survive the challenge since the allocation of
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the burden of proof on the challenging party may deter it from initiating a complaint. 
On the other hand, it could be argued that as the challenging party does not have to 
chose to settle the dispute under NAFTA, such an advantage may not be fully enjoyed in 
practice.
From the NAFTA’s approach concerning the relationship between its dispute 
settlement and that of GATT/WTO, a valuable lesson APEC could learn is that it may 
provide that where a trade and environment dispute arises between its members, the use 
of the APEC’s DMS could be requested by the party defending its trade-related 
environmental measure. If the DMS could provide a more environmentally friendly way 
of resolving a trade and environment dispute as envisaged in the last chapter, more 
trade-related environmental measure would go unchallenged, hence better 
environmental protection in the Asia-Pacific region.
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Chapter 7 
Conclusions and Recommendations
In this last chapter, conclusions of the thesis will be given. They will be followed by 
some recommendations, suggesting the way forward for trade and environment dispute 
resolution in the Asia-Pacific rim. Next, the chapter will highlight issues which have 
not been addressed by this thesis with a view to suggesting the basis upon which further 
research might be taken. This thesis will be drawn to an end by a short epilogue.
7.1. Conclusions
Having examined the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) as an institution, its 
trade and environmental aspects, and its dispute resolution mechanism, this thesis posits 
that APEC with its dispute mediation service (DMS) should have the potential to strike 
a balance in resolving trade and environment disputes. However, it must be admitted 
that finding a trade-environment balance is not an easy task as the relationship between 
trade liberalisation and environmental protection in itself is indeed complex. As 
discussed in Chapter 2, the interdependency between trade and the environment could 
have positive as well as negative implications. While it has widely been acknowledged 
that trade and environment paradigms could and should exist coherently, differences in 
terms of culture, policy, legal principles and their modus operandi have to a certain 
extent inhibited these two regimes from existing mutually. One particular issue which 
has caused concerns for both trade and environmental communities is the use of trade- 
related environmental measures (TREMs). TREMs which are used to further 
protectionism do not yield benefits for either trade or environmental activities. On the 
contrary, they hinder the efforts to promote trade liberalisation as well as environmental 
protection. And often, such a protectionist use of TREMs is the main cause of a trade 
and environment dispute.
In the Asia-Pacific rim, trade expansion - as a result of trade liberalisation 
programmes under both the World Trade Organization (WTO) and APEC regimes - has 
been achieved at the cost of environmental degradation. Certain countries in this region,
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particularly the United States, have already resorted to using TREMs as a means to 
enhance environmental protection within, and sometimes outside, their geographical 
boundaries. As APEC does not yet have its own dispute settlement mechanism to 
resolve trade and environment disputes, the members of APEC up until now have to 
resolve such disputes at fora other than APEC itself, i.e. the WTO and its predecessor - 
the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT).
In the light of the cases like Tuna/Dolphin I, Gasoline. Shrimp/Turtle and Beef 
Hormone which have been discussed in this thesis as examples in order to shed light on 
how trade and environment disputes were resolved by GATT/WTO, the general 
impression that one could perceive is that although the WTO’s rule-based style dispute 
settlement system seems to be successful as far as the resolution of trade disputes is 
concerned, Chapter 3 has demonstrated that the resolution of trade and environment 
disputes under the GATT/WTO system has not always produced a trade-environment 
balance. As a result, the GATT/WTO has been criticised heavily by the environmental 
community for not being a suitable forum for resolving trade and environment disputes. 
The GATT/WTO’s inability to balance the trade and environmental interests is partly 
owed to the way the GATT/WTO panel and Appellate Body have interpreted the so- 
called environmental provisions under the GATT Art. XX(b) and (g), including the 
chapeau of Art. XX general exception. Another aspect of the GATT/WTO’s dispute 
settlement which remains an area of dissatisfaction in the eyes of the environment 
protagonists is the way the panel process operates in practice. The secret style of 
operation does not bode well for the environmentalists’ approach which emphasises 
transparency and public participation.
Although the way in which the WTO’s dispute settlement organs resolved trade 
and environment disputes in the past recent years seems to suggest that several 
improvements to the trade and environment dispute settlement under the realm of 
GATT/WTO have been made, especially with regard to the reinstitution of the “two- 
tier” test by the Appellate Body in the Shrimp/Turtle case and more lenient 
interpretation of the environmental sub-paragraphs in Art. XX which has enabled 
TREMs to pass the environmental threshold, the trade threshold as contained in the 
chapeau still appears to be a difficult obstacle to overcome. With respect to the health 
and safety issues, the Beef Hormone has also shown that although the WTO’s dispute
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settlement organs did recognise the ability for a WTO member to pursue it own level of 
environmental protection, criteria as contained in the Agreement on Sanitary and 
Phytosanitary Measures (SPS Agreement), such as risk assessment and scientific 
justification, were restrictively applied, resulting in the difficulty to justify the domestic 
measures used in pursuance of the high health and safety standards.
As examined in Chapter 5, the strict criteria which have to be observed in the 
panel procedures under the WTO regime may hinder the finding of the balance between 
trade and environmental interests. The parties would concentrate on winning by proving 
their case within the limited scope of legal issues without the real intention to find the 
best solution optimal for a trade-environment balance. In other words, the WTO’s 
dispute settlement system is simply not “interest-based”. An alternative to the panel 
procedures is to use mediation as will be offered by the APEC’s DMS, provided that 
both parties of the dispute are APEC members. However, this thesis has not argued 
that the trade and environment disputes could be better resolved by mediation. Rather, 
it has posited that mediation could provide an effective alternative for resolving trade 
and environment disputes among APEC members. This is because, firstly, mediation 
suits the APEC style of doing business. It is a product of a compromise between the 
Western and Eastern members’ style of dispute resolution. And, secondly, mediation 
could fit well with the ideal way to resolve trade and environment disputes - i.e. finding 
a  compromise. On the whole, not only does mediation offer the chance for the disputing 
to be in control of the negotiating process which is facilitated by the mediator, the 
flexibility and informality of mediation could offer the parties to focus on their interests. 
The mediated outcome could also have a wider implications than the more formal 
methods of dispute settlement, as a wider range of remedy may be available.
In the domain of trade and environment dispute resolution, the APEC’s DMS 
could offer two tracks of resolving the conflicts.1 As Track 1, the DMS could be used 
as a means of “dispute avoidance” with a view to preventing a conflict between APEC 
members from escalating into a frill blown dispute. As Track 2, the DMS could be used 
fo r r;solving the dispute itself once it has arisen, i.e. a means of “dispute settlement”. 
A t etch track of dispute resolution, the DMS could incorporate several elements which
1 Ses the last chapter, Diagram D: APEC’s Two Track Dispute Resolution Mechanism for Trade and 
Enwionment Disputes.
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could promote the more balanced trade and environment dispute resolution, including 
the involvement of environmental experts, the NGO’s participation, and the resort to 
environmental law principles such as those contained in the Rio Declaration or the 
Framework of Principles for Integrating Economy and Environment in APEC as a 
yardstick for a decision making exercise during the mediation process.
Mediation, however, does not yield a legally binding outcome. But, as the 
parties themselves were the decision makers in the mediation process, it is more likely 
that they will abide by their undertaking, hence rendering the mediated outcome a status 
of a contract between the disputing parties. However, it must be admitted that 
mediation would not always compel parties to perform its part of the bargain. In this 
circumstance, the disputing parties may opt to use the more elaborate form of mediation, 
i.e. “med-arb”, in order to prevent waste of time should the parties during the mediation 
stage not reach a consensual solution. The med-arb process would allow the med- 
arbitrator to deliver an objective assessment of the situation which should be voluntarily 
observed by the disputants.
However, it would be a mistake to think that only APEC offers mediation. 
Mediation could also be undertaken under the WTO’s framework, alongside the formal 
panel procedures. But, evidence of the WTO has shown that mediation has hardly been 
used. Parties tend to move from the consultation phase to the panel proceedings rather 
quickly without even resorting to mediation or good offices which the parties could ask 
the Director-General to collaborate. Additionally, disputing parties knew that they 
always have an option to request for the establishment of a panel which arguably could 
provide more effective remedy in terms of settling the dispute, hence a “win-lose” 
situation. Trade and environment disputes, on the contrary, would be successfully 
resolved only if both trade and environmental interests are equally taken into 
consideration, and such an equilibrium is reflected in a compromise between the parties, 
hence a “win-win” situation.
Indeed, where the parties have a selection of forum to resolve their dispute, the 
“choice of forum” problem may arise. Chapter 5 has examined the relationship between 
the APEC’s DMS and the WTO’s dispute settlement system. It was found that the two 
systems could co-exist and complement each other. For example, APEC members
229
could use mediation as provided by the DMS in order to resolve their disputes before 
initiating the WTO’s dispute settlement process.
The North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), as discussed in Chapter 
6, has also provided a model for APEC with regard to the relationship between the 
dispute settlement regimes. However, the NAFTA model seems to suggest that the 
dispute settlement system of NAFTA or GATT/WTO is to be chosen to the exclusion 
of each other. The choice depends on whether or not the parties want to benefit from 
the NAFTA’s environmental attributes. These attributes are perceived through: 
allowing the trade measures taken pursuant to certain multilateral environmental 
agreements (MEAs) to take precedence over NAFTA’s obligations; allowing 
environmental, health and safety standards to be set at a higher level than those set 
internationally; allowing environmental experts’ opinions to be taken into account; and 
discouraging the lowering of environmental standards to attract foreign direct 
investment.
Chapter 6 has also shown that such environmental attributes could provide 
important guidance for APEC’s trade and environment dispute resolution mechanism 
with a view to enhancing the trade-environment balanced outcome. However, not all 
aspects of NAFTA’s environmental qualities can be emulated by APEC at present due 
to differences in terms of legal and institutional arrangements.
7.2. Recommendations
Despite its potential to resolve trade and environment disputes in the balanced fashion 
the DMS could undergo some changes in order to fully realise its potential. Two main 
areas where reforms may be necessary are legal and institutional arrangements 
concerning the DMS. They will be discussed below.
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7.2.1. Legal Reforms
7.2.1.1. A Mediation Agreement
It is now common that a mediation agreement is drawn up by the disputing parties when 
the use of mediation is contemplated. The purpose of the mediation agreement is to 
enhance compliance with the outcome that the parties have agreed. It can be argued 
that this is necessary as there is no law which governs the enforceability of the mediated 
settlement.3
In the agreement, the parties may draw up an undertaking to use the mediation 
service offered by APEC and a promise to comply with the outcome resulting from the 
mediation process. Technically, such a promise only acts as a precaution against non­
complying party. The outcome which is reached by mediation is often given effect to by 
the parties as it is the parties themselves who agreed on the outcome. Compliance with 
the mediated solution is likely to be expected as the solution is commonly treated as a 
contract between the parties. Moreover, the parties may agree to convey the jurisdiction 
to resolve the dispute solely to the APEC mediator. Such an agreement would 
effectively act as an estoppel and provide an incentive for the parties to reach an 
agreement.4
As discussed in Chapter 5, a simple mediation could be transformed into a more 
elaborate version, i.e. the “med-arb”, if the parties preferred. Should the parties decide 
to use this form of mediation, they should also clearly express their intention in the 
mediation agreement in order to prevent any later query about such a transformation.
2 See C. A. McEwen and R. J. Maiman, ‘Small Claims Mediation in Maine: An Empirical Assessment’, 
33 Maine Law Review (1981) 237 as cited in Michael Palmer and Simon Roberts, Dispute Processes: 
ADR and the Primary Forms o f Decision Making, (London: Butterworths, 1998), at 144.
3 See Neil Gold, ‘Prospects, Problems and Potential: An Assessment o f Trends and Issues Regarding 
Mediation in Canada’, in The Arbitration Office, APEC Symposium 1998: Alternative Mechanism for the 
Settlement o f  Transnational Commercial Disputes, (Bangkok: The Arbitration Office, Ministry of Justice, 
Thailand, 1998), 281-332.
4 See Professor Jeffrey Talpis, ‘Enforcement of Agreements in Quebec Private International Law’, 
unpublished paper, (Montreal: Faculty de droit, University de Montreal, 1996), as cited by Neil Gold, 
supra, note 3, at 306-307. Talpis argues that “effective conflict resolution of transborder disputes by 
mediation requires: (i) the enforcement o f agreements to mediate to the exclusion o f competing 
procedures, for example, litigation; and (ii) the enforcement o f the mediated settlement such that the result 
is fmal and not reviewable through subsequent proceedings”.
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The agreement should also set out whether or not the mediator could continue to resolve 
the dispute as the arbitrator, as in some cases the parties might prefer a different person 
to be an arbitrator.
7.2.I.2. Guidelines for the Mediation Process
APEC has adopted an informality as its method of operation. As a result, action 
programmes of APEC are conducted voluntarily. To give effect to APEC members’ 
promise to carry out certain work programmes, soft-law instruments have therefore 
become the norm of APEC. These instruments by and large take the form of a 
declaration, a framework agreement or a set of principles. Up until now, no hard-law 
instruments have ever been used by APEC and as long as APEC continues to develop 
under the present approach such instruments are unlikely to be formulated in the near 
future.
With the restriction on the kinds of legal instrument which could be used, it is 
indeed difficult for APEC to formulate the rules like the Dispute Settlement 
Understanding (DSU) with the law binding force as used by the WTO. What APEC 
could do instead is try to agree on certain procedures which could be followed during 
the course of mediation as broad guidelines. Provisions should also be made to allow 
the wishes of the disputing parties to be respected in reflection of the true nature of 
mediation. In other words, the new APEC guidelines would only be used as a model for 
the APEC’s mediation process in the same way as the UNCITRAL Model Law on 
Commercial Arbitration, a product of the United Nations Commission on International 
Trade Law, is used with respect to private international trade disputes.5 Accordingly, 
the APEC’s mediation guidelines should only provide a broad description of the steps of 
the mediation process but leave the disputing parties to decide whether to add any 
special features or preferences into the mediation process.
In fact, APEC could develop a new set of DMS guidelines, based on the existing 
one as proposed by the EPG. However, as noted in Chapter 5, these guidelines are not
5 For discussions on the UNCITRAL Model Law, see, for example, Gerold Herrmann, ‘UNCITRAL 
Model Law: Its Contribution to the International Arbitration Community and the Experience with the 
Law’; and Neil Kaplan, ‘The UNCITRAL Model Law - A Worthwhile Model’, in The Arbitration Office, 
op. cit., 109-131 and 133-157.
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comprehensive insofar as the DMS is concerned. Issues which could be included in 
the DMS guidelines comprise: the stages of the mediation; the timing of each stage 
mediation should take place - to precipitate the mediation process and reduce the time 
wasted; the choice of mediator - in the case of trade and environment disputes, for 
instance, the chosen mediator may be required to possess some trade and environmental 
backgrounds to ensure that there would be no bias towards one discipline or another; the 
representatives of interested parties or non-governmental organisations (NGOs); 
compliance procedures, including the time to implement the agreed outcome; and 
transparency - the outcome reached by the parties may be made publicly accessible via 
the APEC Secretariat.
The guidelines for the DMS should also contain procedures for the med-arb, in 
case the disputing parties chose to use this method for resolving their dispute. In 
contrast to the simple form of mediation, more detailed procedural rules must be drawn 
up. These rules should cover matters such as: the choice of arbitrator; the burden of 
proof; what evidence could the arbitrator take into account during the proceeding; the 
effect of the arbitration ruling; the compliance procedures with the arbitration ruling; the 
methods of enforcement - the guidelines should detail the options available to the 
winning party which might include suspension of the trade benefits, retaliation and 
compensation. For provisions concerning the enforcement measures, some guidelines 
should be provided, suggesting how the amount of trade suspension, retaliation or 
compensation is to be calculated.
7.2.2. Institutional Reforms
As the DMS has not yet come into operation it may be too early to suggest reforms. On 
the contrary, it is better that the areas which need to be reformed are identified now so 
that they could be corrected in advance. Some institutional reforms for the DMS which 
would make it better equipped for resolving trade and environment disputes are 
suggested below.
233
7.2.2.1. Experts’ Involvement
Experts are important for achieving a successfully balanced trade-environment outcome. 
They could provide relevant information which might enhance the trade-environment 
balance. The experts could be either the mediator in the DMS process itself or persons 
from whom environmental information, including scientific evidence and environmental 
impact assessments, could be obtained.
For the expert who is also the mediator, the name of such an expert could be 
included in the pool of mediator and registered with the APEC Secretariat. Once the 
parties know that an environmental expert is available in the APEC pool, they might 
agree to choose him as the mediator. However, it might be advisable if APEC requires a 
mediator with environmental expertise to conduct the dispute resolution process in the 
case of trade and environment disputes. Although a mediator may not necessarily need 
certain expertise in order to conduct mediation, as long as he has the skills to persuade 
the parties to reach an agreement, it is arguably more beneficial to the parties as he 
would understand the issues at hand better than a non-expert. The depth of knowledge 
and the experience possessed by the mediator might act as persuasive forces and 
facilitate the achievement of an outcome.
For experts who do not serve as mediators, they could provide environmental 
information as interested persons or organisations. In the Asia-Pacific region, it is not 
difficult to find such experts. Several members of APEC have already undertaken 
several environmental protection activities, government officials from their environment 
department or ministry could serve well as the experts. In addition, several 
environmental NGOs have already been established within the APEC region. They too 
could act as experts, providing advice to the governments of their nationalities or the 
mediator.
However, it is envisaged that the determination of who are the experts could 
become problematic. APEC thus needs to formulate some guiding criteria which set the 
experts apart from the non-experts. Factors which might be included as such criteria 
could include: the length of time he has participated in certain field of environmental
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protection; the amount of experience he has; and whether or not both parties recognise 
him as an expert.
1.2.2 2 . Participation from Non-State Actors
Non-state actors such as NGOs should be allowed to participate in the DMS process. 
Not only would this enhance the transparency of the dispute resolution proceedings, the 
NGOs could also provide necessary opinions which would promote the achievement of 
trade-environment balance as they would have in-house environment experts who could 
give better analyses and assessments on environmental issues.
The participation of the NGOs could be allowed in one of these two ways. 
Firstly, the NGOs may be allowed to be present during the meeting (in the case of 
mediation) or hearing (in the case of med-arb) as the case might be. They might be 
allowed to make some comments or present their points of view. Alternatively, the 
NGOs might be permitted to submit their views in writing in the form of an amicus 
curiae brief, which the mediator should take into account.
However, APEC should formulate some guiding criteria upon which the 
participation of the NGOs could be decided as a safeguard against the NGOs who do not 
have a direct interest in the case. As a suggestion, a test on the basis of “sufficient 
interest” could be used.6 Additionally, some guidelines are needed with regard to the 
admissibility of the information provided by the NGOs. For example, the guidelines 
might suggest that only legal, factual, or scientific information could be admitted on the 
basis of relevancy.
1.2.23 . Provision of Funding for the DMS
Just like in the dispute settlement system of the WTO, the developing members must be 
able to participate effectively in the APEC’s DMS.7 One way of ensuring that this 
would happen is to provide funding for APEC developing members. The funding would
6 Beatrice Chaytor, Reform o f  the WTO’s Dispute Settlement Mechanism for Sustainable Development, 
a WWF International Discussion Paper, July 1999, (Gland, Switzerland: WWF International, 1999) at 16.
7 Beatrice Chaytor, op. cit., at 20.
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enable them to prepare their cases. The parties might hire private lawyers who have the 
expertise in trade and environment issues who would be able to help the parties better 
understand each other’s position and come to a solution that promotes sustainable 
development.
Funding could be provided by an APEC central fund to which all APEC 
members make a contribution. However, making all APEC members contribute to the 
central fund could trigger some unwillingness from some APEC members, hence 
deterring members from supporting the DMS. But when comparing this amount of 
contribution with the amount of trade loss which might result, the establishment of the 
central fund could prove worthwhile. Furthermore, due to each member’s economic 
development, it would not be possible to require each APEC member economy to 
contribute the same amount. Thus, some formula must be created in order to determine 
the amount of money each member must contribute towards the central fund.
7.3. Further Research
As both trade and environment, and APEC issues develop constantly, there are other 
issues pertinent to these topics which need further exploration in order to provide a 
better understanding on this complex subject so that APEC’s trade and environmental 
policies can develop at the same pace as global trade and environmental initiatives.
7.3.1. Policy Formation, Capacity Building and Transfer of Technology
In relation to the trade and environment debate, dispute resolution is one of the ways to 
help reconcile trade liberalisation process and environmental protection. It merely 
represents a corrective approach which only provides a short term solution to the trade 
and environment dichotomy. A long term solution for trade and environment 
integration needs to be addressed by other means such as policy formation, capacity 
building and transfer of environmental technology.
Firstly, with regard to policy formation, more study is needed in order to find the 
way in which national and international trade and environmental policies of APEC 
member economies can be reconciled, making those policies more mutually supportive.
236
Such a study could be conducted on country-by-country or sector-by-sector basis. There 
should also be a study into how trade and environmental policies in different APEC 
member economies can be made coherent. Speaking in one voice, APEC members 
could help reduce conflicts between their common position before the world trade and 
environmental fora.
Secondly, there should be a further study on how capacity building can be 
enhanced in APEC. This will involve the increase in capacity building on both 
individual and institutional bases. With regard to the former, more work is needed in 
order to find the ways in which capacity building programmes of APEC can be 
effectively implemented. Issues such as who will provide funding and technical 
assistance should be clarified. As for the latter, rather than increasing the capacity of 
each individual government official and other relevant individuals, there should be a 
study into how to encourage well trained individuals to remain in the workforce so that 
such a capacity will remain intact within the institution. Making sure that the institution 
is constantly well endowed with capable personnel will indeed prepare it to tackle future 
trade and environment policies.
Lastly, the transfer of environmentally friendly technology is a necessary part of 
trade and environment integration. There should be more research into an issue of 
which technology should be transferred to whom. This is because different countries 
produce different goods and face different kinds of environmental problem. There is 
also a need to explore further how developing countries may be helped in obtaining 
clean technology. Generally, such technology is owned by multinational enterprises in 
the developed countries, in order to assist the transfer of such technology to the 
developing countries, a financial support scheme may be necessary. It is useful 
therefore to have a study on the possibility of setting up an APEC Environmental Fund 
to help developing members of APEC obtain environmentally sound technology, as 
more than a half of APEC members are developing countries
7.3.2. Intellectual Property, Investment and Services
Beyond the discussion on the nexus between trade in goods and environmental 
protection, linkages between issues like intellectual property, investment and services,
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and environmental protection have become more well known. APEC cannot ignore 
these issues. It should develop clearer policy guidelines and instruments which can 
encourage the synergy between these disciplines. For example, APEC needs to find a 
balance between the protection of intellectual property rights and the need to help its 
members obtaining environmentally sound technology. While it can be argued that 
stricter intellectual property protection laws can attract more innovation, as the 
inventors’ innovations are better protected, such laws may offset against the 
dissemination of, for example, energy efficient technology or less environmentally 
harmful methods of catching fish. Thus, it is useful to study if a shorter period of 
intellectual property protection may be feasible and what incentives need to be given to 
the inventors in order to remunerate them for their innovation.
With regard to the investment issue, it has often been argued that a country may 
lower its environmental standards in order to attract investment. While pursuing the 
NAFTA Art. 1114 type of commitment is an attractive option, a study of other 
alternatives to this option may be useful, for instance how to restrict the ability of 
investors to use natural resources in an unenvironmentally friendly manner and how to 
make the investors repair the damages they cause to the environment. As an 
enforcement mechanism for Art. 1114 is lacking, it is worthwhile to explore if APEC 
can provide a better solution.
Environmentally sound services also cannot be viewed in isolation from the 
trade and environment debate as clean services can help achieve the cleaner 
environment. Although APEC has set up a working group on tourism whose activities 
include sustainable tourism, more work is needed to expand the issue of services and the 
environment into other areas of APEC activities such as government procurement, as 
what the governments choose to buy could have some important environmental impact 
on their countries and also APEC as a region, where goods or services purchased can 
cause transboundary environmental damages.
For further research on the issues of intellectual property, investment and 
services, APEC may investigate how these issues have been dealt with elsewhere and 
how they can be translated into APEC’s framework and APEC’s way of doing business. 
APEC should also encourage the establishment of a dispute resolution system to cover
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these other areas in the future similar to the mechanism which has been proposed for 
trade and environment dispute resolution.
7.3.3. New Issues
Environmental issues evolve with time and technology. Matters like genetically 
modified organisms (GMOs) or biosafety continue to attract attention from the media 
and environmentalists all over the world, especially those in the United States and 
Europe. The legitimacy of using trade measures in relation to them - especially in the 
light of the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety which covers most trade related to living 
GMOs - needs to be further clarified. Like other multilateral environmental agreements, 
the question of compatibility of this Protocol and the world trade regime needs to be 
addressed both globally and from APEC’s perspective.
7.3.4. APEC’s Progress
Although APEC is only an organisation of economic co-operation at the moment, 
further study on its evolution may be valuable. Given the fact that regional integration 
has spawned world-wide, research on APEC’s progress to a deeper level of economic 
integration may prove useful. APEC’s future direction in regard to its institutional 
arrangements may provide a necessary yardstick for the direction in which its dispute 
resolution mechanism will evolve. Moreover, in the light of the growing number of 
economic co-operation arrangements, it can be envisaged that APEC’s activities may set 
an example for other similar organisations to follow, such as the recently formed 
ASEAN-EU Meeting (ASEM) - a forum set up in order to promote economic co­
operation between the ASEAN and EU regional groupings.
7.4. Epilogue
It is now widely acknowledged that trade and the environment, although existing as two 
separate paradigms, also exist interdependently. The proliferation of trade liberalisation 
around the world has allowed people in many countries to enjoy a better lifestyle as well 
as made our environment suffer. The only way forward to ensure that both trade 
liberalisation and environmental protection work together for all of us is to make trade
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and environmental policies mutually supportive. Admittedly, this is a demanding task. 
Conflicts between trade and environmental polices have generated a number of trade 
and environment disputes which are not easily resolved. Even if such disputes could be 
settled, dispute resolution is only a short term solution. In the long run, what is needed 
are changes in both trade and environmental policies. Such changes could not be 
accomplished merely by political rhetoric, they also need some affirmative actions both 
domestically and regionally. APEC, with its resources and technologies, stands in a 
good position to set an example of how trade and the environment could co-exist 
successfully. If APEC could provide a way forward for the trade and environment 
nexus on a regional scale, it could be an important impetus for the global trade and 
environment movement, given that APEC is a microcosm of the world. The ability to 
bridge the gap between trade and environment ideologies would not only ensure that 
sustainable development could be achieved in the Asia-Pacific rim, it would also 
continue the APEC’s phenomenon into the future.
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Appendices
Appendix A
APEC Economic Leaders’ Declaration of Common Resolve (Bogor 
Declaration)
1. We, the economic leaders of APEC, came together at Bogor, Indonesia today to chart the 
future course of our economic cooperation which will enhance the prospects of an 
accelerated, balanced and equitable economic growth not only in the Asia-Pacific region, 
but throughout the world as well.
2. A year ago on Blake Island in Seattle, USA, we recognized that our diverse economies 
are becoming more interdependent and are moving toward a community of Asia-Pacific 
economies. We have issued a vision statement in which we pledged:
♦ to find cooperative solutions to the challenges of our rapidly changing regional 
and global economy;
♦ to support an expanding world economy and an open multilateral trading system;
♦ to continue to reduce barriers to trade and investment to enable goods, services 
and capital to flow freely among our economies;
♦ to ensure that our people share the benefits of economic growth, improve 
education and training, link our economies through advances in 
telecommunications and transportation, and use our resources sustainably.
3. We set our vision for the community of Asia-Pacific economies based on a recognition 
of the growing interdependence of our economically diverse region, which comprises 
developed, newly industrializing and developing economies. The Asia-Pacific 
industrialized economies will provide opportunities for developing economies to 
increase further their economic growth and their level of development. At the same time 
developing economies will strive to maintain high growth rates with the aim of attaining 
the level of prosperity now enjoyed by the newly industrializing economies. The 
approach will be coherent an comprehensive, embracing the three pillars of sustainable 
growth, equitable development and national stability. The narrowing gap in the stages of 
development among the Asia-Pacific economies will benefit all members and promote 
the attainment of Asia-Pacific economic progress as a whole.
4. As we approach the twenty-first century, APEC needs to reinforce economic cooperation 
in the Asia-Pacific region on the basis on equal partnership, shared responsibility, mutual 
respect, common interest, and common benefit, with the objective of APEC leading the 
way in:
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♦ strengthening the open multilateral trading system;
♦ enhancing trade and investment liberalization in the Asia-Pacific; and
♦ intensifying Asia-Pacific development cooperation.
5. As the foundation of our market-driven economic growth has been the open multilateral 
trading system, it is fitting that APEC builds on the momentum generated by the 
outcome of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations and takes the lead in 
strengthening the open multilateral trading system.
We are pleased to note the significant contribution APEC made in bringing about a 
successful conclusion of the Uruguay Round. We agree to carry out our Uruguay Round 
commitments fully and without delay and call on all participants in the Uruguay Round 
to do the same.
To strengthen the open multilateral trading system we decide to accelerate the 
implementation of our Uruguay Round commitments and to undertake work aimed at 
deepening and broadening the outcome of the Uruguay Round. We also commit 
ourselves to our continuing process of unilateral trade and investment liberalization. As 
evidence of our commitment to the open multilateral trading system we further agree to a 
standstill under which we will endeavor to refrain from using measures which would 
have the effect of increasing levels of protection.
We call for the successful launching of the World Trade Organization (WTO). Full and 
active participation in and support of the WTO by all APEC economies is key to our 
ability to lead the way in strengthening the multilateral trading system. We call on all 
non-APEC members of the WTO to work together with APEC economies toward further 
multilateral liberalization.
6. With respect to our objective of enhancing trade and investment in the Asia-Pacific, we 
agree to adopt the long-term goal of free and open trade and investment in the Asia- 
Pacific. This goal will be pursued promptly by further reducing barriers to trade and 
investment and by promoting the free flow of goods, services and capital among our 
economies. We will achieve this goal in a GATT-consistent manner and believe our 
actions will be a powerful impetus for further liberalization at the multilateral level to 
which we remain fully committed.
We further agree to announce our commitment to complete the achievement of our goal 
of free trade and open trade and investment in the Asia-Pacific no later than the year 
2020. The pace of implementation will take into account differing levels of economic 
development among APEC economies, with the industrialized economies achieving the 
goal of free and open trade and investment no later than the year 2010 and developing 
economies no later than the year 2020.
We wish to emphasize our strong opposition to the creation of an inward-looking trading 
bloc that would divert from the pursuit of global free trade. We are determined to pursue 
free and open trade and investment in the Asia-Pacific in a manner that will encourage 
and strengthen trade and investment liberalization in the world as a whole. Thus, the
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outcome of trade and investment liberalization in the Asia-Pacific will not only be the 
actual reduction of barriers among APEC economies but also between APEC economies 
and non-APEC economies. In this respect, we will give particular attention to our trade 
with non-APEC developing countries to ensure that they will also benefit from our trade 
and investment liberalization, in conformity with GATT/WTO provisions.
7. To complement and support this substantial process of liberalization, we decide to 
expand and accelerate APEC’s trade and investment facilitation programs. This will 
promote further the flow of goods, services, and capital among APEC economies by 
eliminating administrative and other impediments to trade and investment.
We emphasize the importance of trade facilitation because trade liberalization efforts 
alone are insufficient to generate trade expansion. Efforts at facilitating trade are 
important if  the benefits of trade are to be truly enjoyed by both business and consumers. 
Trade facilitation has also a pertinent role in furthering our goal of achieving the fullest 
liberalization within the global context.
In particular we ask our ministers and officials to submit proposals on APEC 
arrangements on customs, standards, investment principles and administrative barriers to 
market access.
To facilitate regional investment flows and to strengthen APEC’s dialogue on economic 
policy issues, we agree to continue the valuable consultations on economic growth 
strategies, regional capital flows and other macro-economic issues.
8. Our objective to intensify development cooperation among the community of Asia- 
Pacific economies will enable us to develop more effectively the human and natural 
resources of the Asia-Pacific region so as to attain sustainable growth and equitable 
development of APEC economies, while reducing economic disparities among them, 
and improving the economic and social well-being of our people. Such efforts will also 
facilitate the growth of trade and investment in the Asia-Pacific region.
Cooperative programs in this area cover expanded human resource development (such as 
education and training and especially improving management and technical skills), the 
development of APEC study centers, cooperation in science and technology (including 
technology transfer), measures aimed at promoting small and medium scale enterprises 
and steps to improve economic infrastructure, such as energy, transportation, 
information, telecommunications and tourism, with the aim of contributing to 
sustainable development.
Economic growth and development of the Asia-Pacific region has mainly been market- 
driven, based on the growing interlinkages between our business sectors in the region to 
support Asia-Pacific economic cooperation. Recognizing the role of the business sector 
in economic development, we agree to integrate the business sector in our programs and 
to create an ongoing mechanism for that purpose.
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9. In order to facilitate and accelerate our cooperation, we agree that APEC economies that 
are ready to initiate and implement a cooperative arrangement may proceed to do so 
while those that are not yet ready to participate may join at a later date.
Trade and other economic disputes among APEC economies have negative implications 
for the implementation of agreed cooperative arrangements as well as for the spirit of 
cooperating. To assist in resolving such disputes and in avoiding its recurrent, we agree 
to examine the possibility of a voluntary consultative dispute mediation service, to 
supplement the WTO dispute settlement mechanism, which should continue to be the 
primary channel for resolving disputes.
10. Our goal is an ambitious one. But we are determined to demonstrate APEC’s 
leadership in fostering further global trade and investment liberalization. Our goal 
entails a multiple year effort. We will start our concerted liberalization process from the 
very date of this statement.
We direct our ministers and officials to immediately begin preparing detailed proposals 
for implementing our present decisions. The proposals are to be submitted soon to the 
APEC economic leaders for their consideration and subsequent decisions. Such 
proposals should also address all impediments to achieving our goal. We ask ministers 
and officials to give serious consideration in their deliberations to the important 
recommendations contained in the reports of the Eminent Persons Group and the Pacific 
Business Forum.
11. We express our appreciation for the important and thoughtful recommendations 
contained in the reports of the Eminent Persons Groups and the Pacific Business Forum. 
The reports will be used as valuable points of reference in formulating policies in the 
cooperative framework of the community of Asia-Pacific economies. We agree to ask 
the two groups to continue with their activities to provide the APEC economic leaders 
with assessment of the progress of APEC and further recommendations for stepping up 
our cooperation.
We also ask the Eminent Persons Group and the Pacific Business Forum to review the 
interrelationships between APEC and the existing sub-regional arrangements (AFTA, 
ANZERTA and NAFTA) and to examine possible options to prevent obstacles to each 
other and to promote consistency in their relations.
APEC Economic Leaders 
Bogor, Indonesia 
November 15,1994
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Appendix B
APEC Environmental Vision Statement
This meeting of APEC Ministers for the Environment forged consensus on a wide range of 
issues, sharing the spirit of the Rio Declaration on Environment and Development. We 
reaffirmed the inseparable linkages between environment protection and economic growth 
to build an enduring foundation for sustainable development in our region.
We want to see the continued dynamic growth and growing interdependence of APEC 
member economies which has transformed our region. We are concerned that degradation 
of our environment will adversely affect our ability to sustain our economic growth. Our 
efforts to assure stable and sustainable development must take account of the effect of our 
economies and our populations on the natural environment. To this end we support the 
outcomes of UNCED.
We, the Asia Pacific economies are agreed that we must protect our environment and 
conserve natural resources. In particular, we have to improve the quality of air, water and 
manage energy resources to ensure sustainable development and provide a more secure 
future for our people. We agree to develop co-operative programs to this end.
We recognize that problems such as climate change, biodiversity loss, pollution and waste, 
deteriorating water quality and availability, soil erosion, population pressures, and growing 
energy consumption challenge all of us to cooperate more effectively in dealing with these 
issues. APEC should take the lead in addressing these global problems and solutions in line 
with the global consensus reached at UNCED.
All APEC members share a commitment to sustainable development. We support 
enhanced protection for our environment and greater sensitivity and concern for the 
environment in our economic decision-making processes by integrating environmental 
considerations into relevant policy development and economic decisions throughout the 
region. To this end, we encourage APEC working groups and policy committees to 
integrate environmental concerns into their work programs.
Members recognize that the market can be an efficient an flexible means of allocating 
resources but that market outcomes do not always take into full account relevant 
environmental concerns. The challenge is to achieve sustainable development while taking 
advantage of the dynamism that market economies provide.
We welcome the call of the Eminent Persons Group (EPG) for APEC members to embark 
on a course of sustainable development, without creating new forms of protectionism. We 
would hope the important EPG work of developing a long term vision for APEC would 
address equally relevant environmental and economic considerations.
245
We think APEC’s work on the environment should add value to other environmental 
activities in the region through mutually beneficial work complementary to other 
multilateral institutions and fora.
We believe sound environment and sound economic policies are mutually supportive and 
that preventing environmental degradation is fundamental to sustainable development.
We will work together with our APEC Ministers to promote sustainable development, trade 
and investment in the region, through a vision for APEC that encourages members to 
integrate environmental considerations into their policy making having regard to the 
attached framework of principles for integrating environmental considerations within 
APEC, at all levels.
APEC economies recognize the inter-relationship among poverty, unsustainable patterns of 
production and consumption, population growth, natural resource depletion and 
environmental degradation, and the potential for regional approaches in addressing global 
environmental problems. We encourage an enhanced dialogue focused on opportunities for 
regional co-operation in priority areas such as environmental technologies, environmental 
education and information, policy tools, and sustainable cities as well as earth observation 
and global changes research.
We urge each APEC economy to broaden consultations on sustainable development issues 
to provide multi-sectoral input into their policy development process. We encourage the 
private sector to observe their role and obligations in achieving sustainable development. 
We also encourage APEC senior officials (SOM) to develop ideas for multi-sectoral 
exchanges at the regional level, including the possible exploration of an Asia Pacific Round 
Table on the Environment and the Economy, and we encourage APEC economies to 
develop their own mechanisms for contacts with the private sector and major groups.
We call on APEC senior officials to build on the environment work already underway in 
APEC working groups to develop a strategic approach, based on sustainable development 
principles, environment considerations to be fully integrated into the program of each 
APEC working group and policy committee.
We are committed to develop policies that are sound economically and environmentally. 
We agree that sustainable development depends upon successful implementation of policies 
and programs that integrate economic, environment and social objectives. We believe that 
APEC should take the lead in achieving sustainable development.
APEC Ministers Responsible for the Environment
Vancouver, Canada 
March 25, 1994.
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Appendix C
Framework of Principles for Integrating Economy and Environment 
in APEC
Preamble
The challenge of sustainable development requires integration of economy and 
environment in all sectors and at all levels.
The experience of APEC members is that a market economy can be a very efficient and 
flexible means of allocating resources to meet individual preferences. Competitive 
market economies make for a dynamic and innovative society.
But the market will not necessarily deliver other objectives that society may have, such 
as meeting the basic needs of all citizens, environmental quality, an access to resources 
for future generations.
In seeking to reconcile the objectives of economic growth and efficiency with improved 
environmental outcomes, the following principles could be taken into consideration by 
member economies to achieve sustainable development.
Principle: Sustainable Development
Member economies should promote sustainable development and a higher quality of life 
for all people. All the possible measures should be seriously considered to bring about a 
society where “...environmental protection shall constitute an integral part of the 
development process and cannot be considered isolation from it” (from Principle 4, Rio 
Declaration on Environment and Development).
Member economies should promote the complementary principles of reduction of 
poverty and improvement of the environment, consistent with Principle 5 of the Rio 
Declaration.
Principle: Internalization
Members should “endeavor to promote the internalization of environmental costs and 
the use of economic instruments, taking into account the approach that polluter should, 
in principle, bear the cost of pollution, with due regard to the public interest and without 
distorting international trade and investment” (from Principle 16, Rio Declaration).
Principle: Science and Research
Scientific research should be fostered to increase the community’s understanding of 
ecological system, and their interactions with the economy, employment, and human 
communities.
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Principle: Technology Transfer
Member economies should cooperate to strengthen capacity-building for sustainable 
development through exchanges of scientific and technical knowledge. They should 
enhance the development and transfer of technologies, including new and innovative 
technologies, consistent with Chapter 34 of Agenda 21.
Principle: The Precautionary Approach
Member economies should, according to their capabilities, widely apply the 
precautionary approach in accordance with Principle 15 of the Rio Declaration: 
“...Where there are threats of serious or irreversible damage , lack of full scientific 
certainty shall not be used as a reason for postponing cost-effective measure to prevent 
environmental degradation”.
Principle: Trade and the Environment
Member economies should support multilateral efforts to make trade and environment 
policies mutually supportive, consistent with Principle 12 and other relevant principles 
of the Rio Declaration.
Principle: Environmental Education and Information
Member economies, industry, consumer groups, and environmental groups should 
provide to all citizens information and educational opportunities that will enhance 
informed choices that affect the environment.
Principle: Financing for Sustainable Development
Member economies should cooperate to meet the goal of mobilizing financial resources 
for sustainable development, including the exploration of innovative approaches to fund 
raising schemes and mechanisms, taking into account conditions and priorities of APEC 
members.
Principle: Role of APEC
APEC members should, in promoting regional cooperation, make the best use of 
existing multilateral and bilateral fora, and activities of APEC to attain sustainable 
development. These fora and activities have contributed to the implementation of 
Agenda 21 in the fields of environmental priority setting, accumulation of scientific 
knowledge, and enhancement of capacity building. APEC member should seek 
appropriate ways and means by which APEC can add concrete value to these ongoing 
activities, avoiding duplication of functions.
Meeting of APEC ministers responsible for the environment should be held on an ad 
hoc basis as the necessity arises.
APEC members should consider ways to better incorporate sustainable development 
into the work of APEC Working Groups and Committees, where relevant, including 
consideration of these issues at the levels of Senior Officials Meetings and APEC 
Ministerial Meetings.
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APEC members should achieve the integration of economy and environment 
considerations through conscious efforts to incorporate environmental concerns into 
decision making for sustainable development at all levels.
APEC Ministers Responsible for the Environment
Vancouver, Canada 
March 25, 1994
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Appendix D
Selected  G o v ern in g  L aw s o f T R E M s in A P E C  M e m b e r E conom ies
Member Economy Governing Law of TREMs
Australia • Motor Vehicles Standards Act 1989
• Environment Protection (Sea Dumping) Act 1982
• Quarantine Act 1908
• Fisheries Act 1905
• Ozone Protection Act 1989
• Ozone Protection Amendment Act 1995
• Hazardous Waste (Regulation o f  Exports and Imports) 
Act 1989
• Wildlife Protection (Regulation o f  Exports and Imports) 
Act 1982
Brunei • Vehicle Emission Standards
• Petroleum Mining Act
• Water Supply Act
• Fisheries Enactment & Fisheries Regulation
• Forest Enactment & Forest Rules
• Forest Act 1934
Canada • Benzene in Gasoline Regulations (SOR/97-493)(CEPA)
• Fuels Information Regulations, No. l(C.R.C.,c.407) 
(CEPA)
• Motor Vehicle Safety Regulations (C.R.C., c. 1038) 
(Motor Vehicle Safety Act)
• New Substances Notification Regulations (SOR/94-260) 
(CEPA)
• Energy Efficiency Regulations (SOR/94-65 l)(Energy 
Efficiency Act)
• Ozone-depleting Substances Regulation (SOR/95-576)
• Ozone-depleting Substances Products Regulation 
(SOR/95-584)
• Export and Import o f  Hazardous Wastes Regulation 
1992 (SOR/92-637)
• Wild Animal and Plant Trade Regulations (SOR/96- 
263)
• Export of  Logs Permit (C.R.C., c. 612)(Export and 
Import Permits Act)
• Fish Health Protection Regulations (C.R.C., c. 
812)(Fisheries Act)
Chile • Emission Related to the Discharge o f  Liquid Industrial 
Wastes into Sewers
• Emission Related to the Discharge o f  Liquid Industrial 
Wastes into Surface Water
• Maximum Permissible Levels o f  Annoying Noise 
Generated by Fixed Sources
China • Environmental Protection Law o f  PRC
• Marine Environment Protection Law
• Law on the Prevention and Control o f  Water Pollution 
of  PRC
• Law on the Prevention and Control o f  Air Pollution of 
PRC
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Law on the Prevention and Control o f Noise Pollution 
of PRC
Law on the Prevention and Control o f Environmental 
Pollution by Solid Wastes of PRC 
Law on Preventing Environment Pollution by Solid 
Wastes 1995
Provisional Regulations on Environmental Protection 
Management of Waste Imports 1996 
Wildlife Protection Law 1988
Regulations on the Protection o f Land-born Wild 
Animal 1992
Circulation from the State Council on Prohibiting the 
Trade of Rhinoceros Horn and Tiger Bone 1993 
Regulations on the Protection of Wild Aquatic Animals 
1993
Foreign Trade law of PRC
Interim Rules for the Import of Electromechanical 
Products
Interim Rules of Limitation for the Import o f Ordinary 
Goods
Hong Kong Air Pollution Control (Motor Vehicles Fuel) Regulation 
Noise Control (Air Compressors) Regulations (Cap. 
400)
Noise Control (Hand Held Percussive Breakers) 
Regulation (Cap. 400)
Air Pollution Control (Motor Vehicle Design
Standards)(Emission) Regulation
Ozone Layer Protection Ordinance (Cap. 403)
Ozone Layer Protection (Products Containing 
Scheduled Substances)(Import Banning) Regulation 
Waste Disposal Ordinance (Cap. 354)
Animals and Plants (Protection of Endangered Species) 
Ordinance (Cap. 187)
Air Pollution Control Ordinance (Cap. 311)___________
Indonesia Environmental Management Law 
Technical Guidelines for the Reporting of Containment 
o f Impacts on Living Environment in the Industrial 
Sector (Ministry of 
250/M/SK/10/1994)
Minister of Industry
137/MPP/Kep./6/1996 
Minister of Industry
11 l/MPP/Kep/1/1998 
Minister of Industry
110/MPP/Kep./1998
Minister of Trade Decree No. 99/kp/IV/1992 
Minister of Trade Decree No. 349/kp/XI/1992 
Minster of Trade Decree No. 94/kp/V/1995
Industry Decree No.
and Trade Decree No.
and Trade Decree No.
and Trade Decree No.
Japan Chemical Substances Control Law
Law concerning the Disposal and Cleaning of Wastes
(Law No. 137 of 1970)
Law for the Conservation of Endangered Species of 
Wild Fauna and Flora 1992
Law concerning the Protection o f the Ozone Layer 1998 
Law for Control o f Export, Import and Others of 
Specified Hazardous Wastes and Other Wastes 1992
Korea Air Quality Preservation Act 
Water Quality Preservation Act 
Noise and Vibration Control Act
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• Act Relating to Treatment of Sewage, High Soil, and 
Livestock Wastewater
• Noxious Chemical Substance Control Act 1990
• Drinking Waste Management
• Act Relating to Transboundary Movements of Wastes 
and Their Disposal 1992
• Act of control on the production, etc. o f specified 
substances for the protection of the Ozone Layer 1991
Malaysia • Environmental Quality (Clean Air) Regulations 1978
• Environmental Quality (Prohibition on the use of 
Controlled Substance in Soap, Synthetic Detergent and 
Other Cleaning Agents) Order 1995
• Motor Vehicles (Control of Smoke and Gas Emission) 
Rules 1977
• Environmental Quality (Control o f Lead Concentration 
in Motor Gasoline) Regulations 1985
• Environmental Quality (Motor Vehicle Noise) 
Regulations 1987
• Wildlife Protection Act No. 76, 1972
• Customs (Prohibition of Imports) Order 1988
• Customs (Prohibition of Exports)(Amendment)(No. 2) 
Order 1993
• Customs (Prohibition of Imports)(Amendment)(No. 3) 
Order 1993
Mexico • Project NOM-020-SCT2-1995
• Project NOM-105-ECOL-1000
• NOM-006-FITO-1995
• NOM-097-ECOL-1995
• NOM-097-ECOL-1995
• Declaration of Basel Convention on the Control of 
Cross-boundary Transportation of Hazardous Wastes 
and the Treatment of Hazardous Wastes
New Zealand • Transport Act 1962
• Import Control (Hazardous Waste) Conditional 
Prohibition Order 1994
• Ozone Layer Protection Act 1996
• Trade in Endangered Species Act 1989
• Customs Export Prohibition Order 1996
• Customs Import Prohibition (whales and whale 
products) Order 1975
• Smoke Free Environments Act 1990
• Customs Export Prohibition Order 1996
• Marine Mammals Protection Act 1978
Papua New Guinea • Environment Contaminants Act 1978
• International Trade (Fauna and Flora) Act 1979
• Crocodile (Trade & Protection) Act 1982
Philippines • Presidential Decree 984: Pollution Control Law
• National Air and Water Act
• Toxic Substances and Hazardous and Nuclear Wastes 
Control Act of 1990 (Republic Act No. 6969)
• Pre-Manufacturing and Pre-Importation Notification 
(PMPIN)
Singapore • The Clean Air Act and Regulations
• The Sale of Food Act and the Food Regulations
Taiwan • The Management Code of the Permissible Vehicle 
Energy Exhaustion Standards
• Toxic Chemical Control Act
• Motor Vehicle Noise Control Regulation
• Regulations Governing the Application of Petroleum
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Coke Import Permits
• Regulations Governing the Import Permits Application 
of Used Diesel Generators and Air Compressor
• Management Regulations on the Imports, Exports and 
Transshipment of Hazardous Waste 1993
Thailand • Enhancement and Conservation National Environmental 
Quality Act B.E. 2535
• The Ministry o f Commerce Notification Regarding 
Imports (No. 120) B.E. 2540
• The Wild Animal Reservation and Protection Act 1960
• Hazardous Substances Act B.E. 2535
• The Ministry o f Commerce Notification Regarding 
Imports: Import prohibition (No. 99) B.E. 2536
• Non-automatic licensing (No. 34) B.E. 2508; (No. 107) 
B.E. 2538; (No. 91) B.E. 2521; (No. 50) B.E. 2512; 
(No. 66) B.E. 2515; (No. 88) B.E. 2512; (No. 85) B.E. 
2534
USA • The Clean Air Act
• The Clean Air Act, 1990 Amendment
• 1974 Safe Drinking Water Act
• Air Quality Preservation Act
• The Endangered Species Act 1973
• Solid Waste Disposal Act 1965
• Marine Mammal Protection Act 1972, 16 U.S.C. § 
1361 -1421 h
• Pelly Amendment to the Fisherman Protective Act of 
1967, 22 U.S.C. § 1978
• Conservation of Sea Turtles, 16 U.S.C. § 1537note
• Lacey Act Amendments of 1981, 16 U.S.C. § 3371- 
3378
Source: APEC Economic Committee, Survey on Trade-Related Environmental
Measures and Environment-Related Trade Measures in APEC, (Singapore: APEC 
Secretariat, 1999).
Note: This table is a compilation of some selected laws which allow use of TREMs 
either unilaterally or in pursuant to MEAs.
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Appendix E
Details of the APEC Mediation Process
From the mediator’s perspective, there are three stages of the mediation process: (1) 
information gathering; (2) probing or analyzing strengths and weaknesses of each 
party’s contentions; and (3) strategizing and negotiating. The mediator’s role is set forth 
in the following description of the proposed mediation process.
Sine the APEC Dispute Mediation Service (DMS) would be an entirely 
voluntary and nonbinding procedure, and would be a supplement to the WTO dispute 
settlement mechanism , APEC members submitting their disputes to the DMS must be 
willing participants with a belief that it can help lead to an agreement. The DMS would 
convene a mediation session promptly after the mutual request of the parties to the DMS 
administrator. The location would be agreed upon by the parties, with a default location 
being the site of the APEC Secretariat in Singapore. Expenses for the mediation would 
be born equally by the parties, subject to a settlement which otherwise allocates such 
expenses. Expenses for third parties wishing to participate in the mediation process 
would be borne by themselves and not by the principals to the dispute.
The mediation process should begin with a joint session attended by all 
interested parties (we assume hereinafter that there are two parties to the dispute), 
including third party states who may be materially affected by the outcome of the 
settlement. At this meeting, the mediator first explains the format of the session and 
discusses the nature of the procedures. The parties are informed that the mediator’s 
function is to assist them in finding common points upon which to base a settlement, 
and that the mediator will not be judging them or directing them to take any particular 
action.
After these introductory remarks, the mediator will ask each party to make a 
brief presentation of its case to put the major issues on the table and identify areas of 
dispute. At this time, third parties will also make presentations to clarify their interest in 
the dispute. The presentations should provide each party with a clear outline of the 
issues which are regarded as being important by the other party, and they should also 
provide the mediator with a broad overview of the case.
Once the parties complete their presentations, the mediator shifts the mediation 
to the private caucus sessions and the parties move to separate locales. The mediator 
meets privately with each party, at which time he informs them that these private 
sessions are confidential and that nothing will be disclosed to other party without the 
express consent of that party. If additional information is required by one party after the 
closing of the joint session, then the mediator must request such information from the 
other party since there will not be another joint session.
During the private caucus session, the mediator should ask each side to analyze 
the respective strengths and weaknesses of its own case, and the projected outcome, 
given the information it received during presentations in the joint session. At the close
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of each caucus, the mediator and the party should discuss what specific information may 
be disclosed to the other party and identify what information should remain confidential.
From this point on, the mediator moves back and forth between the parties, 
listening to their points and relaying information and arguments for the other party. 
After the parties agree with the mediator that all of their points have been effectively 
communicated to the other party, the mediator may privately ask each party for its 
“bottom line” or least acceptable solution. It is then largely up to the sill of the mediator 
to move each party towards a mutually acceptable settlement.
Once a settlement is reached, the mediator should ensure that it is captured in 
written form. The final language should be prepared and signed at the time of the 
mediation.
We propose that a list of DMS mediators be maintained by the APEC 
Secretariat. From that list, one to three mediators would be selected upon agreement of 
the parties to the dispute to guide the parties through the mediation process. Such 
selection would be completed within ten days after a request for mediation, subject to 
passage of a 30-day period of direct prior consultations between the parties to the 
dispute.
The qualifications of DMS mediators should be similar to those of WTO 
panelists. The list could include individuals who have previously served as a 
representative of a member of APEC, taught or published on international law or policy, 
served as a senior trade policy official of a member of APEC, or come from the 
business/private sector. DMS mediators should be selected to ensure their independence 
of judgment from any APEC government, their diverse background, and a wide 
spectrum of experience.
Potential DMS mediators from member economies whose governments are 
parties to a dispute shall not serve as a mediator to that dispute unless the parties to that 
dispute agree otherwise. Neither shall mediators serve who are from economies that are 
members of the same SRTA [Subregional Trade Arrangement] as a party to the dispute. 
DMS mediator shall serve in their individual capacities and not as representatives of 
governments nor of any other organization. APEC member economies will not seek to 
influence the mediators.
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